

ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND BACTRIA

The Formation of a Greek Frontier in Central Asia

BY

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2nd impression 1989



E.J. BRILL
LEIDEN • NEW YORK • KØBENHAVN • KÖLN
1989

For Linda and Laura

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Holt, Frank Lee.
Alexander the Great and Bactria.

(Mnemosyne bibliotheca classica Batava.
Supplementum, ISSN 0169-8958 ; 104)

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. Bactria—History. 2. Alexander, the
Great, 356-323 B.C. 3. Asia, Central—History.
4. Hellenism. I. Title. II. Series.
DS374.B28H65 1988 939'.6 88-2627
ISBN 90-04-08612-9 (pbk.)

ISSN 0169-8958

ISBN 90 04 08612 9

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS BY E. J. BRILL

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PREFACE

More than eighteen centuries ago, an historian complained about the profusion of books published on the controversial subject of Alexander the Great, and so I hesitate to add another. But in defense I may say that this one is not a biography of that incredible king; it is rather a book about Bactria and Sogdiana, a Persian province in Central Asia which Alexander invaded and colonized. I have tried to see this important area as it was before Alexander arrived, and as it became during and immediately after his 'conquest'. Thus, the pages here present a story in which Alexander played an important part, but which long preceded and later outlasted Alexander's own short life.

On one final point the defense rests. When Arrian the historian complained about the number of controversial Alexander books in his day, he was doing so in the preface of his *own* biography of the Macedonian king. He insisted—as all academics do—that another work was necessary to set the subject straight. My claim is not nearly so bold, either for Alexander or Bactrian studies. Yet, I believe that this book finds its justification—at least, in part—in the complaint of an Alexander historian much more modern than Arrian. In an article just published in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (1986), Professor A. B. Bosworth points out (p. 1) that in studies of Alexander's career in Central Asia, "There is no attempt to view the campaign from the Sogdian side." Bosworth has tried to meet this need in some of his articles, and I have done what I could in this book. In the twentieth century A.D. no less than the second, Arrian is right: the reader must judge the results.

To whatever extent this book proves itself a worthy addition to the field, I have the privilege of acknowledging the assistance and encouragement of family, friends, and colleagues. My research began as a Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Virginia, and in that work I have thanked my patient mentors. As a book, this research could not have reached fruition without the guidance and good humor of one man in particular—Professor Stanley M. Burstein of California State University, Los Angeles. I extend to him my deepest thanks for advice and inspiration.

I have had the opportunity in other publications to express my gratitude to colleagues and friends for their many kindnesses. Their labors around the world have greatly enriched mine, and I thank them all again. I would like to add to their number E. J. Brill (especially Classics Editor Tullian G. Naeth) for assistance in publishing this book.

and the University of Houston's Office of Sponsored Programs for grants to pursue my research abroad.

Most importantly, I thank my wife and daughter for seeing this great family project through to the end. Both have typed, read, and talked about the manuscript more times than humanity should allow. No others could have—or would have—done so much for me. This book, therefore, is dedicated to them.

June, 1987
Houston, Texas

Frank L. Holt

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

On Bactria

History has a habit of writing out the great deeds of humankind with one swift hand while erasing them with another. Back and forth across its well-worn slate, the chronicles of empires and armies come and go with barely a trace of the old beneath the new. In Afghanistan, for example, a new narrative of war is now being written upon a landscape where countless other such stories have been inscribed and then erased by history's trailing hand. The wreckage of modern war is thus freshly written, but little remains of the destructions wrought by earlier invaders such as Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, and Alexander the Great. And of other kings and conquerors we know even less. Over two thousand years ago, when today's Afghanistan was the heartland of a kingdom called Bactria, it was ruled by an extraordinary line of some three dozen kings and queens. History has erased them all too well, so that only the deeds of a handful have survived. The rest we know only through numismatics, the study of coins still saved in the greedy fist of history's effacing hand.

Thus, for example, if not for the coins struck in his name somewhere in Central Asia sometime in the second quarter of the second century B.C., we would know nothing at all about King Agathocles 'The Just' of Bactria. None of his decrees has ever been found; no city or monument bearing his name has yet been brought to light. Whatever accounts were written of his reign by ancient authors have long since disappeared. And yet, this monarch and his money represent far more than a phantom image of a forgotten past; they are part of a remarkable episode of central importance to the histories of several civilizations.

This King Agathocles, after all, was a man of two worlds, a scion of east and west. His scattered coinage has been found on both sides of the Hindu Kush; yet, much of it seems to be as thoroughly Mediterranean as his name.¹ He issued beautiful Greek silver coins on the Attic standard

¹ Agathocles' coins first aroused interest in the 1830's, when several specimens reached Paris from St. Petersburg. On these early discoveries and debates about them, consult H. H. Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua* (1841; reprint, Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1971), pp. 294-300. For the coinage of Agathocles in general, consult the following catalogues: A. N. Lahiri, *Corpus of Indo-Greek Coins* (Calcutta: Poddar Publications, 1965), pp. 74-78; and M. Mitchiner, *Indo-Greek and Indo-Scythian Coinage*, vol. 1: *The Early Indo-Greeks and*

with his skilfully carved portrait on one side, and a standing Zeus holding Hecate on the other. On smaller denominations struck in bronze or nickel, Agathocles chose Dionysos and the panther as his types.² The inscriptions they bore are naturally Greek: BASILEOS AGATHOKLEOVS ['belonging to King Agathocles'], with the epithet DIKAIOS ['The Just'] added to his later issues. These coins suggest that Agathocles, though ruling a kingdom in Central Asia, was certainly a Greek who governed subjects of Hellenic culture.

But on the other hand, Agathocles issued the coins of a very different world. He struck bronze and silver coins of Oriental type that were square or rectangular in shape, and which portrayed the gods of India rather than Greece. These deities have been variously identified as Vishnu, Shiva, Vasudeva, Buddha, and Balarama.³ With Greek retained on some bilingual issues, these coins of Indian type were generally inscribed in either Brahmi or Kharoshthi (derived from Aramaic) script.⁴ This is the money of 'Rajane Agathuklayasa', a monarch whose subjects required a native currency in the local scripts of North-West India.

Agathocles/Agathuklayasa was indeed a man of two worlds, a Bactrian king of the borderlands between Greek and Indian culture. An additional Persian influence upon his realm is evident in the Aramaic origins of Kharoshthi lettering, while neighboring China and Scythia certainly contributed to the complex mix of civilizations in his ancient homeland. The kingdom of Agathocles is thus a subject of interest to scholars in many fields. Classicists, for example, may easily recognize Bactria's significance as the easternmost edge of Greek civilization, the historical horizon of the Hellenistic world. Land-locked in surroundings so unlike those of their Mediterranean heritage, the Bactrian Greeks demonstrated the full measure of their culture's adaptability to an alien environment.

² A new bronze type now in the American Numismatic Society collection seems to have the head of Herakles and an unidentified standing goddess instead of the usual Dionysos/panther. Hyla Troxell, "Greek Accessions: Asia Minor to India," *ANSMN* 22(1977): 25-27.

³ In addition to the general references in note 1 above, special attention should be drawn to the new Indian-style Agathocles coins excavated at Ai Khanum: R. Audouin and P. Bernard, "Trésor de monnaies indiennes et indo-grecques d'Ai Khanum (Afghanistan) II: Les monnaies indo-grecques," *RN* 16(1974): 6-41; A. K. Narain, "The Two Hindu Divinities on the Coins of Agathocles from Ai-Khanum," *JNSI* 35(1973): 73-77; and K. Chaudhary, "Dionysos of Indo-Greek Coins—A Study," *JNSI* 45(1983): 119-133.

⁴ The Brahmi inscription is, like its Greek counterpart, in the genitive case; it may be transliterated "Rajane Agathuklayasa", and will be so written without regard to its use as genitive or nominative in my English text. The Kharoshthi script (unlike the Brahmi) reads from right to left. These two read 'harkwante' the inscription sa-wa-kr-ta-

In fact, nothing so broadened the bounds of Greek history and culture beyond the proverbial 'frog-pond' of Plato as the Bactria of Agathocles.

Yet, from a vantage point among the mountains of Afghanistan rather than the monuments of the Acropolis, it is clear that Bactria was not simply the most remote of all Greek states; it was also an irrepressible center of Central Asian cultures never wholly subdued by the invasions of Iranians, Greeks, Indians, and others. Greek 'conquerors' and colonists were never alone nor omnipotent in Bactria, and the success of their stay required the accommodation of non-Greeks no less numerous or civilized than they. The coins of Agathocles/Agathuklayasa provide eloquent testimony to this hybrid nature of Bactria's history.

In spite of this clear message on his money, the two worlds of King Agathocles/Agathuklayasa have not always been treated with an even hand by modern historians. Even in the two great books that have become the standard guides to the subject, the approaches have not been balanced between the Greek and Asian sides. Sir W. W. Tarn's *The Greeks in Bactria and India* and A. K. Narain's *The Indo-Greeks* are both admirable, indeed landmark, attempts to set forth the history of Bactria and India on the basis of numismatics and other sources.⁵ Yet, Tarn writes (as it were) the history of 'Basileos Agathokleous' while Narain prefers the point of view of 'Rajane Agathuklayasa'.

It would be unfair, of course, to criticize either scholar for being a product of his times and training. Tarn wrote as a Hellenist, and reacted to the scholarship of his day which treated Bactria as part of India's history.⁶ He wanted to set the subject "in its right place as a lost chapter of Hellenistic history", admitting that he could not do so "impersonally" or with the necessary training in eastern studies:

But it is time that somebody with some knowledge of the Hellenistic world tried to get the more important Greek side into order, for one sees how often the Orientalist is hampered by not knowing what there is; and it is no use waiting for a scholar who shall have a proper critical knowledge of both sides, or rather of all sides, for he has not yet been born.⁷

Tarn's insistence that the "Greek side" was the more important is certainly ethnocentric for Bactrian history as a whole, but his position is

⁵ Tarn, *GBI*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Aris Press, 1985); this volume includes my introduction and bibliographic update to the earlier editions of 1938 and 1951 published by Cambridge University Press. Narain, *IG* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957); a new edition is eagerly anticipated.

⁶ In the preface to his first edition of *GBI* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), Tarn mentions the work of MacDonald and Rapson in Volume I of *The Cambridge History of India*; this was the standard treatment of ancient Bactria before the appearance of Tarn's book.

nevertheless understandable; he was anxious to establish the subject as an integral part of Hellenistic history.⁸

For a time, Tarn was successful—so much so that it became necessary for Narain to wrestle the giant in order to restore the subject to Indian history. His prose hammers home the return of an eastern perspective:

The constitution of the Greco-Bactrian and Indo-Greek kingdoms was not the same as that of the Hellenistic states... Bactria was not a 'fifth Hellenistic state'... Their history is part of the history of India and not of the Hellenistic states; they came, they saw, but India conquered.⁹

Thus, at a time when Tarn's views held full sway, Narain was himself forced to become ethnocentric. He over-emphasized again the Indian perspective in order to overcome, in its turn, the Hellenistic. But regardless of well-meant motives, the rival claims of Tarn and Narain have not served the subject well. They have created a moot-court as to which culture, Greek or Indian, was the more important in Bactria's history. Readers have been asked to judge, as if by a toss of the coins, between Agathocles on one side and Agathuklayasa on the other.

The inability to recognize both sides as part of a single coin remains a major stumbling block in modern Bactrian studies. That Bactria was, for a time, a true Hellenistic state is absolutely undeniable. Similarly, the increasing (and eventually overwhelming) influence of Indian culture cannot be ignored. Surely Bactria, and such kings as Agathocles/Agathuklayasa, belong to the history of both the Hellenistic and Indian worlds. Even if it were possible to blend the old accounts of Tarn and Narain into a single, balanced narrative, the result would now be seriously flawed.¹⁰ Through no fault of these pioneering scholars, their books have long since been outdated. More than a quarter-century has passed since *The Indo-Greeks* was published, and nearly a half-century since the appearance of the first edition of *The Greeks in Bactria and India*. A great deal of new evidence has since come to light, largely as the result of

⁸ For early Bactrian history (late fourth—early second century B.C.), Tarn is correct to emphasize Hellenistic culture. Recent archaeological discoveries have fully vindicated his view. Only after the Indian campaigns of Demetrius I is it possible to speak of 'Indo-Greeks'. On this point see my remarks in the introduction to Tarn, *GBI*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Aris Press, 1985), pp. iii-v; this material was reprinted in a special issue of *The Ancient World*: Holt, "Discovering the Lost History of Ancient Afghanistan—Hellenistic Bactria in Light of Recent Archaeological and Historical Research," *AmW* 9(1984): 3-11.

⁹ Narain, *JG*, p. 11.

¹⁰ This was tried unsuccessfully years ago by George Woodcock in *The Greeks in India* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), a work expanded from his article "The Indian Greeks," *History Today* 12 (1962): 558-567. An independent attempt, well-written and

archaeological explorations in Afghanistan, Soviet Central Asia, Pakistan, and India. Added to the older coin evidence, the new material has clearly demonstrated the active cross-currents of eastern and western cultures in ways that Tarn and Narain could scarcely imagine.¹¹ At Khandahar, for example, the edicts of Asoka have been discovered in several languages: Prakrit, Aramaic, and Greek. At Ai Khanoum, a marvelous Hellenistic city has been unearthed which provides at once a clear picture of Greek and Oriental features side by side. At Takhti-Sangin, a temple's treasures have offered a wealth of fresh information on the religious syncretism of Greeks, Bactrians, Sogdians, and their neighbors in Central Asia. Taken together, this kind of evidence far exceeds the few coins and other clues available to Tarn and Narain at an earlier stage of Bactrian studies.¹²

These new discoveries are especially important because there are no extensive narrative accounts of ancient Bactria upon which to base our histories. Such sources perished long ago, with the exception of a few literary fragments.¹³ As is typical of the Hellenistic period, the relative dearth of narrative sources forces us to rely quite heavily upon the kinds of durable data: art works, inscriptions, coin hoards, and excavated materials and monuments of the types now available in Central Asia. The problem, as always, is to weigh this evidence wisely, to integrate as many kinds of data as possible into our reconstructions of events, and to accept the limitations which still remain in this field of research. Thus, while any new history of Bactria has the advantage of fresh information, it is by no means possible to fill all the gaps or to answer yet certain kinds of questions about the inner workings of the state. King Agathocles, after all, is still known to us only in the numismatic record; nothing else has been found to further our knowledge of his wars, laws, or day-to-day life. Such discoveries, however, cannot be far from us at the present pace of archaeological exploration in Central Asia.

¹¹ Both scholars did express hopes for future discoveries that might yield more conclusive evidence: Tarn *GBI*, p. xxii, and Narain, *JG*, p. x.

¹² An account of these new discoveries in archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, and other areas may be found in my introduction to the third edition of Tarn, *GBI*, pp. vi-xvi, with bibliography (pp. xvii-xli); this material is also available in *AmW* 9(1984): 5-28. For a more recent update, see Holt, "Hellenistic Bactria: Beyond the Mirage," *AmW* 15 (1987): 3-15.

¹³ The major extant literary sources for Bactria's history and geography include the so-called Alexander historians (Arrian, Quintus Curtius, Diodorus Siculus, Justin, and Plutarch), the geographers Strabo and Claudius Ptolemy, the polymath Pliny the Elder, the grammarian Stephanus, and the historians Herodotus, Polybius, and Ammianus Marcellinus.

¹⁴ On Hellenistic sources and source problems, see Frank W. Walbank's recent sum-

In addition to fresh discoveries, the ongoing success of Bactrian studies requires that we employ more evidence in a more balanced approach than was possible for Tarn and Narain. An essential step in this process is first to expand the inquiry beyond the chronological limits set by Tarn and then followed by Narain. Both scholars commenced their political narratives at the same point: the establishment of an independent Bactrian monarchy in the middle of the third century B.C.¹⁵ For books that are basically about the kings of Bactria and India, such a beginning may seem logical enough. But to understand Bactria as a developing state, it is necessary to look deeper into its ancient origins. Scholars must trace back, as far as possible, the historical forces which culminated in a Greco-Bactrian kingdom. The centuries before 250 B.C. or so were clearly of great significance. By beginning their histories of Bactria in *medias res*, Tarn and Narain have ignored this long evolutionary period leading up to the independent monarchy of men like Agathocles/Agathuklayasa. In fact, the tell-tale coins of this Bactrian king have suggested this very point.

In addition to the types already described, the coinage of Agathocles includes a special series of so-called pedigree issues.¹⁶ These coins actually ask—and help to answer—a key question in Bactria's history: under what conditions did earlier generations of Greek colonists and kings first establish themselves in Central Asia as the forerunners of Agathocles/Agathuklayasa? So complex a story, especially in terms of its social and cultural significance, could never be told in its entirety on the tiny surfaces of a few Greek tetradrachms; yet, these 'pedigree' coins point the way to a major improvement in the historical approaches of W. Tarn and A. K. Narain.

King Agathocles' commemorated most of the earlier kings of Bactria, beginning with the ephemeral Pantaleon 'The Savior' of his own family.

¹⁵ Tarn commences his political narrative with Diodorus I, ca. 250 B.C. (*GBI*, p. 72); however, his historical reconstruction does not begin in earnest at that 'early' date, but with the exit of Antiochus' army in 206 B.C. (p. xxi). After his Introduction, Narain begins (*IG*, p. 12) with the 'birth of the new kingdom of Bactria' which was apparently significant only as "an event fraught with momentous consequences for India's immediate future."

¹⁶ F. Hohl, "The So-Called 'Pedigree Coins' of the Bactrian Greeks", pp. 69-91 in W. Heckel and R. Sullivan, eds. *Ancient Coins of the Greco-Roman World. The Nixie Numismatic Papers* (Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1984); see also Paul Bernard, *Fouilles d'Al Khannum IV. Les monnaies hors trésoirs. Questions d'histoire gréco-bactrienne*, MDAFA 28, (Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 1985), pp. 151-152. Contrary to Tarn, *GBI*, pp. 440-451, I contend that no true pedigree of blood-line was the basis for this special issue of coins.

¹⁷ Not 'Rajane Agathuklayasa' here, since these coins were meant to emphasize and commemorate Greek rule in Bactria.

Others stretching back to the earliest period of Greek rule in Bactria are better known to us because their names have survived in ancient literary sources. There is, for example, Demetrius 'The Unconquered' who pushed Bactrian power south across the Hindu Kush shortly before the reign of Agathocles.¹⁸ Commemorated, too, is Euthydemus 'The God', the father of Demetrius and founder of the dynasty. Euthydemus, we know from Polybius the historian, was powerful enough to hold back the armies of Antiochus the Great at the end of the second century B.C.¹⁹ Agathocles also included in his 'pedigree' series the kings Diodotus 'The God' and Diodotus 'The Savior', the two monarchs of an earlier dynasty overthrown by Euthydemus. Historical sources tell us that the Diodotids had seized royal power by breaking away from the Seleucid empire, of which Bactria had been a province.²⁰ This rebellion apparently took place during or soon after the reign of the Seleucid King Antiochus 'The God', who seems to be commemorated in this series as well.²¹

Before Antiochus and his Seleucid ancestors, there was but one other monarch of Greek background who held sway over Bactria. Alexander 'Son of Philip' in the 'pedigree' series is no less a figure than Alexander the Great of Macedonia. His name is last, but certainly not least, in the great line of kings traced back by Agathocles to the very beginning of Greek rule in Bactria. Here, then, is the heart of the matter: the Greco-Macedonian invasion of Bactria nearly a century before the independent monarchy with which the books of Tarn and Narain begin.

On Alexander

By following this extraordinary coin-trail back to the age of Alexander, we are drawn into one of the most disputed eras of ancient history. The enigmatic Alexander towers over this busy season between the breakdown of Hellenic city-states and the buildup of Hellenistic superstates. In fact, no figure in world history has so overshadowed the age into which he was born as this young king of the Macedonians. In his lifetime of less than thirty-three years, he inspired a legend which has now outlasted twenty-three centuries and shows no signs of abating. This legendary Alexander, this man-myth who looms ever larger over history

¹⁸ Strabo 11.11.1, and Justin 41.6.4.

¹⁹ Polybius 10.49 and 11.39.

²⁰ Justin 41.4.5-9.

²¹ For the problems in identifying this Antiochus, see Hohl, "Pedigree Coins", p. 79. In spite of the difficulties, there is a general consensus that Antiochus II of Syria is meant; see Bernard, *Fouilles d'Al Khannum IV*, pp. 151-152.

ancient and modern, presents a special challenge to scholars. How does one eliminate bias or deal with the flimsy tissue of our source tradition? Was the king a darling do-gooder who dreamed of world brotherhood, or a man alienated by power and driven to despotism and destruction? The wide variety of answers, skilfully argued and honestly presented by reputable scholars, illustrates the ongoing (and probably unending) effort to understand Alexander and his age.²²

The ancient history of Bactria is thus bound up with the important, but elusive figure of Alexander the Great during a time of transition to the Hellenistic period.²³ This is not the place, of course, to offer a new biography of the king which might cast some light on Bactria, but rather to study Bactria and perhaps, in the process, clarify some points about Alexander and his legacy. By starting in Central Asia rather than Greece, it might be possible to determine whether a 'titanic' Alexander truly shaped the east to fit his own plans, or whether the king was himself forced into a mold not quite Macedonian. We might avoid preconceptions about Alexander's personality and impact by asking what the king *did* rather than *dreamt*, and what *difference* he made in the lives of the Bactrians and Sogdians. We might be rewarded by asking who won these wars in Central Asia, and what was it like for those left behind after Alexander's early demise? Alexander's age may thus turn out to have been far more complicated than Alexander himself.

²² The vast literature devoted to Alexander and his achievements has been catalogued and critiqued by a number of leading scholars: E. Badian, "Alexander the Great, 1948-67," *CW* 65 (1971): 37-56 and 77-83; E. Badian, "Some Recent Interpretations of Alexander," pp. 279-303 in Badian, ed. *Alexandre le Grand: Image et Réalité* (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1976); J. Seibert, *Alexander der Grosse* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972); P. Goukowsky, "Recherches récentes sur Alexandre le Grand," *REG* 96 (1983): 225-241; R. Andreotti, "Die Weltmonarchie Alexanders des Grossen in Überlieferung und geschichtlicher Wirklichkeit," *Saeculum* 8 (1957): 120-166; R. Andreotti, "Il problema di Alessandro Magno nella storiografia dell'ultimo decennio," *Historia* 1 (1950): 583-600; and N. Burich, *Alexander the Great—A Bibliography* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1970). Books and biographies are, of course, legion and the rate of publication is not likely to decrease. In addition, there are numerous special collections of articles and essays, including W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza, eds. *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage* (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1982), and special issues of the journals *Greece and Rome* (1965) and *The Ancient World* (1981, 1982, 1985, and 1986). An excellent starting point is still E. N. Borza's "An Introduction to Alexander Studies," pp. ix-xxviii of his edited edition of Ulrich Wilcken's 1931 classic *Alexander the Great* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967).

²³ On the Hellenistic age, the major reference in English is now the new second edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 7 (see above, note 14); also useful are M. Grant's *From Alexander to Cleopatra: The Hellenistic World* (New York: Scribners, 1982); F. W. Walbank's *The Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Ehsan Yarshater, ed. *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 3, pts. 1 and 2. *The Seleucid*,

When Alexander and his army conquered and colonized the vast Persian Empire in the closing decades of the fourth century B.C., we know that a fresh and far-reaching civilization was fashioned from the wreckage of war. Stretching from the Adriatic to the Indus, and spanning the three centuries which separated the conquests of Alexander from those of Augustus Caesar (ca. 330-30 B.C.), this new Hellenistic civilization was an immense and complex creation. At Alexandria in Egypt, for example, the Ptolemies created a grand new capital for their populous kingdom of native Egyptians and polyglot newcomers including Greeks, Macedonians, Persians, Jews, and countless other immigrants. A similar smelting-pot was fired in Syria, where the Seleucid rulers established one of their capitals at Antioch on the Orontes. Indeed, all along the Mediterranean seaboard and inland to Mesopotamia and beyond to Bactria, Hellenistic civilization grew out of great cities like these where disparate peoples were thrown together by the career of Alexander.

This new civilization arising from the new settlements of Alexander and his successors was, in the span of centuries, a positive achievement directly linked to the power and personality of the young Macedonian king. And yet, we must wonder whether it was a *deliberate* link arising from a 'dream of world brotherhood'. For W. W. Tarn, there was no question—Alexander hoped for a fusion of races, a unity of mankind, and Hellenistic history fulfilled his wish by way of Bactria.²⁴ Others, too, have taken up the theme of Alexander the humanitarian who brought the gifts of civilization to the barbarians of Central Asia and so planted the harvest of Agathocles.²⁵ Bactria, then, has become hallowed ground for the most glowing assessments of Alexander's life and legacy.²⁶

²⁴ Tarn never treated the problem directly in *GBI*, but as a leading Alexander scholar he had ample opportunity in other publications to tie together the king and Hellenistic Bactria with the slipknot of Alexander's dreams. See, in particular, his *Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), vol. 2, pp. 399-499 (Appendix 25, "Brotherhood and Unity") which ends with the "misty" tale of the Euthydemids in Bactria.

²⁵ See, for example, the conclusion of Tarn's *Alexander the Great*, vol. 1, pp. 145-148, and its echo in the last paragraphs of N. G. L. Hammond's *Alexander the Great: King, Commander, and Statesman* (Park Ridge, N. J.: Noyes Press, 1980), pp. 268-269. Perhaps the most blatant imitation of Tarn's views on Alexander and Bactria may be found in G. A. Robinson, Jr. "The Extraordinary Ideas of Alexander the Great," *AHR* 62 (1956/57): 326-344. Robinson writes (p. 344), "To understand Alexander... we need not go beyond Bactria" and concludes with the 'brotherhood of man' in Euthydemid Bactria.

²⁶ On the historiographical problem which has made Tarn's 'dream of world brotherhood' the nightmare of three generations, see G. A. Koschelenko, *Griechsky Pakt na ellinisticheskoy vostoke [The Greek Polis in the Hellenistic East]* (Moscow: Akademika Nauka, 1979), pp. 23-79; Holt, (works cited in note 8 above); and Ernst Badian, "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind," *Historia* 7 (1958): 425-444, a famous reply to Tarn's Raleigh Lecture of the same title published in *The Proceedings of the British Academy*.

But is the 'brotherhood of man' really the lesson Alexander learned for himself and then left for his settlers in Bactria? Did he establish in peace a new Greek frontier that was the foundation of Hellenistic fusion? Avoiding all preconceptions, the honest answer arising from this study must be a negative one, though this should not be taken to mean that Alexander was inherently evil or indifferent. He was simply, in spite of his own military genius, a prisoner of his own (and of Persia's) past. As the result of his conquests, the king was caught in Bactria between two very hostile traditions, east and west. His efforts to adjust his position and policies were largely futile in Bactria-Sogdiana, and the reactions of those around him—Macedonian, Greek, and Persian—led to bitter warfare and incessant revolt. Only when these first fires had burned themselves out could later generations begin again, between the wars of colonization by Seleucus and his successors, to find peace and prosperity on the Bactrian frontier. It took considerable compromise by natives and newcomers to maintain the Hellenic link traced in the 'pedigree' coins from Alexander to Agathocles. Most of that story must wait for later works, for this one can focus only on the first efforts to form a Greek frontier in Central Asia. It will show that whatever Alexander may have wished, the wedding of east and west was ministered by War, and the first child was Antipathy.

PART TWO

BACTRIA BEFORE ALEXANDER

Land and People

Ancient Bactria¹ and the surrounding regions of Sogdiana, Margiana, Aria, Drangiana, Arachosia, and 'India' lay within the heartland of continental Eurasia in an area which now extends across the disputed borders of six modern nations.² The entire region is part of the vast and varied geological system identified with Central Asia. Although best known for its open steppe, the principal feature of this system is the wide range of mountains descending in a diagonal line from Lake Baykal in the northeast to the Hindu Kush in the southwest.

Historically, this great divide has defined the cultural limits of three very important civilizations: the Chinese, Iranian, and Indian.³ But, like the Alps, this formidable 'barrier' is breached in numerous places and thus allows access along certain routes from one cultural center to the next, as the existence of the famous Silk Road attests.⁴ The central location of ancient Bactria within the larger system of Central Asia explains its special significance as a cultural and commercial crossroads.

The geologic history of the mountains dominating this region has not been fully investigated, but their development is part of the same tectonic process which produced the massive belt beginning in the Pyrenees and stretching by way of the Pamirs to the Himalayas.⁵ From the so-called

¹ 'Bactria' is used in most books to denote the combined region of Bactria-Sogdiana, but I shall endeavor (except where style dictates otherwise) to distinguish between Bactria proper and Sogdiana. While it is true that the Persian satrapy of 'Bactria' included Sogdiana, it is shown below that the two regions often had quite different histories.

² These are Afghanistan, the U.S.S.R., Iran, Pakistan, China, and India. Much of this region appears on the satellite-based map ONC-G6 (1:1,000,000) produced by the Defense Mapping Agency. Since this serves as an aviation chart, attention to topography and elevation is extremely detailed.

³ The legacy of Alexander adds, of course, a fourth: the Graeco-Macedonian. Consult K. De B. Codrington, "A Geographical Introduction to the History of Central Asia," *GJ* 104(1944): 27-40, and 73-91. Although hopelessly out-dated on many historical matters, this essay is an informative geographical guide which offers helpful criticisms of overly-simplified views regarding steppe nomads, 'Scythia', and so forth.

⁴ The long and legendary history of this trade-route has been nicely summarized by Luce Boulnois, *The Silk Road*, trans. Dennis Chamberlain (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1966).

⁵ For details consult the pioneering works of H. H. Hayden, "The Geology of Northern Afghanistan," *Memoirs of the Geological Survey of India* 39(1911): 1-97; Sir T. H. Holdich, "An Orographic Map of Afghanistan and Baluchistan," *GJ* 16(1900): 527-531.

Pamir Knot, a tangle of over one hundred peaks reaching to some 25,000 feet, the Northern Pamirs fan out across Soviet Turkestan while another chain sweeps southwest across Afghanistan. This latter group forms the central spine (Koh-i-Baba) of the Hindu Kush, ranging from 14,000 to 17,000 feet. These ridges gradually give way to the Iranian Plateau as the land levels out into the dry western and southwestern sectors of Afghanistan.⁶ Here the stony 'desert of death' (Dashi-i-Margo) and sandy deserts of Registan lie between Baluchistan and the Seistan basin.

The soaring ranges of the Pamirs and Hindu Kush therefore surround the heartland of ancient Bactria on all sides except the west-north-western. In that direction stretch the deserts of Turkestan through which the Amu Darya (ancient Oxus) River now finds its way across the Russian steppes to the Aral Sea.⁷ As in the south, relatively fertile soils along the rivers become mere rock and sand in some parched areas of arid desert, although this inhospitable environment is relieved by oases and occasional grasslands suitable for pasturage.

The Amu Darya is the largest of four principal river systems in present-day Afghanistan; the others are the Hari Rud, Helmand-Arghandab, and Kabul. All, of course, flow out of the Pamirs and Hindu Kush and experience the same seasonal variations since they share a common source of water from rainfall and melting snows. Although most of this water is lost into the deserts lying beyond the mountains, rivers provide adequate irrigation if carefully controlled. Unfortunately, during the period of maximum flow between February and July, flash-floods still cause considerable property damage and loss of life.⁸ To this list of rivers should be added two others north of modern Afghanistan: the Zeravshan (ancient Polymetus) and Syr Darya (ancient Jaxartes). The former disappears into the desert sands before reaching the Amu Darya, while

the Syr Darya flows parallel to the Amu Darya and likewise empties into the Aral Sea.

These major mountains, rivers, and deserts of Central Asia combine to create conditions ranging from stifling desert wastes to lush semi-tropical valleys, from mountain-bound glaciers to the grazing lands of open steppes. For the most part, the region is arid, with twenty-one centimeters or less of annual precipitation.⁹ The summer season is hot and dry, and though most precipitation falls in the winter, rivers generally reach their peak during spring as a result of melting snow in the mountains.¹⁰ At elevations above 18,000 feet, the mountains are perpetually snowbound, and most are covered from November to March, blocking access across the major passes. Along with other factors, altitude therefore plays an important part in patterns of precipitation and temperature-range within the various geographical zones of Central Asia.¹¹

On the basis of this modern sketch, it is quite easy to appreciate an ancient assessment of this rather unusual area: *Bactrianae terrae multiplex et varia natura est*.¹² Although scant and widely scattered, the literary evidence for the geography of ancient Bactria makes it possible to compare present and past conditions. For the most part this will demonstrate that the land has changed very little in recent millennia, although certain questions must remain about the course and length of various rivers.

The principal ancient sources for the geography of Bactria include Curtius and Arrian among the Alexander historians, Strabo's *Geography*, Pliny's *Natural History*, Claudius Ptolemy's *Geography*, Ammianus Marcellinus' description of Persia, and the *Ethnika* of Stephanus the Byzantine. The most useful of these is certainly Curtius, who provides general descriptions of large regions as well as details of specific places. Curtius' general reliability has been vindicated in recent years as part of the scholarly trend to consider the so-called *Vulgate* more carefully, and the Arrian tradition less exclusively, for the period of Alexander's invasion.¹³ Yet, the amount of material in Curtius is occasionally a matter of

⁹ For data on the extremes of precipitation, see Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 3; Bowly in *Archaeology of Afghanistan*, pp. 12-18; and especially Humlum, *Géographie*, pp. 66-65.

¹⁰ See the descriptions of major rivers below. Although periods of maximum rain- and snow-fall vary, precipitation increases with elevation and thus most moisture takes the form of snow; Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 3-5. This source of water for the main river channels tends to moderate flooding; Humlum, *Géographie*, p. 64. Where torrential rains do fall on the plains, the water generally evaporates with little effect upon vegetation; Bowly in *Archaeology of Afghanistan*, p. 12.

¹¹ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 2-5. Temperature charts for Afghanistan, unfortunately based upon relatively poor records, are available in Humlum, *Géographie*, pp. 55-60.

¹² Curtius 7.4.26.


¹³ The remarks of A. B. Bosworth, comparing Curtius and Arrian, make this point clear: *Commentary*, pp. 24-34 and 372-373 where Curtius is called "only too credible," in his description of the Bactrian desert. Bosworth's preference for the 'vulgate' tradition has been criticized in S. Hornblower's review published in *CR* 31 (1981): 185.

map on p. 596; H. deCizancourt, "Remarque sur la structure de l'Hindou-Kouch," *Bulletin de la Société Géologique de France* 7(1938): 377-400; and Raymond Furon, *L'Hindou-Kouch et la Kaboulisme, Contribution à l'étude géologique et géomorphologique de l'Afghanistan* (Paris: Albert Blanchard, 1927). Short but useful surveys of this subject are contained in Sophia R. Bowly's Chapter I, "The Geographical Background", pp. 9-12 of Alchin and Hammond, eds. *The Archaeology of Afghanistan from the Earliest Times to the Timurid Period* (London: Academic Press, 1978); and J. Humlum, *La Géographie de l'Afghanistan* (Copenhagen, 1959), pp. 22-37.

⁶ Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 1.

⁷ The problem of the ancient course of the Oxus River, a sore point in the Alexander source tradition, has been revived by J. R. Hamilton, "Alexander and the Aral," *CQ* 21(1971): 106-111, and by A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), Vol. I, pp. 373-374. Tarn, *GBI*, Appendices 14 and 15, pp. 488-493, had insisted prematurely that the question was settled.

⁸ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 33; Humlum, *Géographie*, p. 43, n. 4 for severe Badakshan floods.



Map I. Central Asia

quantity over quality, as some apparent internal contradictions will show. Arrian offers less topographical detail, but his material bears merit principally for its descriptions of various rivers.¹⁴ Curtius and Arrian, in

¹⁴ Arrian's chief sources, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, account for this. For example, Ptolemy's special mission into Sogdiana to take custody of Bessus (Arrian 3.29.7-3.30.3) in Curtius, although the latter had just given the marvelous description of the march to

fact, form the basis of Franz von Schwarz's pioneer topographical study of Alexander's Bactrian and Sogdian campaigns.¹⁵

Strabo of Amaseia (ca. 64/3 B.C.-21 A.D.), the earliest extant authority, gathered material unevenly from Apollodorus of Artemita, Eratosthenes, and elsewhere.¹⁶ Generally reliable, Strabo in any given instance is only as sound as his sources, which sometimes seem contradictory. When he cites Apollodorus, a native of Parthia, there is reason to be confident in his geography; unfortunately, this material is meager.

Pliny the Elder (A.D. 23/24-79) included in book six of his *Naturalis Historia* various sketches of far-eastern peoples and places. His list of Greek and Latin sources for this section is quite long and his critical approach is commendable, but there is only enough information for the areas in question to form a composite picture with the aid of other surviving sources.¹⁷ This is even more true of Claudius Ptolemy (*fl.* 127 A.D.-148), whose difficult system of locating sites requires the aid of either additional evidence or complex interpretations.¹⁸

Ammianus Marcellinus (ca. 330-395 A.D.) and Stephanus of Byzantium (early sixth century A.D.?) have left problematical works pertinent to eastern geography.¹⁹ Ammianus, like Curtius, offers some sketches of the Oxus River omitted by Arrian. As for rivers, from Aristobulus comes the report in Arrian 3.29.2-4 of the Oxus itself (*FGH* 139 F 20; Strabo 11.7.3); cf. Bosworth, *Common-law*, pp. 27 and 372-379.

¹⁵ von Schwarz, *Alexanders des Grossen Feldzüge in Turkistan*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Fr. Grub, 1906). Until very recently this work represented the only serious effort to reconstruct the ancient geography of Bactria and Sogdiana (for recent work, see F. Holt's bibliographic surveys in *ArchW* 1984 and 1987; Part One, note 12). The pioneering book by von Schwarz does suffer numerous faults, particularly in its attempts to identify ancient sites on slim or no evidence. There is in the early literature of antiquarians and scholars a pseudo-archaeological "shell-game" whereby one guesses under which mound lies such-and-such city. The result is that any site with no ancient name is matched with some ancient name with no known site. Unfortunately, von Schwarz has done this, but not so badly as some insist, especially D. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 99-100 with notes. Engels is right that "The book is out of date" (p. 100, note 2), but a review below of the excavations and surveys he calls for will show that the "shell game" must continue with mixed results.

¹⁶ See, for example, the survey of geographical sources by P. Goukowsky, *Essai sur les origines du mythe d'Alexandre* (Nancy: Université de Nancy, 1978), Vol. I, pp. 149-165, which traces some of the influences of early geographers upon Strabo and others. See also Jacoby, *FGH* 241 (Eratosthenes) and 779 (Apollodorus).

¹⁷ For Pliny and the east there are helpful remarks to be found in F. F. Schwarz, "Pliny the Elder and Ceylon," *Journal of Asian Studies* 8 (1974): 21-48, especially 31-32 on sources and methods.

¹⁸ See P. Bernard and H.-P. Francfort, *Études de géographie historique sur la plaine d'Al Khawam (Afghanistan)* (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1978), pp. 3-9 and Appendix I: "Les sources de Ptolémée sur l'Asie centrale," pp. 45-58.

¹⁹ For Stephanus see the critical edition of August Meineke, *Stephanus von Byzanz: Ethnika* (Berlin, 1849; repr. Graz: Akademische Druck., 1958). For Ammianus see R. C. Blockley, *Ammianus Marcellinus: A Study of his Historiography and Political Thought* (Brussels: 1977).

various regions such as Bactria and Sogdiana, but the late date creates some doubt about the existence of certain cities during the Hellenistic period. For this reason, earlier sources are to be preferred. Stephanus, on the other hand, was neither an historian nor a geographer. He was, in truth, a grammarian whose *Ethnika* is an alphabetical list of place-names. His sources are many, including Strabo but excluding Ptolemy. Thus, the nature of the work and the fact that only an epitome of the original survives must relegate it last in order of reliability.

The nature of all such ancient sources is to describe places in terms of peoples, so that a region such as Bactria or Sogdiana is no more than the general area inhabited by a particular group of people. Areas relatively uninhabited, such as deserts and mountains, are seldom described in any useful detail. Thus, one learns much about cities, but little about the surrounding countryside. At best, therefore, the ancient accounts are scattered, secondary, and often mere catalogues of peoples or cities. Even so, it is necessary to draw from them as much information as possible in order to understand the physical environment of ancient Bactria, beginning first with the more detailed descriptions offered by Curtius.

Curtius was quoted above on the varied and complex terrain of Bactria. He offers by way of explanation a description of the varied regions found within Bactria.²⁰ In one area, he says, there are productive vineyards and orchards watered by numerous streams. The better part of the land is sewn with grain (*frumento*) while the remainder is utilized for pasturage. In this region, the soil supports a large population of both men and horses, out of which the Bactrians maintain a cavalry force 30,000 strong. The capital Bactra, and the Bactrus River flowing alongside its walls, is situated here beneath Mount Parapanisus.

On the other hand, he adds, a large part of Bactria is sterile desert (*terrae steriles harenae*), uninhabited and subject to violent sandstorms. Sand dunes obstruct the roads and navigation, forcing travellers to follow a course set by the stars during the cool of night. This was the plan of Alexander when he set across this desert in pursuit of Bessus.²¹ The account of this devastating march to the Oxus River across 400 stadia (46 miles) of waterless wasteland is not only explicit, but also quite accurate. Modern travellers have reported the same conditions, including many of the physical ailments suffered by Alexander's men.²² As another exam-

²⁰ Curtius 7.4.2-31.

²¹ Curtius 7.5.1-16. Called here the 'Sogdian desert' although in Bactria; the problem of the Bactrian/Sogdian frontier is addressed below.

²² Engels, *Logistics*, pp. 101-102. On the question of the Oxus crossing see the new study by E. V. Riveladze, 'The Location of the "Greek Crossing" on the Oxus River,' *VDI* (1977): 182-188. Of great interest is the investigation made by Captain Peacocke into the history of the Khawaja Saleh and Kilif ferry crossing (1886 Afghan

ple, French archaeological surveys have described the territory between modern Balkh (Bactra) and Mazar-i-Sharif, two oases a mere fourteen miles apart as:

fort mal famé, le Koral d'Abdu, un éperon terreux, extrêmement érodé, qui barre tout l'horizon.²³

The distinction drawn by Curtius between the two regions of Bactria is evident today between the hill country lying westward of the Chungur Ridge and the great sandy plain reaching from there to the Oxus.²⁴ None of the present rivers or *oueds* (seasonal streams) reaches the Oxus from the hills, since all are gradually drained dry by evaporation and irrigation. The latter increases the fertility of the land tremendously, now as in antiquity, but this shortens the rivers and widens the desert between the cultivated foothills and the Oxus River.


Curtius' geographic description may be corroborated by any one of numerous modern examples. For one, the modern town of Tashkurgan (alternatively known as Khulm or Khoun, between Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz) lies within the fertile fringe of ancient Bactria at an elevation of 1495 feet.²⁵ As the land levels off to some 350 feet in elevation, cultivated fields give way northward to a twenty-five mile stretch of sand and bitter-salt desert ending only at the banks of the Amu Darya (Oxus) River. On the other hand, the region *south* of Tashkurgan abuts the precipitous hills of the Elburz-Koh. Surrounded by desert and mountain, the town of Tashkurgan commands one of the most fertile parts of Afghan Turkestan. In the nineteenth century it hosted a large population, including a cavalry corps. The land was further renowned for its fruit trees and vineyards, its sheep and grazing lands, and its vegetable gardens. The fields were fed by eighteen irrigation canals, which drained away the life-giving water of the Tashkurgan River. Further up the river, on the high plateau, every available plot of ground was planted

Boundary Commission): see Adamec, ed. *Historical and Political Gazetteer of Afghanistan* 4 (Mazar-i-Sharif and North-Central Afghanistan), pp. 343-353.

²³ Foucher, *La Vieille Route de l'Inde de Bactres à Taxila*, MDAFA, vol. 1 (Paris: Les Editions d'Art et d'Histoire, 1942), p. 14. Similar conditions were reported in the trek onward to Kunduz.

²⁴ Adamec, *Gazetteer* 4 (Mazar-i-Sharif and North-Central Afghanistan), pp. 4-6. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 21-26 offers a useful description of the Turkestan Plain. From the foothills to the Oxus the terrain is generally transformed from stony plains (the area of pebbles, sandy clay soil, and loess which can be cultivated with irrigation) to sandy plains (salt pans, loose sand, and shifting dunes). The Oxus floodplain varies in width from 3.2 to 16 kilometers.

²⁵ The following information is derived from government reports and military records collected in Adamec, *Gazetteer* 4 (Mazar-i-Sharif and North-Central Afghanistan), pp. 332-335 and 564-575. For a general treatment of climate and vegetation, consult Hunlum, *Geographic*, pp. 52-70.



Map II. Some major ancient sites

with fruit trees, vineyards, and nut trees. Tashkurghan has long been an important Central Asian emporium frequented by caravans and local merchants. In 1855, for example, on market days (Sundays and Wednesdays) there were offered there some 500 sheep for sale, plus 150 camel-loads of wheat and barley. The ancient account of Curtius, then, can be easily confirmed by a review of recent conditions in northern Afghanistan.

Without mentioning the desolate parts of Bactria, as Curtius does, Ammianus Marcellinus notes in a short passage that this was a fertile region with good grazing lands along the higher plains and in the mountains.²⁶ He praises the quality of Bactrian flocks, including their prover-

bially strong camels.²⁷ Of the many rivers which provided the necessary life-blood of Bactrian agriculture, Ammianus notes that the Aramis and Zariaspes joined, as did the Ochus and Orgomanes, before reaching the Oxus.²⁸ That these did flow all the way across the Turkestan Plain to the Oxus seems to be an accepted fact among most ancient authorities, although Curtius' description of Alexander's march indicates instead a wide desert margin between Bactria and the Oxus.

Several factors may account for these discrepancies. Irrigation, of course, affects the reach of such rivers beyond the cultivated fields, and in modern times the lengths of some rivers have been changed by such projects. It has also been argued that general elevation and specific stream-beds have been altered by seismic activity since antiquity (Strabo 15.1.19 was aware of this problem for the Indus and its tributaries). Too, some of these rivers toward the east may have been identified (or confused) with the Kunduz or Kockba Rivers. Finally, some rivers may have reached the Oxus only for a portion of the year.²⁹ Whatever the reason, the problem of the rivers draining across the Bactrian plain cannot be explained satisfactorily from the evidence of the ancient sources. If Curtius be accepted, Ammianus and others have passed along erroneous data.

Arrian describes the Oxus (modern Amu Darya) River as the largest in Asia; among the rivers traversed by Alexander, he notes that it was exceeded only by the Indus.³⁰ Flowing out of the Caucasus Mountains (Hindu Kush), it was mainly fed by melting snows and its rapid current carried large amounts of silt and sand in a channel six stadia (approx-

²⁷ For domesticated animals (including camels) in the area of Afghanistan, consult Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 47-50. The hearty Bactrian camel is, of course, quite famous. It is worth noting that Ammianus rightly refers to the shaggy coat of the Bactrian camel, as opposed to the one-humped camel of Arabia. On camels and their role in history, see R. W. Bulliet, *The Camel and the Wheel* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1973).

²⁸ Ptolemy 6.11.2-4 also claims that the Dargomanes (Ammianus' Orgomanes) joined the Ochus and both fed the Oxus in the western reaches of Bactria. The Aramis and Zariaspes (the Bactrus) of Curtius and Pliny *NH* 6.18 did likewise toward the east.

²⁹ For changes in elevation, see Cary, *The Geographic Background of Greek and Roman History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 198. In terms of seismic activity, Afghanistan now suffers nearly fifty earthquakes annually: Humlum, *Géographie*, p. 37. Humlum also notes (p. 43) that irrigation shortens a water course so that it disappears in an oasis before reaching its mouth in the Oxus. This is true of the Rud-i-Band-i-Amir (ancient Bactrus River), which may have reached the Oxus during flood season: Adamec, *Gazetteer 4* (Mazar-i-Sharif and North-Central Afghanistan), p. 120. Unfortunately, Alexander probably crossed this wasteland in the high water season, which means he should have followed the Bactrus to Sogdiana. Therefore, a problem still exists in the ancient sources.

³⁰ Arrian 3.29.2-3, excerpted from Aristobulus as shown by Strabo 11.7.3. Bosworth, *Commentary*, pp. 372-373.

²⁶ Ammianus Marcellinus 23.6.56-57.

imately two-thirds of a mile) wide.³¹ Alexander was unable to collect sufficient timber to construct a bridge, but the army crossed in five days using inflated animal hides.³² This description of the river during summer high-water is based upon the eye-witness testimony of Aristobulus and is verified by modern conditions.³³

The Oxus River, like the Jaxartes (modern Syr Darya) River farther north, was one of the most imposing features of the Central Asian landscape. No ancient account of the area could omit it any more than the dominating mountains of the famous Parapamisadae. Thus, these landmarks often served as the conceptual boundaries of Bactria itself. Beyond the mountains lay India; beyond the Oxus, Sogdiana; beyond the Jaxartes, Scythia. The rivers, however, remain the most problematic of such ancient 'borders'. Many scholars, for example, have taken Curtius 7.4.5-6 and 7.4.21 to mean that the Oxus formed an official boundary-line between Bactria and Sogdiana. Such a view is untenable, however, because Curtius at one point (7.5.1) locates Sogdiana south of the Oxus 'line', and more often considers Bactria and Sogdiana a single geographic region (7.7.2; 7.8.21; 7.8.30; and 8.1.19, 35).

Additional evidence only increases this apparent confusion about the Oxus 'border'. Pliny encloses Bactria within the Ochus River, not the Oxus.³⁴ Stephanus placed Alexandria *sub Caucas*, a city south of the Hindu Kush, in Sogdiana.³⁵ Strabo states plainly that the Oxus formed the boundary between the Sogdians and Bactrians, as the Jaxartes delimited Sogdiana from Scythia.³⁶ Yet, he also quotes Eratosthenes as saying that the Arachosians and Massagetae border upon Bactria, and

that these peoples lived along the Oxus itself.³⁷ The relative position of Sogdiana in this sketch is puzzling. Furthermore, Strabo describes Sogdiana as lying above and east of Bactria.³⁸ Since the Oxus flows from the northeast until it is joined by the Kunduz River (Surkhab) at Kolukh Tappeh, it is difficult to locate an area east of Bactria and yet north of the Oxus.

In an apparent attempt to be precise, Strabo places the 'Rock of Ariamazes' in Sogdiana, but the 'Rock of Sisimithres' within Bactria.³⁹ The Sogdian crag is called 'rou Oxou', and its description is compatible with that found in Curtius.⁴⁰ Thus it lay somewhere near the Oxus River, but clearly in Sogdiana. That of Sisimithres, however, was situated in the region of Nauia according to Curtius 8.2.19, and Arrian 3.28.9 locates this across the Oxus in Sogdiana. Whatever the distinction being drawn between Bactria and Sogdiana, Strabo's geography leaves one mystified over one's maps: he seems no clearer than Curtius. There is, then, an occasional hint that no absolute border upon which all sources could agree ever existed between these regions.

To call the Oxus a border between Bactria and Sogdiana requires a dogmatic view not evident in antiquity.⁴¹ Geographically, as one might expect, the area of Sogdiana was not too much different from that of Bactria as a whole. Again, there are two short descriptions extant. Curtius claims that most of Sogdiana was an uninhabited wasteland some 800 stadia wide (about 92 miles); through this vast desert flowed a single stream, the Polyimetus (modern Zeravshan) River.⁴² Although Curtius

³¹ Compare Curtius 7.10.13 and Polybius 10.48.1-8. Polybius' description of the Oxus is one of the earliest, but its context is not entirely clear and the source has not been identified. See Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957-1979), vol. 2, pp. 261-264.

³² Arrian 3.29.4; Curtius 7.5.17 and 7.7.16. Sheepskin floats (Mashk) are still used to ferry men and livestock across the Oxus and other rivers in Asia and India.

³³ Bosworth, *Commentary*, pp. 372-4 has collected modern measurements for the depth, breadth, and current of the Amu Darya. Compare Humlum, *Geographie*, p. 45. For a compendium of eyewitness descriptions made since the nineteenth century, see Adamec, *Gazetteer* 4 (Mazar-i-Sharif and North-Central Afghanistan), pp. 434-452. Especially notable is P. J. Maitland's account, found in Adamec, p. 438.

³⁴ Pliny *NH* 6.18 (48-49); he mentions the Oxus in the previous sentence. These two rivers were, of course, confused on occasion. Strabo mistook the Ochus for the Oxus (11.11.5; cf. Arrian 4.15.7 and Plutarch, *Alex.* 57.4). On the Ochus River see J. Sturm, "Ochus", *PW* 17, 2 (coll. 1768-1770).

³⁵ Stephanus, *Éthnika*, s.v. 'Alexandria Polcis'. Similarly, Ammianus 23.6.59 locates the famous metropolis Drapsa in Sogdiana, while Arrian 3.39.1 places Drapsa in Bactria proper. Strabo 15.2.10 (725) calls Adrapa "a city of Bactriana". Most authorities accept the identification of this city with the modern Kunduz, following von Schwarz, *Alexanders Feldzüge*, p. 28.

³⁶ Strabo 11.11.2 (517); also 11.8.8 (513-514).

³⁷ Strabo 11.8.8 (513). The text defines the border 'to the west' ('*pros dion*'), but the Arachoti must be the Arachosians southeast of Bactria. Eratosthenes may mean that Bactria lay to the west, and the Massagetae and Arachosians to the east. The proximity of these latter peoples seems startling, yet Stephanus by Byzantium (s.v. 'Arachosia' and 'Arachoti') places them near each other as well. *Tam. GBR*, p. 469 assumes that this reflects the situation after the overthrow of the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom. His theory ignores the fact that Eratosthenes, Strabo's explicit source for this information, was dead long before this displacement occurred.

³⁸ Strabo 11.11.2 (517).

³⁹ Curtius 7.11.1-29; note the same figure for the height of the rock in both sources.

⁴⁰ Polyanius, *Stral.* 4.3.29 ('Alexander') places the Rock of Ariamazes in the middle of Sogdiana, a rough and rugged country with no roads. A spring is mentioned, but not a river.

⁴¹ The Oxus boundary has become virtually canonical: K. Krieschmer, "Sogdiana", *Plt* 3 A, 1 (coll. 788-791). In the modern period, this Oxus border has been patently artificial. The population of Badakhshan is largely Tajik, indicating its ethnic unity with Soviet Tajikistan across the Amu Darya (Oxus) River. The modern border along the river is only a matter of convenience; territorial tradeoffs were made in the nineteenth century without regard for natural or human geography; Adamec, *Gazetteer* 1 (Badakhshan Province and Northeastern Afghanistan), pp. 1-9.

⁴² Curtius 7.10.1-3, which includes a description of the river. Strabo 11.11.5 (518) gives the same details, based upon the original account of Aristobulus. Note Engels,

supplies a substantial amount of information on Sogdiana in the course of his narrative on Alexander's campaigns, much of it concerning large settlements and mountain fortresses, his sketch here shows that he generally associated Sogdiana with the desert tracts of modern Turkistan.⁴³ This helps to explain his reference to the wasteland between Bactra and the Oxus River as "*loca deserta Sogdianorum*".⁴⁴ In this sense the desert, and not the Oxus, represented the transition from one region to the next. This makes sense, given the habit of ancient geographers to describe peoples (that is, inhabited areas) more often than specific places. According to Ammianus' report, the Sogdians inhabited the piedmont region of the Sogdian mountains.⁴⁵ He adds in the same passage that two navigable rivers, the Araxates and Dymas, thread this area; both drain into Lake Oxia. As with Bactria, Ammianus has again ignored the deserts described by Curtius, concentrating instead upon the heavily populated portion of the territory. The Sogdian mountains must mean the Pamirs and the Araxates may be a corruption of the Jaxartes River. The Dymas would seem, therefore, to correspond to Curtius' Polytimetus River. Arrian, too, mentions the Sogdian River named Polytimetus, since the Macedonians suffered a devastating ambush there.⁴⁶ Described as much larger than the Peneus in Thessaly, this river had wooded banks until it neared the desert frontier of Sogdiana; there it disappeared into the sands. The Alexander historians therefore refute Ammianus' claim that the river reached Lake Oxia (the Aral?), if indeed the Dymas refers to the Polytimetus.

It is interesting, however, that Arrian and Ammianus do not consider Curtius' vast desert to be part of Sogdiana at all, much less the greater portion. Here again it seems certain that such 'boundaries' were rarely recognized. As already mentioned, major features such as rivers, mountains, or deserts could easily be used by authors to mark various frontiers; however, such 'borders' may have no genuine correspondence to past (or present) political or cultural conditions. A desert may well separate various peoples, but it will be shown that these were barriers to the Graeco-Macedonians more often than to the natives of the east. Likewise, mountain chains were often cut by corridors through which armies and commerce might pass. Rivers, especially those which penetrated

⁴³ Curtius 7.5.1.

⁴⁴ Ammianus 23.6.59.

⁴⁵ Arrian 4.5.3, 4.6.6-7. Alexander explored the whole territory watered by Polytimetus.

⁴⁶ Curtius (7.7.2 and 7.8.30) claims that the Jaxartes formed the definitive barrier between Bactria and the Scythians, which eliminates the Oxus altogether. Strabo 11.5.11, same of the Jaxartes (above, note 36); see also Pliny, *NH* 6.18 (49).

deserts, were the least likely borders. These tended to attract peoples together, not separate them. A close parallel to the Oxus or Polytimetus, the Nile of Egypt was the country itself and never a border. It is a mistake, therefore, to draw strict political lines along the deserts, mountains, and particularly rivers of Central Asia.

The conventional northern frontier of Sogdiana, the Jaxartes River, is no exception to this rule. Curtius and Strabo have established this line as the absolute edge of Achaemenid and Greek Bactria.⁴⁷ The foundation of Alexandria "the Furthestmost" (Eschate) along the Jaxartes could seem to confirm this as some sort of recognized frontier.⁴⁸ This area, indeed, was a true frontier zone, but no precise border; it was a meeting place rather than a barrier. According to Arrian, the Dahae lived along the river, not just the bank opposite 'Sogdiana'.⁴⁹ It was on the southern side of the river that Alexander's troops were attacked, forcing the king then to order the barbarians not to cross as they customarily did.⁵⁰ As for the foundation of the 'furthestmost' Alexandria, one must note that the zone of Greek rule did not end there—Alexander aimed to control both sides of the river.⁵¹ It marked the limit of Graeco-Macedonian city-building, but not empire.

Based upon this evidence, then, one must situate Sogdiana north and east of Bactria, but the Oxus provides no border-line between them. With exemplary precision, Paul Bernard has reached a similar conclusion on the basis of other evidence and arguments.⁵² West of Bactria lay the region of Margiana, but again there is no clearly defined border. For some ancient authors, the Ochus River marked this frontier, while others

⁴⁷ Curtius 7.6.13, 7.6.25-27, 7.7.1; Arrian 4.1.3-4, 4.4.1.

⁴⁸ Arrian 3.28.8, 10.

⁴⁹ Curtius 7.6.12.

⁵⁰ Alexander's attack across the river carried him eighty stadia (nearly ten miles); his army penetrated even further: Curtius 7.9.9-16. That the Scythians considered Alexandria-Eschate a 'strangling yoke upon their necks' means that they were indeed threatened by a Macedonian colony south of the Jaxartes: Curtius 7.7.1. Finally, it will be shown that the Seleucids advanced beyond the Jaxartes in the early Third Century B.C.

⁵¹ Bernard, *Études Géographiques*, pp. 5-9, 12. The context is Bernard's argument that Ai Khanoum is to be identified with either the ancient city of Oxiana or Alexandria Oxiana. These cities, according to Ptolemy 6.12.5-6, were in Sogdiana; Ai Khanoum is south of the Oxus at its confluence with the Kocha River. On the basis of Ptolemy's notions of Asian geography, Bernard concludes (p. 9): "Tout ce que l'on peut dire, c'est que la géographie de Ptolémée laisse ouverte la possibilité que la plaine d'Ai Khanoum ait appartenu à la Sogdiane mais cette possibilité ne peut être confirmée ou démentie que par d'autres sources d'information." For Bernard, these other sources are Achaemenid and Muslim (pp. 9-13), rather than those Greek and Roman used here. It should be noted that Pierre Briant, too, has stressed that no sharp administrative borders existed in the Achaemenid period of Bactrian history: *L'Asie centrale et les royaumes proto-orientaux du premier millénaire* (Paris: Éditions Recherche sur les Civilisations, 1984), pp. 71-73.

located the same river within Bactria proper.⁵² According to Curtius, Alexander crossed both the Oxus and Ochus Rivers on his march to Margiana. If Alexander indeed went west to Margiana, the frontier probably lay beyond the Ochus (modern Andkhoi?) River where nearly three hundred miles of desert would separate Bactria from the oasis of Merv.⁵³ Such a stretch of desert would again appear to be a likely borderland for the Graeco-Macedonians, but perhaps not for the indigenous population.

South of Margiana, the district of Aria shared a common frontier with Bactria. The ancient valley formed here by the Arius (modern Hari-Rud) River was reputed to be 2000 stadia long and 300 wide, a fertile region in which viticulture became the chief commodity.⁵⁴ Beyond Bactria to the west, therefore, lay the vine-producing districts of Aria and Margiana. These were separated from Bactria by a wide tract of desert and thus were identified, as today, as a single geographical zone associated for cultural and ecological reasons with the Hari-Rud drainage system.⁵⁵

The southern reaches of Bactria were defined by the Koh-i-Sufed and Koh-i-Baba ranges of the Hindu Kush, the ancient Parapanisus or Caucasus Mountains. From these mountains flowed all of the rivers which drained north across Bactria in the direction of the Oxus, whether of the Oxus or Hari-Rud drainage system. No major ancient routes through these mountains are known except those which later passed by Alexandria *sub Caucas* (modern Begram) *en route* to the Khyber Pass and India. Here lies the area of the 'Massagetæ and Arachoi' already associated with the Sogdian frontier by later writers. This, then, comprises the circuit of Bactria's frontiers.

Geographically, Bactria and its environs demonstrate a truly diverse character. It must be noted that this environment, if viewed from a Mediterranean perspective, was extremely remote and rigorous. To the Greeks, for example, the climate and terrain of ancient Bactria were quite inhospitable. Its mountains soar much higher than Olympus, which is (at 9,570 feet) a mere foot-hill compared to the Pamirs and Hindu Kush. Bactria, too, is considerably drier; its 21 cm average

⁵² On the Ochus River, see Curtius 7.10.15; Strabo 11.7.3-4 (509-510); Ammianus 23.6.57; Pliny *NH* 6.18 (48-9).

⁵³ Surrounded by desert, Margiana was watered by the Margus River (modern Murghab) and famed for its vineyards. Its principal city Alexandria, refounded as Aniochia, was unusually large and well-fortified; Strabo 11.10.1-2 (515-516); Pliny *NH* 6.18 (47).

⁵⁴ Strabo 11.10.1-2 (515-516); Pliny *NH* 6.21; Ammianus Marcellinus 23.6.69. Other cities include Achaia and Artacona. The wine of Aria was said by Strabo to be aged for three generations.

⁵⁵ Compare the data in Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 33 and 36-37.

annual precipitation falls far short of the 38 cm for eastern Greece and 130 cm for western Greece. This created an 'oasis' culture on the Bactrian plains, where irrigation was essential. In terms of temperature, these Bactrian plains were especially torrid compared to Attica or Macedonia. At Athens, for example, the mean maximum temperature is normally 13°C (55°F) in January and 30°C (86°F) in June; at Balikh (Bactra), the range is from 17°C (63°F) in January to 39°C (103°F) in June. Finally, the absence of the open sea was a crucial difference between the homeland of the ancient Greek and that of the native Bactrian.

The environmental factors set forth here were the immutable background for the human drama of Bactria's history. No matter how great was Alexander, he and his army could never transform Bactria into a Balkan landscape. What changed was not the pattern of the land, but the pattern of peoples' lives—those of the Greek settlers in response to this new, non-Greek environment, and those of the native Bactrians who must accommodate powerful foreigners in a place otherwise familiar to them. To assess this entire process, it is necessary to derive a fair picture of Bactria's human geography prior to the invasion of Alexander. This cannot easily be done in the pale light of our literary sources. For the most part, these are Graeco-Roman accounts based upon the witness of Alexander's troops. As such, they reflect a generally hostile view of Bactria during a time of increasing turmoil. The patterns of life in Central Asia before 330 B.C. or so cannot have been quite the same as those described by Greek invaders during the wars of Alexander. Too often we forget the disturbed conditions which were the basis for these western accounts.

Allowances must be made, therefore, for the distorted picture of Central Asia to be found in the classical literary tradition. Consider, for example, the famous portrayal in this passage from Plutarch's *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Viriute* (1 328C-329D):

Alexander . . . taught the Arachosians to till the soil, and persuaded the Sogdians to support rather than slay their parents. . . He induced the Indians to accept the Greek gods, and the Scythians to bury rather than eat the dead. . . He taught the Gedrosians the tragedies of Euripides and Sophocles. . . Thanks to Alexander, Bactria and the Caucasus peoples worship the gods of Greece. . . He planted Greek institutions all across Asia, and thus overcame its wild and savage way of living. . . His enemies could not have been civilized if they had not been beaten. . . Greckness was marked by excellence, but wickedness was the way of the barbarians. . .

Plutarch, and many others who have echoed his rhetoric down through the ages, would have us believe that things like agriculture, right religion,

and the fine arts did not exist in Asia until Alexander introduced them. Before Alexander, the Bactrians and their neighbors were considered to be savages who were killers and cannibals. They were uncivilized, lacking cities and all the saving graces of Hellenic institutions. Clearly, such people deserved to be defeated by a benevolent king who could educate and improve them. Plutarch, of course, does not find it necessary to describe the process by which the 'barbarians' developed their new interests and better habits. He simply calls it good fortune that all the survivors of Alexander's wars were transformed into Greeks.⁵⁶

No historian should trust so biased a tradition about the peoples of Central Asia, though some modern scholars have done so.⁵⁷ To make matters worse, there is another source problem which has further distorted the perceptions of many about pre-Greek Bactria. As quite an apparent contrast to the derogatory descriptions of Bactria during Alexander's invasion, the same area was often lauded in Hellenistic literature as 'the jewel of all Ariana'⁵⁸ and the prosperous "land of a thousand cities"⁵⁹. The facile conclusion is that an amazing transformation had taken place in terms of urbanization, agriculture, and trade. Bactria, a land that had never known the peace and prosperity of civilization until the coming of the Greeks, became the success story of the Hellenistic age. As if this proved the case made by Plutarch above, it has been argued that Alexander

introduced a new way of life into a very large and populous area. The hill-tribes were forced to abandon their raids on the lowlands and adopted a settled life. The marauding Scythians were kept at a distance by a network of fortified places. Peaceful conditions now favoured the growth of agriculture and urbanisation. Where Alexander had found only villages, the Chinese invaders in 125 B.C. found men dwelling in a thousand walled cities—the culmination of a revolution which Alexander had imposed upon the people. . . (my italics)⁶⁰

⁵⁶ The tendency to describe Alexander's 'barbarian' enemies in this fashion can be traced all the way to the conqueror's own Greek contemporaries. See Strabo 11.11.3 (517) on Onesicritus. What Onesicritus and others said was often true (see Part Four, note 34 on the 'Devourer Dogs' of Bactria), but expressed in disparaging terms to belittle the foreigners (as Strabo makes clear). The Alexander historians are discussed at greater length in following sections.

⁵⁷ See, for example, N. G. L. Hammond's *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman* (Park Ridge, New Jersey: Noyes Press, 1980), p. 196. The most useful corrective has been offered by Pierre Briant; see his collection of articles entitled *Rois, tribus et paysans* (Paris: Les Belles-Lettres, 1982), as well as *Etat et Partisans au Moyen-Orient ancien* (Paris and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and *L'Asie centrale* (see above, note 51).

⁵⁸ Strabo 11.11.1, citing Apollodorus of Artemita. 'Ariana', according to Eratosthenes (Strabo 15.1.10), extended eastward to the Indus where India proper began.

⁵⁹ For this phrase, which probably originated as well with Apollodorus, Justin 41.4.6 supplies the Latin and Strabo 15.1.3 (686) the Greek.

⁶⁰ N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander*, p. 196.

While no one can deny that Hellenistic Bactria was a thriving region, or that conditions in this area had been less peaceful and prosperous during Alexander's invasion, is this judgement accurate in terms of what it suggests about Bactria before Alexander? Again, the Greek tradition does not take into account anything before Alexander's arrival in force, and neither do some modern writers. To find out whether Bactria might not have been a jewelled land of settled cities in an earlier era, we must turn to less biased sources.

Archaeological surveys in Central Asia are at last setting straight the record of Bactria's pre-Greek human geography. Exceeding all earlier expectations⁶¹, the spade has uncovered ample evidence for the early development of irrigation, commerce, and fortified cities in ancient Central Asia. Excavations at Mundigak, Deh Morasi Chundai, Shah-i-Sokhta, Bandi Khan-tepe, Kizil-tepe, Talichkhan-tepe, Kara-tepe, Altin-tepe and numerous other sites have shown the evolution of Bactrian urbanization from the time of the Bronze Age.⁶² Palatial architecture, temple structures, and pottery typologies combine to suggest a very sophisticated state of development during these centuries, although not all sites were continuously inhabited from the Bronze to the Hellenistic Age. Along with the cities, the concomitant rise of irrigation has also now been traced.⁶³ Qanat (underground tunnels) and river (drainage canal)

⁶¹ See, for example, the survey of F. R. Allchin, "The Culture Sequence of Bactria," *Antiquity* 31(1957): 134-135, which represents the thinking of earlier explorers who minimized the urban development of Bactria.

⁶² Consult Paul Leriche, "L'Asie centrale dans l'Antiquité," *REA* 75(1973): 279-310, G. A. Pougatchenkova, "La culture de la Bactriane du Nord à la lumière des découvertes archéologiques dans la vallée du Sourkhan-Darya," pp. 281-295 in J. Deshayes, ed. *Le plateau iranien et l'Asie centrale des origines à la conquête islamique* (Paris: Editions du centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1977); V. M. Masson and V. I. Sarianidi, *Central Asia: Turkmenia before the Achaemenids* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972); H.-P. Francfort, *Les fortifications en Asie Centrale de l'âge du bronze à l'époque Kushane* (Paris: CNRS, 1979); Gardin, ed. *L'Archéologie de la Bactriane ancienne*, Actes du colloque franco-soviétique, Dushanbe 1982, (Paris: CNRS, 1985); and the reports published in *Atti del convegno sul tema: la Persia e il mondo Greco-Romano* (Rome: Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, 1966). More recent evidence is available in F. R. Allchin and N. Hammond, eds., *Archaeology of Afghanistan*, pp. 214-218. Archaeologists have now shown that the Hellenistic city of Ai Khanoum may have had walls dating back at least to the Achaemenid era: P. Leriche "Ai Khanoum, Un Rempart hellénistique en Asie centrale", *RA* (1974): 231-270. For pre-Greek Bactria, one must balance the views found in *Le plateau iranien* with those expressed by Pierre Briant in his various publications (above, note 57).

⁶³ On irrigation, see in particular the following surveys: J.-C. Gardin and P. Gentelle, "Irrigation et peuplement dans la plaine d'Ai Khanoum de l'époque achéménide à l'époque musulmane," *BEFEO* 63 (1976): 59-99; Gardin and Gentelle, "L'exploitation du sol en Bactriane antique," *BEFEO* 66 (1979): 1-29; Gardin and B. Lyonnet, "La prospection archéologique de la Bactriane orientale (1974-1978): premiers résultats," *Métopolamnia* 13/14 (1978-79): 99-154; Gardin, "The Development of Eastern Bactria in Pre-Classical Times," *Parthica* 10 (1981): 8-13.

irrigation systems are both attested.⁶⁴ These provided the means for sedentary agriculture and show how skilled were the early inhabitants of Bactria in the effective management of its precious resources.

There is abundant evidence, too, of long-distance trade linking Central Asia to other centers of civilization. The heavy traffic of lapis lazuli, mined in the Badkhashan mountains of eastern Bactria, can be followed outward to Mesopotamia and India.⁶⁵ In exchange for raw materials, finished products from these other regions made their way back to Bactria. Such a network clearly required organization and initiative no less significant than that which sparked the urban/agricultural revolution in Central Asia. The circulation of Greek coins in Bactria before Alexander suggests that long-distance commercial contacts were fostered right through the Persian period.⁶⁶ Millennia before the Graeco-Macedonian invasion, Bactria was the scene of large-scale building projects which produced in fact (if not yet in fame) scattered cities that were jewelled oases on the plains of Ariana. It is not possible to give precise names to these people or their cities, whether numbering quite a thousand or not; our literary sources, meager as they are for all ancient periods, give barely a dozen names of Bactrian urban sites for all of antiquity. These include Bactra, Zariaspa, Aornus, Drapsaca, Chatracharta, Alicodro, Astaita, Menapila, Chomora, Rouaris, Eucratidia, Kouriana, Ebousinus Anassa, Astrakene, and the various Alexandrias.⁶⁷ In name at least Eucratidia and the Alexandrias are clearly Graeco-Macedonian, although they were generally founded on pre-existing sites.

The capital of ancient Bactria was apparently an impressive city by any ancient standard. Alternately known as Bactra and perhaps

⁶⁴ See Polybius 10.28 for Parthia; cf. Briant, *L'Arie centrale*, p. 62.

⁶⁵ G. Hermann, "Lapis Lazuli: the Early Phases of its Trade," *Iraq* 30 (1968): 21-57; more recently, Francfort and Potier, "Sondage préliminaire sur l'établissement protohistorique harappéen et post-harappéen de Shorugai (Afghanistan du N.-E.)," *Asiaticques* 34 (1978): 29-79.

⁶⁶ See below, note 130. This does not mean direct exchange, but rather Achaemenid support of an imperial economy (based largely on Greek coinage) which provided for 'middle-men' all across the Iranian plateau between Greece and Bactria.

⁶⁷ Ammianus Marcellinus 23.6.58; Ptolemy 6.12; Strabo 15.2.10 (725). Arrian 3.29.2. Drapsaca has been identified as modern Kunduz; von Schwarz, *Alexanders Feldzüge*, p. 28; Bosworth, *Commentary*, p. 372; and Bernard, *Géographie*, p. 75 n. 57. Aornus may be Tashkurgan, according to Brunt, *Arrian*, p. 564. The site was described above. For a survey of one hundred and forty eastern cities, although without appropriate documentation, see Mohammad Sedqi, "Les Villes d'Ariana," *Afghanistan* 7 (1952): 5-21, 29-41, 31-44. An essential reference is Warwick Ball's *Archaeological Gazetteer of Afghanistan* in two volumes (Paris: Editions Recherche sur les Civilisations, 1982), which should be consulted for all sites discussed below. This work replaces the older, but more conveniently arranged (by ancient region) survey of K. Fischer, "Preliminary Remarks on Archaeological Survey in Afghanistan," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 3 (1969): 327-408.

Zariaspa, it has long been associated in Islamic and local traditions as the "Mother of Cities" founded by the first Aryan king, a close descendant of Noah.⁶⁸ Its fertile environment has even made it one legendary site for the Garden of Eden. Little remains there today to suggest such grandeur, except crumbling walls of immense size; but, these are certainly later than those encountered by Alexander in the fourth century B.C., or which held back the army of Antiochus the Great during his two-year siege of Euthydemus in the third century B.C. Many have tried to unearth the ancient city which lies beneath these ruins, but there has been little success thus far.⁶⁹ Yet, Bactra served as the capital of Bactria for centuries and its secrets may someday revolutionize our knowledge of ancient Central Asia.

What is exposed to view is still of considerable interest. The extant walls enclose an area of three square miles, in which lie a village, its orchards, and a small bazaar. The ruins are situated on a plain which stretches south some twelve miles to the ridge of Koh-i-Elburz. This plain is watered by the Rud-i-Bandi-Amir and its ten irrigation canals. There are numerous villages dotting the plain, each with its own groves of fruit trees. The regional population ranges from 174,530 to 362,565, but no reliable figures are known. In the late nineteenth century there was also a "floating population" (pastoralists) of about 1,000 families. At that time, too, the nearby grasslands supported the government stud of between 200 and 300 mares. In 1886, Captain Peacock complained of day-time temperatures of 110°F, with no less than 85°F at night accompanied by steady desert winds from the northwest.⁷⁰

In Sogdiana, the principal cities included Maracanda (Samarcand) and Nautaca in the interior; Gabae, Cyropolis, and later Alexandria-Eschate lay along the Jaxartes (modern Syr Darya) River, while Alexandria-Oxiana stood somewhere along the Oxus (modern Amu

⁶⁸ See, in addition to Ball's *Archaeological Gazetteer*, the following works for legends and present conditions: Adamec, *Gazetteer* 4 (Mazar-i-Sharif and North-Central Afghanistan), pp. 98-115; Tarn, *GBI*, pp. 114-116; Cary, *Geographic Background*, p. 199; Toynebe, *Between Oxus and Jaxartes* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 92-97. Foucher's archaeological survey is summarized in *Yrille Route*, pp. 55-121, especially pp. 70-83. For the alternate name 'Zariaspa' see F. Reuss, "Bakira und Zariaspa," *Rhein. Mus.* 62 (1907): 591.

⁶⁹ The history of the site, along with relevant excavation data, may be found in Rodney S. Young, "The South Wall of Balkh-Bactra," *AJA* 59 (1955): 267-276. A red ceramic sherd from Balkh published by D. Schlumberger in 1949 seems to show one of the later Euthydemid or Eucratidean kings, and is the only pictorial trace of the Greeks who ruled there after Alexander. See Schlumberger, "La Prospection archéologique de Bactres," *Syria* 26 (1949): 187.

⁷⁰ Adamec, *Gazetteer* 4 (Mazar-i-Sharif and North-Central Afghanistan), pp. 98-112, 369, and 207 (Elburz Koh).

Darya) River.⁷¹ Maracanda had been a royal residence of Sogdiana and served as a chief staging-point for Alexander's campaigns. The city's perimeter covered a circuit of seventy stadia (about eight miles), within which Alexander stationed a thousand men in the separately walled citadel.⁷² Outside the city, as in Bactria, numerous villages were scattered.⁷³ Nautaca has been identified with the modern site of Shahr-i-Sabz south of Samarcand.⁷⁴ Curtius, however, describes its environs such that its location may be within modern Tadzhikistan.⁷⁵ Nautaca, or the region called Paratacane, might have been eastward across the fingers of the Pamirs.⁷⁶

Along the Jaxartes River a number of cities fell within the northern frontier zone of Sogdiana (and, by extension, of Bactria-Sogdiana). Xenippa, which bordered upon Scythia, presents the familiar picture of a fertile and populous town surrounded by many small villages; its chief defense rested upon its able horsemen.⁷⁷ Similar were the cities of Gabae and Cyropolis.⁷⁸ These, along with the stronghold of the Memaceni and four others, were sacked by Alexander during the early course of the 'Sogdian Revolt'.⁷⁹ This left but one urban site in place of the seven: Alexander's new foundation, Alexandria-Eschate.⁸⁰ This important Alexandrian city was situated on the southern bank of the Jaxartes near modern Leninabad. Its walls enclosed a camp with a circuit of sixty stadia (almost seven miles), built to a defensible height within twenty days. It would appear that this Græco-Macedonian city was indeed

⁷¹ Alexandria-Oxiana has been identified with the modern site of Ai Khanoum, the most impressive archaeological find yet in these regions. The newly-discovered city at the confluence of the Vakhsh and Pyandh Rivers has not yet yielded its ancient name. On these sites, see F. Holt's bibliographic surveys in *ArchW* 1984 and 1987 (Part One, notes 8 and 12).

⁷² Arrian 3.30.6. For the possibility that modern Bukhara was another royal residence, see Brunt, *Arrian*, p. 500. For the walls, see Curtius 7.6.10.

⁷³ Destroyed by Alexander: Curtius 7.6.10.

⁷⁴ Brunt, *Arrian*, p. 504 (based upon the conjecture of von Schwarz).

⁷⁵ Curtius 8.2.19-33.

⁷⁶ Used by Alexander for winter quarters: Curtius 8.4.1. Alexander's lengthy conquest of Sogdiana has always been restricted to the region of Uzbekistan; yet, it is inconceivable that Alexander avoided the strategic area of the eastern Oxus valley with its Pamir tributaries.

⁷⁷ Curtius 8.2.14-16. It was a refuge for natives in flight from Alexander.

⁷⁸ Gabae (Gaza): Arrian 4.2.1; 4.17.4. Cyropolis: Arrian 4.2.2; 4.3.1-4; Curtius 7.6.16, 19-21.

⁷⁹ Arrian 4.2.4-6; Curtius 7.6.17-23.

⁸⁰ Arrian 4.1.3-4, 4.4.1; Curtius 7.6.13, 7.6.25-27, 7.7.1. Strabo 11.11.4 (517) adds that Alexander founded eight cities in Bactria and Sogdiana, having razed Carianas (in Bactria), Maracanda and Cyra (in Sogdiana), among others. Excavations at Leninabad have apparently turned up signs of Hellenistic pottery; see the citations in Bernart *Knoll*, p. 3; *Excavations*.

"furthestmost" (Eschate) to the north, since no other such settlements are reported in the Trans-Jaxartes region.

North of the Jaxartes lived the Dahae, a Scythian tribe, although a number of other tribes had gathered there during the turmoil of Alexander's advance.⁸¹ As nomadic peoples, these groups were often disparaged by ancient writers for their lack of cities, settlements, and coined money.⁸² Those living nearest to them, such as the Sogdians, were considered more barbaric than those living farther away (the Bactrians).⁸³ Put another way, the native populations of these areas grew (in the eyes of the Greeks) less civilized as one traveled north from Bactria through Sogdiana to Scythia. It would appear, then, that Sogdiana was itself a frontier zone between Bactria and Scythia, and that it was heavily influenced by its neighbors north and south. In the course of Alexander's campaigns, this proved to be precisely the case.⁸⁴ As a result, the tendency of writers past and present to speak of 'Bactria-Sogdiana' as a single political, economic, or cultural unit is not always accurate, although at times Sogdiana was more closely connected with Bactria than Scythia. At other times, however, it is more proper to speak of 'Sogdiana-Scythia' since Sogdiana occasionally exerted its independence of Bactria in times of political and military turmoil, generally with Scythian support. It must be pointed out, too, that nomadism of all varieties has long been prevalent in these regions, and that nomads are not necessarily the 'natural enemies' of sedentary agriculturalists. These were, and remain, interlocked and mutually helpful subsistence types that might at times, like any two cities or civilizations, have conflicts. The old view that Bactria became an enclave of farmers perpetually fighting off nomadic outsiders from Scythia must be abandoned altogether.

Beyond Bactria in other directions lay important cities along major routes of communication. Bactra, in fact, was a central meeting-place of routes connecting China, India, and the Western World. In the words of Arnold Toynbee after his exploration of this region in 1960, Bactria provides a classic example of a geographical 'round-about' where 'routes converge from all quarters of the compass and from which routes radiate out to all quarters of the compass again.'⁸⁵ From the west, Alexandria-Aria (modern Herat) was a major gateway leading to Bactra, as was the oasis of Alexandria-Margiana (Merv) further north. One

⁸¹ Arrian 3.28.8 and 10.

⁸² For one example, see Arrian 4.17.5.

⁸³ Strabo 11.11.3 (517) makes this observation.

⁸⁴ See below, Part Three, for full discussion.

⁸⁵ Toynbee, *Between Oxus and Juma* (New York and London: Oxford University Press,

could, of course, travel eastward toward India from these points by either a northern circuit (through Bactria) or a longer southern route. The latter carried the ancient traveller through the districts of Drangiana, Seistan, and Arachosia, by way of Alexandria-Arachosia (modern Kandahar).⁸⁶ By continuing up the so-called Arachosian corridor (along the valley of the Arghandab River), one reached Alexandria *sub Caucas* near modern Begram. This was, as the toponyms indicate, Alexander's circuitous invasion route into Bactria.

The more common route was that which connected east and west by way of Bactria. This path carried travellers over the Hindu-Kush through either the Bamian or Panjshir Valleys, which converge from opposite directions upon Alexandria *sub Caucas* (Begram). From thence, the famous Khyber Pass opened upon the region of Gandhara at the headwaters of the Indus River. By way of Charsadda and Taxila, then, one penetrated the Punjab of India. To quote the modern traveller Toynebee again:

Human beings have made the rough passage of the Hindu Kush a beaten track, because this mountain-range stands between two worlds that will not submit to being insulated from each other. It stands between 'the Sub-continent' and the main mass of Eurasia; and, ever since mankind first spread over the face of the Earth, the peoples of these two great regions have insisted on communicating with each other, notwithstanding the rigours of the passage across the intervening barrier.⁸⁷

These routes do, indeed, add another dimension to the rigors of the Bactrian environment. Bactria was "terra multiplex" in terms of climate, terrain, and population; but, it was also dotted by cities and favored by nature as a meeting-place of ancient civilizations long before Alexander...and long after.

Historical and Political Traditions

Archaeology leaves no question about the advanced state of Bactria's cultural and commercial development during the centuries preceding

⁸⁶ On the geography of this area and the importance of Kandahar, see P. Bernard, "Un problème de toponymie antique dans l'Asie centrale: Les Noms anciens de Qandahar," *Studia Iranica* 3 (1974): 171-185. Much interest has arisen in this site as a result of recent excavations. An extensive bibliography is provided by W. Vogelsang, "Early Historical Arachosia in South-East Afghanistan: Meeting-Place between East and West," *Iranica Antiqua* 20 (1985): 55-99.

⁸⁷ Toynebee, *Oxus*, 'Preface', p. vi. Given the keen eye of Toynebee and his broad knowledge of history, this is a classic travelogue. Also insightful is a more recent account by Peter Levi, *The Light Garden of the Angel King: Journeys in Afghanistan* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972). On the archaeology of Taxila and Begram, see the references in Holt, "Discovering the Lost History," p. 5; for Charsadda, see M. Wheeler, *Charsadda: A Metropolis of the North-West Frontier* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

Alexander's invasion. But neither our archaeological nor literary evidence can tell us at present just who was responsible for this achievement. Plutarch's 'Alexander miracle' must clearly be rejected as no more than a return to Bactria's ancient prosperity once the region had recovered from the turmoil of Persia's collapse. Do we, then, look back to the Achaemenid kings for a 'Persian miracle' in Bactria? This is quite possible, although some scholars identify evidence for an even earlier 'Median miracle' which brought civilization to Central Asia.⁸⁸ Among archaeologists in particular, there is a growing consensus that Bactria experienced a specifically 'Bactrian miracle'—a local, independent evolution into a powerful and prosperous state pre-dating the arrival of imperialist forces from Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean.⁸⁹

It is not an easy task to refine the chronology in such a way as to answer the question satisfactorily. Clear evidence of economic maturity and cultural unity does not necessarily mean that Bactria was an independent political state, even though there are ancient legends which might support this view. These sources are themselves a problem to sort out because of their fragmentary state and (quite often) late Hellenistic date. Still, it is essential to survey what happens to survive in order to fill out our emerging picture of pre-Greek Bactria.

Documentary evidence from the Achaemenid period of Bactrian history is extremely scarce, and is largely confined to royal inscriptions which merely mention Bactria among the satrapies of the empire. As Édouard Will has summed up the problem, "Méthodologiquement parlant, l'Orient du monde achéménide est encore, dans une trop large mesure, préhistorique."⁹⁰ As a result, scholars are generally left with a few passages from such classical authors as Herodotus (fifth century B.C.), Xenophon (fourth century B.C.) Diodorus (first century B.C.), and Justin (third century A.D.) with which to work out eastern history. These passages do not, however, provide a connected narrative account of early Bactrian history. A further problem is that the later sources must be carefully checked for intrusive elements arising from Hellenistic legends about Alexander. Yet, this sparse testimony must be used to trace some of the political and historical traditions of the pre-Greek period in Bactria.

⁸⁸ J. M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (New York: Schocken Books, 1983), p. 29; Briant, *L'Asie centrale*, pp. 35-41.

⁸⁹ E. E. Kuzmina, "The Bactrian Mirage and the Archaeological Reality: On the Problem of the Formation of North Bactrian Culture," *Ea W* 26 (1976): 111-132; Viktor Sarianidi, "Bactrian Centre of Art," *Metropolitania* 12 (1977): 97-110.

⁹⁰ E. Will, *Le Monde grec et l'Orient*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), vol. 1, p. 36.

When viewed by writers from the Mediterranean world, Bactria was (as noted above) a very far and foreign land. As such, it often became the convenient setting for exotic tales of distant conquest. Bactria and India can be found in classical literature as the *ultima Thule* of the east, the outer limit for the legendary adventures of Herakles, Prometheus, Father Liber, Nabonidas, Sardanapalus, Ozymandias, Ninus, Semiramis, Cyrus, and of course Alexander the Great.⁹¹ Much of this material is simply myth, and of almost no value whatever. Shelley, for example, could make use of the Ozymandias legend for his brilliant poem of that name, but the historian is hard put to believe that Pharaoh 'Ozymandias' included rebellious Bactria in his Egyptian empire.⁹² Of importance here are not the legends, least of all those later arising out of Hellenistic literature, but rather those which pre-dated (and inspired) Alexander in some form or other.⁹³ The likely source for much that Alexander 'knew' about early heroes in Bactria was Ctesias of Knidos, who had gathered information while serving in the Persian court of Artaxerxes II (404-358 B.C.) and wrote a history of Persia (*Persika*) in some twenty-three books. Only fragments of this vast work survive, and generally these represent exotic tales which appealed to later compilers.⁹⁴ A notable example is Ctesias' legend of Semiramis as preserved and probably embellished by Diodorus Siculus.⁹⁵ In this account, King Ninus of Assyria (called here 'the first Asian king of historical record') mastered all of Asia, with the exception of Bactria and India, within a span of seventeen years. Because Bactria was inaccessible and full of warlike men, Ninus was forced to defer its conquest after many unsuccessful attempts.

Later, as Ctesias reported, King Ninus again invaded Bactria with an incredibly large army of 1,700,000 infantry, 210,000 cavalry, and nearly

⁹¹ See, for examples, Diodorus 1.47-48 and 2.1-19; Herodotus 1.184; Strabo 15.1.5-9 (686-688); Justin 1.1; Xenophon, *Cyr.* 1.5.2; and Pliny, *NH* 6.49.

⁹² Diodorus 1.47-48 is the source for this curious tale. The account derives from Hecataeus of Abdera's description of an Egyptian pylon often identified with the that the 'Ozymandias inscription' is not from a monument of Ramses II, but of Thutmose III. See James B. Pritchard, ed. *The Ancient Near East*, vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 175-182 for a translation of the Thutmose inscription; George Steindorff and Keith Settle, *When Egypt Ruled the East*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 66; and S. K. Eddy, *The King is Dead: Studies in the Near Eastern Resistance to Hellenism, 334-31 B.C.* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), p. 282.

⁹³ For example, Arrian 6.24.3 cites Nearchus, Alexander's contemporary, for the report that the Macedonian conqueror emulated the deeds (as he knew them) of Semiramis.

⁹⁴ For the fragments, see Jacoby, *FGH*, III C, no. 688.

⁹⁵ Jacoby, *FGH* 608, F1 (Diodorus 2.1-19). Cf. Herodotus 1.184; Strabo 15.2.5 (1799).

10,600 scythe-chariots. Editorially, Diodorus (2.5.5-7) justifies these figures in light of Ninus' earlier failures, the number and quality of the Bactrian forces (numbering 400,000), and the difficult nature of Bactria's terrain. Bactria, says Diodorus (Ctesias), was a land of many large cities, led in size and strength by the royal capital, Bactra.

The Assyrian host advanced in divisions through the narrow passes leading into Bactria. There the first Assyrian contingent was met and defeated by Oxyartes, the Bactrian king. Eventually, however, the army of Ninus forced its way into the country, and the Bactrians dispersed to the defense of their native lands. Thus fell in succession all the cities except Bactra, which held out against the Assyrian attackers. It was during this protracted siege, relates Diodorus (Ctesias), that the beautiful Semiramis was summoned to Bactria by her husband Onnes. Once arrived, she disguised herself and led an assault against Bactra's ungarded *acropolis*. The city capitulated, yielding its rich treasures of silver and gold. Having captured Bactra, Ninus was duly captivated by the resourceful Semiramis. Her husband, threatened by the king, committed suicide; Semiramis soon became Ninus' queen.

The exploits of Semiramis continued unabated after the death of Ninus. Much later, she assembled her armies in Bactra in order to launch a further invasion into India. Lacking war elephants, she contrived dummies to trick the enemy and so nearly carried off the campaign, but the Indians discovered the ruse and pressed hard upon the Assyrian host. The Indians destroyed some two-thirds of the invading force.⁹⁶ The survivors fled with Semiramis back to Bactra, and so the fabulous story ends.

A similar version of this legend survives in Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus.⁹⁷ In the latter account, however, the defeated Bactrian king was not Oxyartes, but the famous Zoroaster.⁹⁸ Both names are notably suspicious since the former duplicates Alexander's famous adversary and eventual father-in-law, while the latter has been identified as the great prophet of Ahura-Mazda who became the very well-spring of Per-

⁹⁶ H. H. Scullard, *The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 35-36 comments upon the curious 'dummy elephants' found here in the Semiramis tale.

⁹⁷ Justin 1.1.

⁹⁸ On Zoroaster, consult the first five chapters of Altheim and Stiehl, *Geschichte Mittelalters in Altertum* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970), pp. 9-110, which contain the early Greek references to Zoroaster and special problems therein. This work includes an interesting overview of pre-Greek Central Asia, pp. 123-191. On Zoroaster, see also M. Boyce, *A History of Zoroastrianism*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1975 and 1982); G. Gnoli, *Zoroaster's Time and Homeland: A Study on the Origins of Mazdeism and Related Problems*

sian religion. It is clear that the lost original of Ctesias' story inspired several versions in later centuries, some of them certainly shaped by association with the Alexander legend. In fact, it has been persuasively argued by Pierre Briant and others that Ctesias' *Perisika* was rewritten during the Hellenistic age so as to presage the Graeco-Macedonian conquest.⁹⁹

In the legend of Semiramis, for example, Bactria consisted of numerous cities loosely united under a single king. These cities provided a formidable army which fought staunchly against outside invaders, but disbanded to local defense once the enemy penetrated the Bactrian frontier (like Alexander, over the Hindu Kush?). Then, one by one, Bactria's cities struggled independently and unsuccessfully against the Assyrian attackers. Since Alexander's invasion proceeded along these same general lines, it would be easy to attribute this description to the embellishment of later Hellenistic writers. Since many scholars have argued that no such cities existed in Bactria until introduced by Alexander and the Greeks, this aspect of the Semiramis story would indeed seem anachronistic and unreliable.¹⁰⁰ Yet, while it is true that in the Hellenistic period Bactria was renowned as the 'land of a thousand cities', urbanization in this area cannot be attributed (as already shown) to Hellenization alone.

Archaeologists have naturally tried to link their findings in the field with the Ctesian legend of a pre-Achaemenid Bactrian state.¹⁰¹ The evidence is apparently complementary, at least in terms of Ctesias' general description of Bactria's cultural development. In the same way that archaeology has been used to sort out fact from fiction in Homer's epics¹⁰², these scholars hope to salvage some truth from the Diodorus/Ctesias material.¹⁰³

If legends like that of Semiramis do have any historical value, it must be used cautiously. This is not to say that the archaeological record is in

⁹⁹ Briant, *L'Asie centrale*, pp. 30-31.

¹⁰⁰ Tarn, *GBI*, pp. 33, 121-124. Among others, his followers include Woodcock, *The Greeks in India* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 64; and S. K. Eddy, *King is Dead*, p. 95.

¹⁰¹ Kuzmina, 'The 'Bactrian Mirage' and the Archaeological Reality: On the Problem of the Formation of North Bactrian Culture,' *Ea W* 26 (1976): 112 gives a list of major scholars who hold this view.

¹⁰² In the case of the Homeric epics, for example, see M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, rev. ed. (New York: Viking, 1977). Finley acknowledged that particular events in the epics, such as individual battles or conferences, tend to be fictional; however, these often denote conditions which were characteristic of the Mycenaean period (the use of certain weapons, for example). At the same time, many elements of the epics must be attributed to the post-Mycenaean period on the basis of external evidence (burial practices, economic conditions, etc.).

¹⁰³ Against the position taken by Briant, *L'Asie centrale*, pp. 13-17.

doubt about early Bactria, but only that the literary sources are necessarily suspect. The archaeological evidence for cultural and commercial development cannot automatically be equated with the legendary evidence for an independent political and military state. At the same time, if some of the Semiramis story does pre-date Alexander, we may say at least that Bactria was already known as a worthy and difficult prize by the late fourth century B.C.¹⁰⁴ Material finds prove that this much, at least, was so: it was an ancient region of cities and a hub of trade no matter what people were responsible for the 'miracle'. The Ctesian report of many powerful and wealthy cities is not a doublet from the Alexander story, where the king invaded a 'poor and backward' nation. In this limited way, the Semiramis story happens to reflect the archaeological record whether there was anything like a fully functioning pre-Achaemenid monarchy in Bactria or not.

The stories surrounding the Persian conquest of Bactria give a similar impression. According to Herodotus (1.153.4), Cyrus the Great harbored ambitions to subdue four major peoples: the Babylonians, the Bactrians, the Sacae and the Egyptians. Herodotus does not actually describe the Bactrian campaign, but he does allude to its successful outcome in later passages.¹⁰⁵ For whatever reason, Herodotus focuses his attention upon the culmination of the eastern campaign: Cyrus' attempt to secure the Bactrian frontier by defeating the nomadic Massagetae.¹⁰⁶

It is indeed unfortunate that the details of the Persian conquest of Bactria are not preserved. It obviously would be useful to clarify Herodotus' vague hint that Cyrus' war was waged against a loosely organized Bactrian monarchy, an intimation also found in Xenophon's story of Abradates' wife Panthea, a woman of legendary beauty captured by

¹⁰⁴ For Arrian (Nearchus) on the currency of the Semiramis legend, see note 93 above. Curtius 7.6.20 states that Cyrus and Semiramis were the two rulers of Sogdiana most admired by Alexander. Pliny, *NH* 6.18 (49) lists Semiramis, Cyrus, and Alexander (alongside Heracles and Father Liber) as those who erected altars to mark the extent of their conquests at the Jaxartes River. The commentary of Strabo 15.1.5-6 (686-687) is especially appropriate here. Strabo states that he and Megasthenes could not accept Semiramis' invasion of India as fact, but that Alexander certainly believed the tale and acted accordingly. It should be noted that Strabo himself does not discount all of the exploits of the Queen (16.1.2).

¹⁰⁵ Herodotus 1.153.4 and 1.201-216. How and Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, corrected ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), Vol. 1, p. 135; Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire: Studies in Geography and Ethnography of the Ancient Near East* (Westbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1968), p. 289 (Chares' report about Zariadres at the Tarnis River). Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 1.1.4 lists Bactria among Cyrus' conquests. For additional evidence, literary and epigraphic, see David Stronach, *Paratopades* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 289-290; the war is dated ca. 546-540 B.C.

¹⁰⁶ Herodotus 1.201-216, with the *Commentary* by How and Wells, pp. 152-154 and Appendix IV (pp. 391-392).

Cyrus.¹⁰⁷ At the time of her misfortune, Xenophon reports that her husband Abradates of Susa had been sent by the Assyrians on an embassy of alliance to the king of Bactria. As in the case of Semiramis and Ninus, no genuine historical link to the Assyrians is being put forward here. The important point is not the alleged guest-friendship between a Bactrian and Near-Eastern king, but the reference to the Bactrian monarchy itself just prior to Cyrus' eastern *anabasis*.

It is also true that earlier arguments involving the Semiramis legend and Alexander's emulation must apply to Cyrus as well. Alexander acknowledged the famous exploits of Cyrus and endeavored to equal or surpass them.¹⁰⁸ The campaigns of the Persian and Macedonian are quite similar, and this is not all the result of later invention or source corruption. Cyrus' activity in Bactria and Sogdiana is certainly historical, and can be confirmed by sources contemporary with or earlier than Alexander's reign. Thus, it is not possible to see in Cyrus' north-eastern campaign a fictional foreshadowing of Alexander's invasion. Rather, the close parallels are part of a genuine pattern caused by similar geographic and political conditions, as well as by *emulatio* on the part of Alexander. After capturing Bactria, both kings conducted military demonstrations against the Scythians on the Jaxartes frontier as a means of winning Sogdiana from Scythian influence. It will be shown in Alexander's case, where the evidence is more readily available, that such campaigning was not a matter of protecting southern farmers from northern nomads, but of preventing their natural coalition and cooperation. For similar reasons, Cyrus and Alexander founded important garrisons on the Jaxartes frontier on the eve of major wars.¹⁰⁹ Under Cyrus, therefore, the Persians were able to extend their authority into Bactria for the first time. According to Ctesias (in Photius 8), Cyrus put his youngest son Tanyoxartes (Bardiya in the Behistun Inscription; Smerdis in Herodotus?) in charge of this region. It is possible that Cyrus also coopted the native nobility of the area. The silence of our records allows no answer, and one might as easily imagine that a royal house of Bactria fled in the face of Cyrus' invasion. As it later happened under Alexander, Cyrus' foes may have sought the aid of nomads beyond the Jaxartes.¹¹⁰ This would explain much, including the greater emphasis upon Cyrus' Massagetan campaign when compared to Herodotus' mere mention of Bactria

proper, just as Alexander's campaigns in the same area were uneventful until he approached the Scythians and then was bogged down in the long and bitter Sogdian campaigns. The great Cyrus, however, did not survive the enterprise.

The accession of Darius the Great, only eight years after Cyrus' death near the Bactrian frontier, marks the beginning of an important new era in the history of the region. The century spanning the reigns of Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes (522-424 B.C.) is the best-known in Bactria's pre-Greek history, and this information improves our knowledge considerably. Indeed, the Achaemenid empire made a strong impact upon its eastern frontier, and it is possible that Bactria played in turn a prominent role in Persian affairs. Some scholars view Darius' parents as former Bactrian rulers and early converts/patrons of Zoroaster.¹¹¹ If true, this direct connection would be of immense importance in the history of Bactria, giving that region a special significance both politically and religiously within the larger empire of the Persian kings. Unfortunately, there exists no evidence which would indubitably confirm or condemn this direct identification; nevertheless, there are some other indications of a close relationship between Darius and Bactria.¹¹²

Darius' accession provides the first example. Whereas most satrapies offered staunch resistance to Darius on the grounds that he was a usurper, Bactria alone with her southern neighbor Arachosia fought on Darius' behalf.¹¹³ Such support for Darius at the very outset of his career, and from an area only recently annexed by Persia and once governed by a son of Cyrus, might derive from earlier ties. These connections are perhaps alluded to in the famous inscription of Darius at Behistun which commemorates the cooperation of the Bactrians and Sogdians. Indeed,

¹¹¹ Rogers, *A History of Ancient Persia* (Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1929; reprint 1971), pp. 18-20; A. T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 106-107; R. N. Frye, *The Heritage of Persia* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), p. 97, considers this direct connection "quite unproved". For Zoroaster's association with Bactria, see the *Avesta* (*Vendidad*) 1.7.

¹¹² There is no chronological evidence which stands against this family tie. According to Herodotus 1.209, Darius would have been about twenty years old when Cyrus was killed in 530 B.C. Thus, Darius' birth may be dated ca. 550 B.C., just prior to Cyrus' Bactrian and Massagetan wars. It is possible to date Hystaspes, Alosa, and Zoroaster in this period; but, they may also be placed a generation or so earlier, making Darius a distant relative. Herodotus 3.70 tells us that Darius' father was Viceregent of Persia before his son took the throne, a prominent position whether he was a former king or not. The death of Darius' parents in a freak accident is reported by Ctesias, *Persica* 38 a.39-38 b.4. For a survey of the sources on the date of Zoroaster see Altheim and Stiehl, eds. *Geschichte Mittelalters*, pp. 9-61. The death of Zoroaster is therein placed in 522/521 B.C., and associated with Darius' suppression of the False Smerdis and the Magi.

¹¹³ See Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire*, pp. 110 and 113 (based upon the Behistun Inscription).

¹⁰⁷ *Cynopatria* 5.1.3.

¹⁰⁸ Alexander's special regard for Cyrus the Great is well-established, as his efforts to honor Cyrus' tomb attest: Plutarch, *Alex.* 69.2; Strabo 15.3.7 (730); Arrian 6.29.4.

¹⁰⁹ Arrian 4.1.3-4 and 4.2.2. These are discussed below in Part Three.

¹¹⁰ See, for examples, Curtius 6.6.13, 7.7.1; 7.7.31; 8.1.3; 8.3.1; Arrian 4.3.6; 4.5.4-4.6.2; 4.16.4-4.17.2. Strabo 11 R.8.410; cf. Herodotus 3.119 for the story of Cyrus.

the name of Bactria's satrap given in the inscription particularly interesting: Darius (Dadlarshish).¹¹⁴

Another example of a close connection may be found in Darius' great devotion to the religion of Zoroaster.¹¹⁵ It is true, of course, that many things might explain the king's Zoroastrian zeal; however, the association of both Zoroaster and Darius' family with Bactria would be telling. All would be easily explained on the basis of Darius' Bactrian background, especially if his recent ancestors (if not parents) were the famous first converts to the new religion.

The family of Darius has many possible ties to early Bactria. The name of the Bactrian queen who first embraced Zoroastrianism, for example, is repeated in Darius' queen Atossa. Referred to as 'all powerful', Atossa was the daughter of Cyrus and the wife of three successive kings: Cambyses, the Magian pretender, and finally Darius.¹¹⁶ Like queens in other eastern legends, she clearly served in an important political capacity, adding legitimacy to the royal claims of these successive kings. Whether she was of Bactrian origin cannot be proven on the basis of her name alone; however, it is noteworthy that her sister Roxana bore a royal name that would become the most famous in the history of Bactria.¹¹⁷ Though tenuous, if taken together these suggest possible familial ties between Darius and Bactria.

Even more significant are the sons of Darius and Atossa, since their careers clearly reflect the importance of Bactria to the empire as a whole and to the eastern frontier in particular. Xerxes, of course, was destined to become Darius' successor, while his brothers held what may have been vice-royal positions in Bactria. Ariamenes, for example, was satrap of Bactria at the time of Xerxes' accession after the death of their father in 486 B.C.; the uncle Artabanus had been satrap somewhat earlier.¹¹⁸ So strong was Ariamenes' local support that the Bactrians revolted on his behalf, much as they had for Darius himself. Another brother, Masistes, was later made satrap of Bactria.¹¹⁹ His appointment suggests, again, the

importance of this satrapy and the practice of placing a member of the royal house of Darius at its head. Masistes' stature is also evident in his position as one of the six chief infantry commanders during Xerxes' invasion of Greece.¹²⁰ Taking his important place as commander of the Bactrians and Sacae was a fourth brother, Hystaspes, the namesake of Darius' (Bactrian?) father.¹²¹

The case is even stronger when Herodotus' curious account of Masistes' death is considered. Unfortunately set within a tangled web of intrigue, love, lust, jealousy, and excessive cruelty, Herodotus reveals the details of Masistes' revolt against Xerxes.¹²² The tale is typically Herodotean in its emphasis upon personal motives to explain major events, but the distasteful details do not disguise the fact of Masistes' bid for power.¹²³ With Masistes' wife and daughter again playing the pivotal roles of powerful eastern women, the story sets Masistes against his evil brother Xerxes. Conferring first with his three sons and an army of supporters, Masistes decided to stir revolt in Bactria and thus check his brother's abusive powers. Herodotus comments (9.113) that Masistes' plan was likely to succeed because the satrap was strongly supported by the Bactrians and Sacae (a noteworthy alliance). As it happened, however, Xerxes was able to destroy his brother's family and their forces before they were able to reach the safety of Bactria.

The younger sons of Darius and Atossa, then, were all closely associated with Bactria, and two were able to establish a dangerous degree of autonomy there. Completing this pattern, let us add the events of the succeeding generation. In the place of his brother Masistes, Xerxes appointed his own son as satrap of Bactria. This royal personage carried into a third generation a name intimately associated with the 'ruling house' of Bactria: Hystaspes.¹²⁴ Furthermore, when Xerxes died in 465

¹¹⁶ Herodotus 7.82.

¹²¹ Herodotus 7.64. Hystaspes had been satrap of Parthia, showing a further concentration of Darius' sons in and around Bactria, while filling major positions.

¹²² Herodotus 9.107-113.

¹²³ Note the pivotal roles of royal women once again. These details include Xerxes' successive desires for his brother's wife and then daughter, the various marriage arrangements meant to satisfy the king's lust and his brother's likes, the fatal 'out of many colors' (like Desdemona's kerchief), and the fate of Xerxes to grant the disastrous wishes of his lover and his wife. Also suspicious is the name of Masistes' daughter, Ariamita, since in the preceding passage (Hdt. 9.107) Masistes is nearly killed by a certain Ariamites. Herodotus' *logos* sets up Masistes and his wife as a most virtuous pair who are nearly undone by Ariamites, but soon after destroyed by Ariamita, with the help of Xerxes' lust and his wife's cruelty. This is the last example of Xerxes' *hubris* to be found in the pages of Herodotus. For interesting considerations on the meaning of this story to the whole history, see Sir John Myers, *Herodotus: Father of History* (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 116-117, 299-300.

¹¹⁴ See Roland Kent, *Old Persian: Grammar, Texts, Lexicon*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1953) and George Cameron, 'The Persian Satrapies and Related Matters,' *JNES* 32 (1973): 47-56.

¹¹⁵ Showen, for example, by Darius' constant reference to Ahura-Mazda in his official pronouncements; cf. Altheim and Stiehl, eds. *Geschichte Mittelasiens*, pp. 58-61. The alleged collaboration of the prophet in the Magian revolt creates an interesting argument on the part of Altheim/Stiehl: Zoroaster was by chance a victim of Darius' rise to power. The blame for the slaughter of Magi, however, was later transferred to Alexander (pp. 61-62).

¹¹⁶ Herodotus 7.3 ('All Powerful'), 3.88 (marriages).

¹¹⁷ Ctesias, *Perika* 12, epit. 43.

¹¹⁸ See Plut., *Them.* 14.3; Plut., *De An. Frat.* 18; Justin 2.101.11; and Cook, *Persia*, p. 134.

¹¹⁹ Herodotus 9.113.

¹²⁰ Diodorus 2.69.2.

B.C., this Hystaspes pursued an almost predictable course of action—he led the Bactrians in revolt against Xerxes' other son and eventual successor, Artaxerxes I.

On the basis of this evidence, it is clear that Bactria occupied a prominent place in the empire of the Achaemenid Kings, and was perhaps the key satrapy on the eastern frontier. Cyrus' conquest and Darius' consolidation under his own family gave this region a notable place in the political history of the Persian Empire, while Zoroaster's legendary activities there were of added religious significance. It has been shown that this satrapy was generally placed under the control of close relatives of the reigning king. In addition, Bactria became a frequent base of revolts led by, or on behalf of, royal contenders for the Persian throne including Tanyoxartes, Darius, Ariamenes, Masistes, and Hystaspes son of Xerxes.

If to these facts one adds the possibility that the royal house of Darius had direct antecedents in Bactria, then the political role of this region becomes all the greater. The descendants of Darius governing in Bactria would naturally find themselves in a vice-royal position, whether or not this was a matter of official policy as would be the case for their early Seleucid successors. Bactrian satraps of the royal blood would find themselves semi-autonomous and within easy reach of local Bactrian (and often Scythian) support if the opportunity—or need—for revolt should arise. Given the clear evidence for Bactria's strategic importance and military reputation, the early Persian period sets a powerful precedent for later political events in the area.¹²⁵

While political developments suggest that rebellious Bactria was not easily subsumed into the empire, it is clear that the Persians were able to integrate the area fully into the cultural and economic life of the empire as a whole. The strong impact of the Achaemenids upon the east may be seen, for example, in the persistent use there of Aramaic, Persia's *lingua franca*, long after Alexander's conquest. Aramaic inscriptions of Asokan (ca. 273-232 B.C.) and later Hellenistic date have been found at places like Laghman, Kandahar, Taxila, and Ai Khanoum, while (as shown above on the coins of Agathocles/Agathuklayasa) the Kharosthi alphabet was also a legacy of Persia's administrative language.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ There are notable objections to these conclusions. For example, see S. K. Eddy, *King is Dead*, pp. 92-95. More cogent are the remarks of P. Briant, *L'Asie centrale*, pp. 69-80, especially 75-77. He warns, quite rightly, against over-emphasizing Bactria's place in Persian history. Other satrapies were governed by members of the royal house, and the satrapal revolts may reflect Achaemenid (rather than local Bactrian) ambitions. Still, the evidence suggests that Bactria was at least among the important rank of provinces in the empire, and the anchor of the eastern frontier with a record of revolt.

¹²⁶ For a convenient survey of the inscriptions, see Altkhin and Hammond, *The Archaeology of Afghanistan* (London: Academic Press, 1978), pp. 192-200.

In a context suggesting an officially sponsored unification of the imperial economy, Darius' building inscriptions at Susa list products supplied from the east, including lapis lazuli.¹²⁷ Similar efforts to trace the flow of people (as opposed to products) have been hampered by limited bureaucratic records and by a serious onomastic problem. As Briant has repeatedly warned, it is risky to identify names as 'Bactrian' or 'Sogdian'; nevertheless, he expresses confidence that Persian rule in the east brought about a significant level of mobility by individuals and groups.¹²⁸ The evidence for Achaemenid cross-colonization is sufficient enough, both in terms of Bactrians resettled in the west (especially in Asia Minor) and in terms of westerners (especially Greeks) relocated to Bactria.¹²⁹ Finally, the numismatic record makes it plain that Bactria was fully engaged in the larger economy of the Persian Empire, and the artwork associated with at least one hoard (the Oxus Treasure) suggests a similar artistic integration.¹³⁰ Excavations at Takhti-Sangin have recently added considerable new evidence to support the conclusions drawn from the artwork and coins of the Oxus Treasure.¹³¹ This Greco-Bactrian temple site, whose architecture shows (as do certain buildings from Ai Khanoum) a strong Persian influence, contained over five thousand offerings. Many of these works of art date from the sixth through the fourth centuries B.C. and demonstrate just how influential were Achaemenid artistic traditions in Bactria.

Thus, whatever may result from future improvements in the dating of Bactria's early culture sequence and of efforts to match this archaeological record with legends of a pre-Achaemenid monarchy, the

¹²⁷ See E. Will, *Grec et l'Orient*, pp. 37-38; David Fleming, "Darius I's Foundation Charters from Susa and the Eastern Achaemenid Empire," *Afghan Studies* 3/4 (1982): 83-90.

¹²⁸ Briant, *L'Asie centrale*, pp. 60-61 and 89-99. Briant does not see any special significance in the fact that some of the Bactrians at Persepolis were irrigation workers.

¹²⁹ See the previous note, and a fuller discussion below in Part Three.

¹³⁰ R. Curtel and D. Schlumberger, *Trois montaniers d'Afghanistan* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1953), pp. 1-64; H. Troxell and W. Spengler, "A Hoard of Early Greek Coins from Afghanistan," *ANSMN* 15 (1969): 1-19, and R. D. Barnett, "The Art of Bactria and the Treasure of the Oxus," *Iranica Antiqua* 8 (1968): 33-53.

¹³¹ This site, explored since 1976, contains impressive material representing Achaemenid, Greek, Indo-Gandharan, and Scythian artistic traditions. The Persian artwork is of importance here, though the Hellenistic and later material is equally important and must be considered in its place. The excavators think it possible that the Oxus treasure may originally have been part of these temple offerings at Takhti-Sangin. On the finds, consult the following illustrated works authored jointly by B. A. Litvinsky and I. R. Pichikyan: "The Temple of the Oxus," *JRAS* (1981): 133-167 and "From the Throne of Stone," *The UNESCO Courier* (July 1985): 28-31. A votive inscription in Greek has been the subject of much discussion, for which see Litvinsky, Pichikyan, and V. G. Vinogradov, "The Votive Offering of Artosokos, From the Temple of Oxus in Northern Bactria," *VDI* (1985): 84-110 (in Russian with English summary).

picture we have of the early Persian period is fairly clear. Achaemenid Bactria, though politically restless, was economically and culturally a functioning component of the empire. It had its cities, its irrigated system of agriculture, its immigrants and emigrants, its Persian bureaucracy and language, and its notable place in the trade patterns of east and west. More fieldwork will obviously sharpen our focus and probably increase our awareness of the Persian presence in Bactria, just as the single site at Ai Khanoum has dramatically removed all doubt about the later Greek presence in this same area.

Such research will be especially important for the later Achaemenid period, covering the reigns of Xerxes II through Darius III. This century (424-330 B.C.) is poorly represented in our literary sources, leaving scholars at a loss regarding political affairs in Bactria until the historical veil is lifted again by the invasion of Alexander.¹³² Although this lapse in our records is regrettable, it must not be allowed to mark an absolute, sterile break in Bactria's cultural and political history. Past historians have used this unfortunate gap, together with the usual view that Alexander inaugurated an entirely new political order in the east, to justify this as the proper beginning for Bactria's historical development.¹³³ Yet, history should not share with tragedy the convenience of commencing always in *medias res*. In the present case, a pattern has been established which helps to bridge this gap in the sources; the perpetuation of that pattern as soon as the sources are full again suggests the value—and validity—of this fresh approach to the problem.

Bactria was brought back into the historical spotlight by Alexander the Great's invasion of the Persian Empire. The swift passage of the Greco-Macedonian army from Asia Minor to eastern Iran in four short years, during which Alexander journeyed to Siwah and won three major battles elsewhere, contrasts sharply with the next phase of the operation: the prolonged and costly three-year campaign in Bactria and Sogdiana. This circumstance gave to the Greeks a long, unfavorable look at the land and people of Central Asia. What they saw and what they wrote reflects, of

¹³² There is one cryptic comment in Diodorus (14.20.4) which is worthy of mention. During the power struggle between the young Cyrus and Artaxerxes Memnon, Cyrus' rebel army feared in 401 B.C. a march to Bactria. It is possible that Bactria is singled out here simply because it was so remote and forbidding. It would be interesting to know whether something more significant was meant, such as Bactrian support for Cyrus or Cyrus' need for such support. It is curious, nevertheless, that Bactria figures somehow in this revolt as in previous ones: cf. *OGIS* 264 on Orontes son of Artasyras, a Bactrian émigré to Armenia who led a revolt there against Artaxerxes II.

¹³³ Similar 'reasoning' (using the dearth of early Seleucid evidence) led Tarn, Narain, and others to use the numismatic record of the Diodotid revolt in the mid-third century to mark the beginning of the Hellenistic Bactria; see the Introduction above.

course, a region thrown into confusion by the presence of a substantial military force. Thus, as argued above, the Bactria that we are able to see in this period was anything but 'normal', and the invaders were anything but impartial in their judgements. Thus, if the native population was called savage because it dispersed to the protection of mountain strongholds instead of blissfully farming and conducting trade, the modern historian must not be inclined to believe Plutarch that the Bactrians were always barbarians in the worst possible sense until civilized by Alexander's army.

In this troubled age, the first Bactrians to face Alexander were apparently two thousand military colonists in Asia Minor who fought at the Granicus River in 334 B.C.¹³⁴ In time, the Macedonians' steady advance required a much greater commitment to the cause of Persia's defense. After Darius III lost the major engagement at Issus in 333 B.C., the levies from the eastern satrapies were summoned to the west.¹³⁵ At Gaugamela in 331 B.C. where the fate of the Persian Empire would be decided, the Bactrians and their neighbors played a major role in Darius' plan of defense.¹³⁶ Indeed, this important arm of the Persian forces was commanded by Bessus, one of the most prominent men of the empire and destined to be Darius' self-appointed successor. Bessus was not only the satrap of Bactria, but also a member of Darius' own household.¹³⁷

In light of earlier events, the special status of this Bactrian satrap makes perfect sense and continues into the reign of Darius III the pattern set by Darius I. The sequel, too, comes as no great surprise. Defeated by Alexander for the final time at Gaugamela, Darius resolved to find safety in a predictable place: the redoubtable satrapy of Bactria.¹³⁸ But Darius the king was no more successful than Masistes the satrap, and so he was murdered before Bactria could be reached. The assassin was Bessus himself, together with his Bactrian, Sogdian, and Scythian supporters.¹³⁹

Whatever else may have motivated the murder of Darius, it is clear that Bessus aimed not only to remove the king, but to replace him. With his power base in Bactria, Bessus acted no differently than all the known

¹³⁴ Diodorus 17.19.4; cf. Briant, *L'Asie centrale*, pp. 93-94.

¹³⁵ Curtius 3.2.9; 4.6.1-4; and 4.9.2.

¹³⁶ See the detailed account given by N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 140-146; and E. W. Maserden, *The Campaign of Gaugamela* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1964).

¹³⁷ Diodorus 17.73.1; Arrian 3.21.5. It is uncertain whether Darius really feared to summon the powerful satrap Bessus, as Curtius 4.6.1-4 claims, or whether this is a rhetorical device to set the stage for Bessus' later treachery.

¹³⁸ Diodorus 17.73.2.

Bactrian satraps who preceded him. In fact, it was only a short time later that Bessus assumed the royal insignia as the Great King of Persia.¹⁴⁰ A single problem remained for the man who would be king—Alexander claimed that right as well.

It was not as mere king of Macedonia, but also as ruler of Persia that Alexander crossed the Hindu Kush into Bactria during the spring of 329 B.C.¹⁴¹ Having reacted quickly to Bessus' challenge, Alexander presented himself quite openly as the 'legitimate' Persian king and treated Bessus as a rebel.¹⁴² Alexander created a Persian court, adopted important elements of Persian dress, experimented with Persian protocol, instituted Persian military units, and made certain that he himself performed the familial duties of his Persian predecessor.¹⁴³ Alexander not only maintained much of Achaemenid administrative structure, but he also made every effort possible to keep prominent Persians in high positions. Thus, in the extreme east, Alexander took the risk of granting satrapal authority to such men as Satibarzanes, Amedines, Proexes, Tyriaspes, Artabazus, Oxyartes, Arsaces, and others.¹⁴⁴ While most of these satraps were subsequently replaced, it is clear that Alexander was compelled to gamble on their loyalty during the most dangerous period of his easternmost campaigns in order to enhance his image as Great

King. The element of risk was indeed very great, as Satibarzanes' revolt made plain from the start, but this only proves how important it was in this area to preserve the outward appearance of Achaemenid rule.

By every means possible, Alexander acted the part of a Persian king who must suppress a rebellious Bactrian satrap. In this there was no dawning of a new age in the east—it was merely Achaemenid business as usual in Bactria. It is important, therefore, to see in Alexander's invasion of Central Asia the perpetuation of a pre-Greek political pattern. Alexander clearly plotted his course *within* the long tradition of Persian rule in the East, not against it. As such, there was no sharp transfer of political authority from Achaemenid to Argead, nor from barbarian to Greek, during Alexander's 'conquest' of Bactria. In fact, so effective was Alexander's appeal to continuity and legitimacy that there was no immediate need for a military conquest at all. As long as Alexander acted out the traditional role of a relatively unobtrusive Persian king, his march through Bactria and Sogdiana was largely uncontested. The ease with which the king traversed this entire area is often overshadowed by the long and bitter war he subsequently waged there, but it must be remembered that Alexander never had to join battle against Bessus. This failure of Bessus to mount any real opposition against his rival can best be explained in political rather than military terms.

It is not difficult to understand how Bessus was beaten by Alexander's political propaganda. Bessus himself had murdered the Achaemenid king, not Alexander or his army. Bessus could only hope to show that his own leadership was superior to Darius', and that by kinship and deeds he was the man to preserve the eastern empire from Alexander. Bessus' reputation, exaggerated no doubt by the Battle of Gaugamela, spent itself quickly. Alexander cut off Bessus' eastern escape route by turning his flank via Arachosia and occupying the main passage of the Hindu Kush. The foundation of Alexandria *sub Caucaso* provided a safeguard there, while numerous villages supplied the advancing army.¹⁴⁵ Then, against the formidable rigors of the Hindu Kush, Alexander and his army crossed into Bactria to test the deeds of Bessus.

When Bessus first established himself at Bactra as King Artaxerxes, his power appeared quite formidable. He called upon his various Scythian

¹⁴⁰ Diodorus 17.83.3; Arrian 3.25.39; Curtius 6.6.13; *Mez Epit.* 3. Saluted earlier by his close companions: Arrian 3.21.4.

¹⁴¹ For an excellent analysis of Alexander's new royal position, see A. B. Bosworth, "Alexander and the Iranians," *JHS* 100 (1980): 1-21. Also valuable is P. Goukowski, *mythe d'Alexandre*, Vol. 1, pp. 30-68. Alexander's role as an Achaemenid king has long been recognized by prominent historians of the period (e.g., E. Badian, "The Administration of Empire," *G&R* 12 (1965): 172-173); however, not all have agreed. For example, a recent biography of Alexander provides an interesting example of special pleading to the effect that Alexander's title 'Lord of Asia' was in fact "a claim greater than and in practice excluding being heir to Darius": N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great*, p. 313, n. 58. This presses the point unnecessarily, since Alexander (and for that matter, Philip) did not exclude being heirs to the Macedonian throne while amassing other and often greater titles. This was one of Alexander's great dilemmas; see Part Three and the broad discussion of Alexander's evolving position in Altheim and Stiehl, *Geschichte Mittelalters*, pp. 195-234.

¹⁴² Alexander had already sent couriers to the satraps and generals of Bactria and surrounding areas to order their loyalty to himself: Diodorus 17.64.2.

¹⁴³ Bosworth, "Alexander and the Iranians," pp. 4-8; Goukowski, *mythe d'Alexandre*, pp. 30-56.

¹⁴⁴ Badian, "Administration of Empire," pp. 174-177, and *supra* note 142. One might easily add a number of lesser rulers, such as Chorienes/Sisimithres, who were defeated at then confirmed by Alexander in their former positions of power: Arrian 4.21.1-9; Curtius 8.2.24-32. A number of Bactrians, including relatives of Alexander through his wife Roxane, and yet another Hyaspes of Bactria, were even enrolled in the king's guard: see Bosworth, "Alexander and the Iranians," p. 13. For the personnel of Alexander's army and government, consult Helmut Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf probablen Grundrissen*, 9 vols. (München, 1926-35), 1: 17-18.

¹⁴⁵ The city: Diodorus 17.83.1-2; Curtius 7.3.23; Arrian 3.28.4. See Bernard, "Diodore XVII, 83, 1: Alexandre du Caucase ou Alexandre de l'Oxus," *Journal des Savants* (1982): 217-242. The needed supplies: Strabo 15.2.10. On the chronology, see C. A. Robinson, Jr., "When did Alexander Reach the Hindu Kush?" *AJP* 51 (1930): 22-31; though important, this is certainly not, as Robinson claims, the only major chronological problem in Alexander's career. For cities in Central Asia, consult V. Tschirikow, *Die hellenistischen Städtegründungen von Alexander dem Grossen bis auf die*

allies for support and had some eight thousand Bactrians under arms.¹⁴⁶ Yet, Bessus' plan was a scorched-earth defense to slow if not stop Alexander's advance.¹⁴⁷ Rather than hold the passes leading into Bactria, or fortify the principal cities of the region, Bessus chose instead to abandon the heartland of his 'kingdom'. It was a doomed decision, but he had no other—Alexander had already stolen a political victory.

Although Alexander's army was greatly weakened by the severities of Bactria's climate and terrain, there was no effort to stop its advance. Indeed, the principal cities of Bactria actually opened their gates to Alexander while Bessus' army of Bactrians deserted and disbanded to their native villages; 'Artaxerxes' was forced to withdraw into Sogdiana with those who had not yet changed their loyalty.¹⁴⁸ With the aid of the local inhabitants, Alexander and his troops were reprovisioned by the time they marched unopposed into the very capital of the satrapy.¹⁴⁹

It is generally argued, of course, that the speed or direction of Alexander's march was not anticipated by Bessus, and the latter was thus forced to fall back in haste.¹⁵⁰ This may be true, as far as it goes; but, the important question is how Alexander's destitute army moved so successfully through devastated territory. The one thing Alexander could not do was conduct sieges without supplies. Thus, the amazing thing is that Alexander did not have to take cities, not even the well-fortified Bactra. These fortresses would have hoarded foodstuffs in advance as the remainder was destroyed by Bessus' torches. If the latter's retreat were indeed part of a larger plan, the cities could greatly slow Alexander or close ranks behind him if he passed. Yet, Alexander was helped, not hindered, by the Bactrians. Bessus had lost support as satrap no less than as 'King Artaxerxes'.

¹⁴⁶ Curtius 6.6.13 and 7.4.20; Arrian 3.28.8. At another point, Curtius 7.4.30 gives Bactrian cavalry strength at 30,000.

¹⁴⁷ Arrian 3.28.8. Curtius 7.4.1-19 reports Bessus' "war council" with a similar plan to withdraw from Bactria to a defensive line at the Oxus.

¹⁴⁸ Arrian 3.28.9-10; Curtius 7.4.19-21. This is not as Bessus originally intended. Diodorus 17.74.1-2. The decision of Bessus not to attack the exposed army of Alexander is considered by A. B. Bosworth, *Commentary*, Vol. 1, p. 371. Bosworth, too, suggests that Bessus' decision was forced upon him because the morale (loyalty?) of his Bactrian cavalry was in doubt. Bessus, too, was clearly hoping to gain further support from his Sogdian and Scythian allies. Note the similarities shared with Cyrus' invasion, as indicated earlier.

¹⁴⁹ Curtius 7.5.1, where Alexander leaves at Bactra the army's baggage train. The reprovisioning of the troops must be due to the cooperation of the cities Drapsaca and Aornus, where the only supplies could be found. Donald Engels, *Logistics*, p. 97 assumes that the army could only be supplied if the area had not been properly devastated by Bessus, but the sources suggest that the cities must be the solution to Alexander's supply problem (as the villages of the Hindu Kush had been).

¹⁵⁰ See, for example, Tarn, *Alexander*, pp. 65-66.

All of this suggests that Bessus could not organize a 'nationalistic uprising' at all against a 'hated foreign invader'.¹⁵¹ Bessus' only strategy, a scorched-earth policy, proved ineffective because his Bactrian army deserted and his fortresses—even his capital—chose not to defend their walls. In an area renowned before and after for its guerrilla forces and the staunch resistance of its cities and towns, this quiet submission of Bactria is quite notable. Alexander himself was somewhat surprised and off-guard as a result of this easy success. Anxious to capture his forsaken rival, he left a Persian, Artabazus, as his own satrap in Bactra with a small garrison; then Alexander and his main force marched without supplies into the Turkestan desert.¹⁵² Without water and supplies, this march from Bactra to the Oxus was a terrible disaster.¹⁵³ Again it was the weather which played havoc with Alexander's army, not a Persian enemy, and again the stricken Macedonians were not attacked while indisposed.¹⁵⁴

Even more surprising, Alexander chose *after* this difficult march to discharge some nine hundred veterans.¹⁵⁵ The size and circumstance of this demobilization is quite interesting. It is likely that this group of mainly Thessalian mercenary cavalry was released because the men were demoralized by the desert disaster, and had lost interest in advancing further.¹⁵⁶ Thus, it may have been as punishment that they now must immediately cross the desert again, if not the Oxus also. Some of the released soldiers, however, were old and unfit Macedonians. Why these veterans should have advanced from Bactra across the desert, only to be released at the Oxus, requires another explanation. It would seem that Alexander had anticipated resistance at the Oxus, a logical military calculation requiring maximum troop strength. This would provide another reason why so few men were left behind to garrison quiescent Bactra. After crossing the Oxus, however, Alexander was able to recon-

¹⁵¹ This stands against the view in Altheim and Stiehl, *Gedachte Mitteilungen*, pp. 204-205.

¹⁵² Arrian 3.29; Curtius 7.5.1. Even later, when the area was endangered by Spitamenes' revolt, Bactra was garrisoned by only a handful of injured Macedonians and eighty mercenary cavalry: Arrian 4.16.6. This shows how secure Alexander considered Bactra and Bactria, as opposed to Sogdiana and Scythia.

¹⁵³ Curtius 7.5.1-18; cf. Arrian 3.28.8.

¹⁵⁴ According to Curtius 7.4.5, Bessus had planned to defend the Oxus "like a wall" against the army. The wall proved to be quite porous.

¹⁵⁵ Arrian 3.29.5 states that these men were dismissed just before the Oxus itself was crossed, whereas Curtius 7.5.27 places this event after the river-crossing. The crossing itself was no easy matter since Bessus had destroyed the bridge: Curtius 7.5.17-18; Arrian 3.29.2-4.

¹⁵⁶ On the basis of Arrian 5.27.5; cf. Bosworth, *Commentary*, p. 324. The 'mutiny' figures prominently in Robinson's famous article "The Extraordinary Ideas of Alexander the Great," *AHR* 62 (1956/57): 326-344.

sider matters. In light of Alexander's experience in Bactria to this point, it may be that the king realized he had so completely undermined Bessus' authority that these nine hundred unable or unwilling troops were no longer essential as a fighting or garrison force. Furthermore, it is probable that prominent defectors from Bessus' dwindling camp had already reported to Alexander the imminent demise of 'Artaxerxes'.¹⁵⁷ Alexander could easily assume at this point that the threat of Bessus had ended and that Bactria-Sogdiana was secure.

It was the arrival of Alexander at the Oxus, in fact, which prompted the complete betrayal of Bessus.¹⁵⁸ Spitamenes and the other chief associates of Bessus arrested the "usurper" (tearing from him his royal insignia) and made arrangements to deliver him up to Alexander for punishment. Spitamenes himself joined Ptolemy, who had been sent ahead with a detachment of troops for the purpose, in escorting the chained 'criminal' to Alexander the 'rightful king'.¹⁵⁹ Thus was Bessus, like other Bactrian satraps before him, the victim of his own ambition.

The interrogation, mutilation, and later execution of Bessus by Alexander and the Persian nobility were all calculated to underscore that Bessus' crime was not merely the murder of Darius, but also his onerous claim to the Persian throne in defiance of Alexander.¹⁶⁰ By Persian practice and with Persian support, Alexander eliminated the 'false Artaxerxes' and assumed his unchallenged place as Darius' successor. This was a political victory based upon Persian precedent in the east, and it in no way signified the sudden end of the Achaemenid era or the beginning of Greek rule in Bactria. As long as Alexander's authority could be

¹⁵⁷ Curtius 7.4.19 reports the desertion of Gobares the Mede prior to Bessus' retreat from Bactria; Diodorus 17.83.7-8 gives a similar account, giving the name as Bogodaras. Diodorus adds that Alexander's politic reception of this deserter attracted Bessus' leading commanders to Alexander's court.

¹⁵⁸ For what follows, see Arrian 3.29.6-30.6; Curtius 7.5.19-26 and 36-43; Diodorus 17.83.8-9.

¹⁵⁹ See Bosworth, *Commentary*, pp. 376-377 for a discussion of the discrepancies in the versions of Ptolemy and Aristobolus. Bosworth concludes that Spitamenes and his associates did not flee, but surrendered themselves to Alexander. Spitamenes may even have hailed Alexander as king; Curtius 7.5.37.

¹⁶⁰ Since others who had assisted in the murder of Darius (including Spitamenes) were never punished, one must never forget that Bessus alone usurped royal power. Curtius 7.5.36-39 emphasizes Bessus' false claim to the throne and the zeal of the Persians themselves for his various punishments. Such were the crimes of Bessus, however, that it is fruitless to argue too legalistically about which deed was more punishable; they are part of one great act of treason. The real danger is that scholars will continue to argue away Bessus' damning usurpation in the eyes of Alexander, for which see J. R. Hamilton's summary of views in *Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 114-115, and Hammond, *Alexander*, p. 316, note 80 which makes the odd statement that "Bessus was not prosecuted as a pretender to the throne of Persia, because Alexander had put that throne in obedience and Persia was now a republic" (emphasis mine).

accepted by the native peoples of Bactria, there was no real hint of a Macedonian conquest. In this sense, the advance of Alexander into Central Asia was not yet a turning point in the history of Bactria-Sogdiana. The king was imitative, not innovative, and this was the key to his early success. It was only when Alexander aimed for something more than political recognition that he and his army were opposed, and that a Greek frontier was gradually forced upon the land and people of Bactria.

PART THREE

A FRONTIER UNDER FIRE

Alexander and the 'Barbarian' Resistance

The mere passage of Alexander and his army across Bactria and Sogdiana did not mark a turning point in the history of Central Asia. While it was not an everyday occurrence for the population of this region to evade a large Graeco-Macedonian army in its midst, the scattering of people from field to fortress did not signal a permanent break in their ancestral ways of life. They no doubt planned to return in time to fields and flocks, to renew old crops and irrigation canals, to revive the patterns of trade and travel between the cities, towns, and villages of this still-Persian satrapy. The situation in the summer of 329 B.C. was thus highly charged, but not radically changed by the march of Darius' avenger.

In the struggle between Alexander and Bessus for Darius' throne, we have seen that the Bactrians all but crowned the foreigner. There was no passion for the cause of Bessus, much less a nationalistic uprising. One by one, the principal nobles of Central Asia had abandoned the 'usurper' and made their peace with King Alexander; they then were rewarded and allowed to return to their various homes.¹ The Bactrians once serving under arms with Bessus had already gone back to their native towns and cities.² There was a Persian, old Artabazus, in place as Alexander's new satrap at Bactra.³ The only scars upon the land had been made by the torches of Bessus, not of Alexander.⁴ There were no battlefields, no siegeworks. Indeed, the ghostly passage of the new king's army had left behind no signs at all save for the dead (all Graeco-Macedonian victims of the Hindu Kush and Turkestan plain) or the old and infirm quartered with small garrisons at major cities. There were no native casualties, except for Bessus and the Branchidae, a colony of *Greeks* massacred by Alexander.⁵ For the non-Greek natives of Central Asia, Alexander was

just another Persian king who had suppressed a seditious satrap. Once he and his army were gone, their lives seemed destined to repeat the old rhythms of the past.

But soon after Bessus was delivered to Alexander for punishment, the latter was forced to fight the longest and perhaps most costly campaign of his entire career in this very satrapy which had just surrendered. The dramatic turn of events had little to do with Alexander's accession as Persian king, which the Bactrians and Sogdians never contested. Nominal control of the region the inhabitants were willing to concede to the new king, but any direct interference in local affairs was likely to arouse immediate opposition. It was Alexander's disruption of regional socioeconomic patterns on a permanent basis that suddenly made the presence of his army unacceptable to the inhabitants of the area.

Passing peacefully through Bactria and Sogdiana, Alexander and his army reached the Jaxartes River before meeting the first signs of native resistance.⁶ There, an unsuspecting party of Macedonian foragers was suddenly attacked by a large force of local 'brigands'.⁷ During Alexander's fierce counter-attack, the king himself was wounded and the war intensified.⁸ Those tribes which lived along the Jaxartes then massacred the Macedonian garrisons placed in their towns, and the general revolt spread southward through Sogdiana and even drew in a few Bactrians as well.⁹ Thus, without apparent warning, there began here two years of savage warfare waged all across Sogdiana on a scale unequaled anywhere else in Alexander's *anabasis*.

⁶ Alexander's cavalry was resupplied with horses from the area and his forces passed through heavily fortified Maracanda, the chief city of the region, without incident: Arrian 3.30.6; cf. Curtius 7.6.10 for the defenses of Maracanda. This passage in Curtius (which mentions hostilities) has created much unnecessary confusion, and must here be clarified. The context of Curtius' remarks is not Alexander's (uneventful) march to the Jaxartes, but a later episode. This should be clear from Curtius' previous statement (7.5.36) that Alexander had already reached the Tanais (Jaxartes). There is nothing in Curtius' statement which contradicts Arrian, who himself places the Maracandan conflict after Alexander had reached the Jaxartes: Arrian 4.3.2 and 4.6.4, which (like Curtius) states that Alexander reached Maracanda from the Jaxartes on the fourth day.

⁷ Curtius 7.6.1-9 (giving 20,000 Sogdians); Arrian 3.30.10 (giving the enemy force at 30,000). Numbers, of course, must be treated carefully in our sources. Curtius, for example, often uses '30,000' to mean 'a great number': 30,000 Bactrian cavalry (7.4.30); 30,000 cattle (8.4.20). For a heavy casualty figure, Curtius often chooses the number 2,000: Gazaca storm (8.4.13); infantry at the Polyimetus River (7.7.31-39).

⁸ Curtius 7.6.3-9 claims that the barbarians were overcome with grief and surrendered, but this quaint gesture is not compatible with Arrian's account (3.30.11) nor Curtius' own text (7.6.14). Far from surrendering, Arrian describes a suicidal defense on the part of the Sogdians which allegedly cost them more than 20,000 lives.

⁹ Arrian 4.2; Curtius 7.6.14-15. Throughout the war, the Bactrians proper were rarely involved in the fighting in any substantial way.

¹ These included the prominent nobles who arrested Bessus, the so-called hyparches Dataphernes, Catanes, and Splanenes: Curtius 7.5.21. They were later summoned back by Alexander for a meeting at Bactra: Arrian 4.1.5.

² Curtius 7.4.20; Arrian 3.28.10.

³ Arrian 3.29.1; Curtius 7.5.1.

⁴ Curtius 7.4.1-19; Arrian 3.28.8.

⁵ Curtius 7.5.28-35. On the Branchidae massacre, see the discussion below.

It is important, of course, to identify the causes of this long and vicious confrontation which erupted so late in Alexander's march through Central Asia. Why, like Cyrus before him, did Alexander face stiff opposition only when he reached the frontier zone of Sogdiana-Scythia? What, in fact, were the native peoples there suddenly resisting? The usual answers follow upon the brief suggestions made by Arrian (4.1.4-5): either general fear of Alexander or, more specifically, the king's 'ominous' summons of all local leaders to a conference at Bactra.¹⁰ Yet, one may wonder why Alexander was suddenly to be feared in this particular region, and why local leaders such as Spitamenes, who had previously benefited from Alexander's generosity, should now fear to meet the king. In any case, Arrian makes it clear that he is explaining why the prominent natives who had arrested Bessus and gained Alexander's favor would now induce the Sogdians to join the revolt *already in progress*.¹¹ The authors of the rebellion, clearly identified by Arrian (4.1.4), were the barbarians associated with the native cities along the Jaxartes River. Their sudden movement against the Graeco-Macedonians was then joined by the Scythians and many of the other Sogdians, the latter incited by Spitamenes and other nobles who had been ordered by Alexander to help suppress the revolt at the Jaxartes. Eventually, some of the Bactrians were drawn into the war as well, but the war was essentially a Sogdian and Scythian affair. Clearly, some new action of great regional importance had provoked the native population at the Jaxartes River, and their insurrection gradually spread to neighbors north and south.

The only major enterprise undertaken by Alexander at the Jaxartes was the foundation of a new city, Alexandria-Eschate.¹² It was, in fact, just after the site had been chosen and the city planning begun that the immediate area rose up in revolt.¹³ The enterprise was directly inter-

¹⁰ For an example of one who follows Arrian's assumptions, see Hammond, *Alexander*, p. 190. There is also a religious explanation first championed by H. G. Rawlinson, *Bactria* (London, 1912; reprint New York: AMS Press, 1969), pp. 42-43. According to this theory, Alexander 'the accused' had persecuted Zoroastrianism, then plotted the eradication of the 'Iranian knightly class'; there is no reason to believe that any such events really sparked the revolt. On Alexander and Persian religion, see Altheim and Stiehl, *Geschichte Mittelasiens*, pp. 248-263.

¹¹ Arrian 4.1.5; note that Curtius 7.6.14-15 also suggests this. He has Alexander summon Spitamenes and Caranes, the betrayers of Bessus, for their aid in putting down the outbreak. By this time, however, the Sogdian leaders had also joined the rebellion, and were using Alexander's summons as a pretext for resistance.

¹² Arrian 4.1.3-4, 4.4.1; Curtius 7.6.13, 7.6.25-27; Justin 12.5.2. The city's foundation is even noted in the *Marmor Parium* (Jacoby, *FGH* 239 B 7). On Alexander's eastern foundations, see also F. Hohl, 'Alexander's Settlements in Central Asia,' *Antiqua Macedonia* 4 (1986): 315-323.

¹³ Curtius 7.6.13; Arrian 4.1.3-4. Having introduced Alexander's plans for the new city, Arrian remarks 'kai en touto' the neighboring peoples revolted.

rupted by the outbreak of hostilities, and only against fierce opposition was Alexander able to get the new city's walls up to a defensible height.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the king struck back: he stormed and sacked all seven of the Sogdian cities which had revolted in the area, including Cyropolis.¹⁵ Because the inhabitants of these cities were held responsible for the war, they were either killed or enslaved. The cities themselves were razed. Alexander's vengeance notwithstanding, the Scythian tribesmen inhabiting the shore opposite the new city also joined the effort to stop the city's construction. Like the Sogdian city dwellers, the Scythians considered the Macedonian settlement to be an unwelcome stronghold upon their necks and they aimed to help destroy the city and to drive off its Macedonian settlers.¹⁶ Alexander thus prepared, in spite of his own injuries, to lead a highly dramatized assault across the Jaxartes. Meanwhile, too, it was learned that Spitamenes had joined in the revolt and was conducting military operations at Maracanda, no doubt to draw the king away from the Jaxartes in a coordinated effort with the Scythians.¹⁷ A full-scale war was underway; the turning point had come.

The revolt in Sogdiana seems, therefore, to have been a direct response to the foundation of Alexandria-Eschate. So strong a reaction from the Sogdian cities, the Scythians, and such nobles as Spitamenes must be explained in terms of what Alexander's new city represented. It was, after all, the first permanent settlement established by the king anywhere in Bactria or Sogdiana. Only a few soldiers, many of them unfit for active service, had earlier been stationed in the native cities of the region.¹⁸ Thus, the Graeco-Macedonian presence had not earlier seemed particularly large or long-lasting. Alexandria-Eschate, however, marked a considerable change. It was a large new settlement, with circuit walls of sixty stadia.¹⁹ It was, furthermore, of a decidedly military nature quite unlike the older Greek colonies established in the area by earlier Achaemenid kings.²⁰ It was Alexander's intention, according to our

¹⁴ Arrian 4.4.1.

¹⁵ Arrian 4.2-4; Curtius 7.6.16-23. Note that these walled cities could be quite formidable, and that Cyropolis was especially so.

¹⁶ Curtius 7.7.1.

¹⁷ Curtius 7.7.5-7.9.16; Arrian 4.3.6-4.6.2.

¹⁸ The small garrisons left by Alexander in places like Aornus, Bactra, Maracanda, and the Jaxartes cities were generally unable to defend themselves once the rebellion broke loose: Arrian 4.16.5-6; Curtius 7.6.24 and 8.1.4-5.

¹⁹ Curtius 7.6.25. By comparison, Maracanda was seventy stadia in circumference: Curtius 7.6.10.

²⁰ For pre-Alexandrian Greek settlements in Central Asia, note the following references. The Branchidae: Curtius 7.5.28-35; Strabo 11.11.4 (518). Bactra: Herodotus 4.159-205; Carians: Strabo 11.11.4 (517). See also Briant, *l'Asie centrale*, p. 97. There is no reason to accept A. K. Narain's view (*JG*, p. 6) that a substantial number of 'Indo-Greeks' were already inhabiting the area. Bessus was not even familiar with the Greek

sources, to make the city a bulwark between the Sogdians and Scythians.²¹

For perhaps the first time since Cyrus the Great, a ruler of the Persian realm was trying to militarize the Jaxartes in order to create a controlled frontier separating Sogdiana from Scythia. The announced intention to keep the Scythians out of Alexander's empire by means of a military colony ran counter to local, long-established conventions of close interaction between the diverse peoples on both banks of the Jaxartes.²² Cyrus, and his city Cyropolis, had provoked a similarly disastrous reaction on the same frontier, and this was one instance where Alexander's *emulatio* was ill-advised.²³ In the many decades since Cyrus' death fighting the Scythians, this border had clearly reverted to its open, fluid state. Neither Cyropolis, nor any of the other Sogdian cities, was serving as a barrier against the nomads 'outside' the empire. Scythians, Sogdians, and (to a lesser degree) Bactrians were considered peoples of kindred stock, and various of these Scythian tribes had long been active in allied Persian military service alongside Sogdians and Bactrians.²⁴ Indeed, Scythian allies figured prominently among the forces serving with Bessus and, later, with Spitamenes.²⁵ Theirs was a natural collaboration, as shown above in Part Two, and most Persian kings after Cyrus had apparently chosen to accept this circumstance. It was Alexander's insistence that this historic intercourse be permanently halted that touched off the native revolt at the Jaxartes River.

Alexander's decision to break the military and economic bonds between Scythia and Sogdiana may be explained on several grounds. The alliance of Bessus with these able horsemen gave Alexander reason

language: Curtius 5.11.7. There were some earlier Greeks, but these did not fare well during Alexander's invasion (Carians and the Branchidae were destroyed), and certainly were not the basis for the later growth of a Graeco-Bactrian state. With Alexandria-Eschate, the natives knew that a different era was dawning.

²¹ Arrian 4.1.3-4; Curtius 7.6.13. The city was to be a military base from which Sogdiana could be defended and the Scythians attacked, as Alexander did when the foundation was established: Arrian 4.4.1-4.5.1, and Curtius 7.7.5-19, 7.8.1-7.9.17.

²² Alexander had previously warned the Scythians not to cross the Jaxartes without his permission: Curtius 7.6.12.

²³ Curtius 7.9.9-16; Pliny *NH* 6.18 (49).

²⁴ See A. M. Mandelstam, "Les Nomades en Asie centrale dans l'Antiquité," pp. 215-223 in Deshayes, ed. *Le Plateau iranien* (Russian with French summary). The works of P. Briant are most exemplary, especially the following: "'Brigandage', dissidence et conquête en Asie achéménide et hellénistique," *DHA* 2(1976): 163-258; "Colonisation hellénistique et populations indigènes," *Klio* 60 (1978): 57-92; and *L'Asie centrale*, pp. 71-73.

²⁵ Curtius 6.6.13 and 7.4.6; Arrian 4.16.4; Strabo 11.8.8 (513). The sources refer repeatedly to the different native elements involved in the revolt, including those from cities, villages, open country, mountains, and the trans-Jaxartes steppes—literally,

to worry about future challenges to his authority. In any case, the Greeks were generally hostile toward the Scythians because these nomads were considered uncivilized predators whose crude and warlike lifestyle endangered sedentary, civilized societies.²⁶ It was thought proper to keep such 'trouble-makers' at arm's length, and Macedonian kings (including Alexander) had dealt harshly with similar tribes on the northern fringe of the Greek world.²⁷ In a real sense, Alexander reverted to this European perception and policy regarding the Scythians, and thus (Bessus now safely out of the way) the king lapsed from his Persian model into a Graeco-Macedonian one. The record of Cyrus, it is true, Alexander was repeating, but it was a strategy that was never welcome in Central Asia and which other kings had wisely abandoned.²⁸ Recent Persian history called for a swinging door at this frontier, not one barred and bolted.

The foundation of Alexandria-Eschate intensified for the present what Alexander wished to avoid for the future—a hostile confederacy of Sogdians and Scythians on the north-eastern frontier of his new empire. By militarizing the Jaxartes under direct Graeco-Macedonian control, the king produced a reaction which confirmed both his fears and his prejudices. He had himself created an artificial 'march state' where none had existed, and soon faced the military consequences.²⁹ When they had risen in arms, the natives were indeed forced to seek refuge as 'brigands' and 'wild men' among the forests, mountains, and deserts of the region.

²⁶ For the scornful and stereotyped treatment of Scythian peoples by classical writers, consult F. Hartog, "La question du nomadisme: les scythes d'Hérodote," *AAASH* 27 (1979): 135-148, and his book *Le miroir d'Hérodote: Essai sur la représentation de l'autre* (Paris: Gallimard, 1980). Note also the relevant comments of an earlier scholar, K. de B. Cochrington, "A Geographical Introduction to the History of Central Asia," *G* 104 (1944): 27-40 and 73-91. The Alexander sources perpetuate the negative view of Scythian nomads: Curtius 7.8.8-30; Arrian 4.17.5. Arrian 4.1.2 suggests that Alexander used the pretext of one Sogdian alliance just to spy out Scythian military strength.

²⁷ D. M. Pippidi, "Les Macédoniens en Scythie Mineure de Philippe II à Lysimachus," *Ancient Macedonia* 2(1977): 381-396; N. G. L. Hammond, "Alexander's Campaign in Illyria," *JHS* 94 (1974): 65-87.

²⁸ For Persian practice in this particular region, compare the analysis of Briant, "Brigandage," pp. 185-194, to that of Tarn, *GBI*, p. 116. Briant acknowledges that the Jaxartes was only a nominal 'border' of the Persian Empire, and that the Scythian tribes were never fully incorporated into the empire—they rendered tribute and occasional military service to the Great King. Persian cities along the Jaxartes (such as Cyropolis) obviously were not serving as a mighty wall against the Scythians in the days of Darius III and Alexander, as Tarn alleges.

²⁹ Tarn, *GBI*, p. 409 considered the 'march state' a natural phenomenon in Bactria, but no such conditions (a militarized and racial barrier between the settled Bactrians and the alien Scythians) existed until Alexander tried to impose one. Once Alexander left, such areas lapsed soon enough into their earlier socio-economic patterns: Curtius 7.10.1b

Whether true nomads, transhumants, or city-dwellers, their normal life-styles were shattered, forcing them to pursue the crude, animal-like customs (foraging, banditry, etc.) which the Greeks presumed to be their normal habits. The damaging effects were then cumulative, reinforcing prejudices and removing all prospects for a timely and lasting settlement.

There can be little doubt that the king conceived the foundation of Alexandria-Eschate for the military purpose of enforcing a sterile frontier against the Scythians. It was certainly not, as some have argued, for the humane purpose of settling and civilizing the nomads.³⁰ The latter, in fact, were excluded from Alexander's settlements and further alienated rather than incorporated. This practice did more to 'barbarize' than 'civilize' the Scythians.³¹ Nor was it Alexander's purpose to introduce cities ('civilization') among the Sogdians as a beneficent gesture. Those natives who were settled in Alexandria-Eschate were, in fact, ransomed prisoners from the seven neighboring cities destroyed by Alexander when the revolt began; most of these survivors had been urbanized before Alexander's arrival, and their status was hardly improved by being carried off as booty to a Graeco-Macedonian fortress.³²

The precise status of the non-Greek population in Alexander's colonies is difficult to determine, and there is no certainty whatever that the king treated all such settlers and settlements in a uniform fashion. Since the native population was itself so varied, the circumstances of their resettlement may have differed greatly. Some of the prisoners seized in pre-existing cities and later resettled were probably part of the diverse rural population which sought refuge in cities when the revolt erupted. Others were no doubt members of the local nobility, tribal leaders and village chieftains whose status may also have changed much in their new surroundings. Again, this is hardly to say that their lives improved at all. They were likely to have been a segregated, second-class group serving the discharged Macedonians and Greek mercenaries who controlled this and other colonies in the king's name. How all of this altered affairs in the area is problematic, but that fundamental and unsettling changes occurred can scarcely be questioned.

The precise nature of Persian rule in the area, as reconstructed by Briant³³, had been somewhat diffuse. The Great King had tried to control directly the major cities located in fertile and populous districts, and

these in turn exercised general authority over surrounding villages. Xenippa, one of the cities in Sogdiana, is a notable example.³⁴ Areas beyond the administrative territory of a city would be controlled by 'petits princes locaux' who enjoyed varied degrees of autonomy. In other words, royal authority was not very visible in much of the region and it tended to dissipate further where populations were more mobile, more remote, or more loyal to an indigenous nobility unfettered by the Achaemenids. In light of this political 'system', Alexander's actions in northern Sogdiana did mark a fundamental change. By destroying the existing cities which resisted him and resettling the inhabitants of the area in his own, the king meant to exert firm royal authority at the expense of local 'princes'. As Briant maintains, Alexander attacked an ancestral, feudal system based largely on tribes by attaching the population to a new royal city administered by Graeco-Macedonians.³⁵ As a new political settlement quite unlike his earlier *laissez-faire*, Alexander's effort at the Jaxartes was in no way acceptable to the native population.

In spite of the praises to be found in our sources, Alexander enjoyed little success in Sogdiana or Scythia once the natives were aroused into rebellion. The king raided Scythia, for example, but this did not inhibit its support of the Sogdians—much less pacify all Asia as Curtius claimed.³⁶ Alexandria-Eschate and *andropodismos* had little effect upon the Sogdians beyond increasing their determination to resist the Macedonian king.³⁷ If the native peoples were unable to pursue the political, social, and economic patterns of life to which they were accustomed, they were not thereby bettered or beaten. In fact, while Alexander was still at the Jaxartes, Spitamenes and his Sogdian-Scythian cavalry ambushed a detachment of the Macedonian army operating in the Zeravshan valley: over two thousand of the king's troops were lost.³⁸ This engagement proved to be the worst military defeat of Alexander's career, showing how serious the situation had quickly become. The King ravaged the

³⁴ Curtius 8.2.14.

³⁵ The assumption is that Alexander sought to replace the piecemeal approach of his Persian predecessors with a more uniform system, based on an extension of *chora basileia*: Briant, "Colonisation," pp. 78-80.

³⁶ Curtius 7.9.17. Alexander advanced some eighty stadia across the Jaxartes: Curtius 7.9.9-16. The Scythians joined forces with Spitamenes and were conspicuous throughout the two-year struggle; they even raided south of the Oxus: Arrian 4.5.4-4.6.2; 4.16.5.

³⁷ Arrian 4.2-4.4; Curtius 7.6.16-23. I do not know of what period N. G. L. Hammond is thinking when he asserts that Alexandria-Eschate "was the beginning of a new way of life which was to win over the Sogdians and unite them against the Scythians" (*Alexander*, p. 191). This never happened in Alexander's lifetime.

³⁸ Curtius 7.7.30-39; Arrian 4.5-6. This engagement is discussed below in further detail.

³⁰ This view, held by such scholars as W. W. Tarn and Claire Preaux, has been discredited by Briant: "Brigandage," pp. 194-210; "Colonisation," pp. 70 and 74-77.

³¹ In this regard, see the seminal work of O. Latimore, "La Civilisation, mère de Barbarie?" *Annales Economies Sociétés Civilisations* 17 (1962): 95-108.

³² See Briant, "Colonisation," pp. 74-77.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

countryside, but Spitamenes evaded him. The revolt continued unabated as Alexander retired to winter quarters in Bactria (329/328 B.C.).³⁹

Although Alexander had responded to the revolt with systematic repression and destruction, the resistance in Sogdiana merely spread as a result.⁴⁰ The problem was self-perpetuating because Alexander's political and military counter-measures only contributed to the original causes of the revolt. The more he tried to exert his control over Sogdiana, the more resistance he aroused. The king's studied efforts to ravage the forts and fields along the Jaxartes and Polyimetus Rivers are clear examples. As a result, the situation in the following year was no better for Alexander or his adversaries. War was waged all across Sogdiana, while Spitamenes and his Sogdian-Scythian cavalry made strikes against Bactria.⁴¹

His army heavily reinforced by the arrival of Greek mercenaries,⁴² Alexander began the operations of 328 B.C. with a major military drive to suppress the Sogdians and Scythians. Taking Artabazus with him, no doubt to help negotiate with the natives and to shore up the king's earlier image as a ruler of the Persians, Alexander left Bactria proper in the care of four officers: Polyperchon, Attalus, Gorgias, and Meleager.⁴³ Alexander led the main army across the Oxus, and there divided his forces into a five-pronged operation designed to clear all Sogdian forts from the outstretched fingers of the Pamirs. It would seem that Hephæstion swept

up the valley of the Kizil-su River, Ptolemy up the Vakhsh, Perdiccas the Kalinrgan, and Coenus (with Artabazus) the Surkhan-Darya. Alexander led the fifth column back along the Oxus and then on toward Maracanda. After clearing these valleys in much the same way as the Polyimetus at the end of the previous campaign season, the various units would later rejoin the king at Maracanda.⁴⁴

It is the mission of Alexander alone that Curtius (7.11.1-29) describes. Ariamazes, a locally autonomous Sogdian leader, had collected together supplies, armed men, and many other refugees atop a steep spur of the Pamirs.⁴⁵ By this time, Alexander's search-and-destroy missions had driven large numbers of people into such mountain hide-outs where springs and hoarded food-stuffs might sustain them.⁴⁶ Since Artabazus was with Coenus in the next valley eastward, Alexander called upon Cophes, the satrap's son, to negotiate the surrender of the fortress. The 'haughty' refusal of Ariamazes to offer submission drove Alexander to extreme measures. He asked volunteers to make an almost suicidal climb above the enemy, and their success startled the Sogdians into surrender. As a reprisal, the king allegedly scourged and crucified the local nobility, including Ariamazes and all his family. The plundered fortress and surrounding countryside were naturally returned to the authority of Alexander's satrap.⁴⁷

Artabazus and the Macedonian commanders rejoined Alexander at Maracanda as each unit completed its mission. Coenus and Artabazus

³⁹ Arrian 4.7.1.
⁴⁰ Besides the systematic destruction of the seven Sogdian cities, the king also ravaged the countryside in methodical fashion: Arrian 4.6.5-7; Curtius 7.9.21-22. These were areas once crossed without incident or opposition, a point lost in those works stressing an ongoing nationalistic war against Alexander: cf. Altheim and Stiehl, *Geschichte Mitteleuropas*, p. 205, where chronology is blurred and Bessus plus Alexander in *extremis*!

⁴¹ The events of the years 329-327 B.C. have now been examined at length by A. B. Bosworth, 'A Missing Year in the History of Alexander the Great,' *JHS* 101 (1981): 17-39, and in works by Igor Khlopkin, 'The Chronology of the Campaign against Central Asia Launched by Alexander the Great,' *Voprosy Istorii* (1979): 95-104; 'Marschroute des Asiatischen Feldzuges Alexander der Grossen,' *Iranica Antiqua* 17 (1982): 105-129; 'Die Chronologie und Dynamik des Feldzuges Alexanders des Grossen nach Mitteleuropa,' *Antient Society* (1982): 151-172; and *Historical Geography of Central Asian Southern Regions* (Ashkhabad, 1983). With the exception of the article in *Antient Society*, Khlopkin's works are in Russian with summaries in German or English. Bosworth and Khlopkin have attempted to shift the chronology one way or the other in order to smooth out the discrepancies between Arrian and Curtius (Diodorus suffers a lacuna here). The efforts are ingenious, but not convincing in either case: see P. Goukowsky, 'Recherches Récentes sur Alexander le Grand (1978-1982),' *REG* 96 (1983): 239-240.

⁴² Arrian 4.7.1-2; Curtius 7.10.10-13. On the question of reinforcements in general, see R. D. Milns, 'The Army of Alexander the Great,' pp. 87-130 in Badian, ed. *Alexander le Grand: Image et Réalité* (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1976). These Greek soldiers are discussed below.

⁴³ Arrian 4.16.1. They were to patrol the satrapy, but failed in the duty (see below, note 57).

⁴⁴ Arrian 4.15.7-4.16.3 gives the details of this operation, which Curtius truncates by merely mentioning (7.10.13) that Alexander marched for four days in Sogdiana before returning again to the Oxus. Both sources remark on the discovery of oil during this mission (Arrian 4.15.7-8; Curtius 7.10.14; cf. Strabo 11.11.5 (518) and Plutarch, *Alex.* 37.4). This occurred before Ptolemy's column separated from the main army, or during the next operation (see note 48 below). Curtius ignores the other four units of the army, and concentrates instead upon Alexander's own exploits. Paul Bernard, 'Alexandre et le Khanoun,' *Journal des Savants* (1982): 131-135 has set much of the record straight for these events.

⁴⁵ The site, a precipitous mountain stronghold, was located near the Oxus and not far from the destroyed Branchidae town: Strabo 11.11.4 (517). Thus, it was indeed along Alexander's path to Maracanda. It is nearly impossible to sort out all of the stories about these 'rocks' attributed to Ariamazes, Sisimithres, and Chonienes. Our sources have jumbled together many of the details; compare the 'rock' of Ariamazes with Arrian's account of the 'Rock of Sogdiana' the following year (327 B.C.): Arrian 4.18.4-4.19. One author has attributed the features of this assault to the wrong 'rock'. Curtius' version seems more likely as it stands, especially in its greater detail, the time of year (late spring), and violent conclusion after so difficult a task. See below, note 64.

⁴⁶ Though incredible, Briant accepts Curtius' figure of 30,000 men on the 'rock': *L'Asie centrale*, pp. 81-82. The more turmoil stirred by the war, the more the Sogdians asserted their independence and fortified these 'rocks'.

⁴⁷ Curtius 7.9.28-29. Note that old Artabazus would retire altogether from active service during the following winter of 328/327 B.C., before the capture of Arrian's 'Sogdian Rock' with which this operation is often identified.

were then dispatched against the Scythians while Alexander, Ptolemy, and Perdicas advanced against areas still unassailed in the present operation, presumably the regions westward toward Bukhara and the middle Oxus. One contingent may have been sent to Margiana, where six forts were founded.⁴⁸ As at the Jaxartes a year earlier, Alexander chose to fortify this western frontier against the nomads. The Graeco-Macedonian 'towns' which were planted around the native city of Margiana (Merv) were meant to add a military presence not previously evident, and certainly the settlements were not an attempt to urbanize the oasis. The native reaction is not surprising: the forts were eventually attacked and destroyed by 'barbarians' unwilling to be controlled by them.⁴⁹

While this mission was underway to Margiana, a larger colonization effort was entrusted to the fifth army unit. Hephæstion drew orders to settle the Sogdians into new cities, and his commission must have covered the valleys cleared by each unit before the rendezvous at Maracanda.⁵⁰ Thus, units were now being sent to scour anew and to colonize the western tracts toward Bukhara and beyond, to patrol and probably to reinforce the Jaxartes and its military colony in the north, and finally to set up cities in the eastern regions just swept by the king's divided army. The natives who resisted, whether at the 'rock' of Ariamazes or elsewhere, were hauled away as before and distributed among the settlers of the cities newly founded from one Sogdian frontier to the next.⁵¹ It was an ambitious and intricate plan made possible by the Greek reinforcements which had arrived over the winter months, but it was by its very nature a scheme which incurred native unrest.

It would be most useful to have at hand a complete record of Alexander's colonies in Sogdiana, but our literary sources are not at all precise about the size, location, or physical bearing of these cities. Fortunately, archaeology has begun to lift the veil on at least one corner of Alexander's fortified frontier. It was probably during Hephæstion's mission to colonize the eastern Oxus and its tributaries that Ai Khanoum (Alexandria-Oxiana?) was founded at the strategic juncture of the Oxus

and Kochba Rivers.⁵² This great site, excavated between 1965 and 1978 by the Délégation Archéologique Française en Afghanistan, is one of the most important discoveries in Central Asia. The place was apparently occupied and well-developed by irrigation before the Graeco-Macedonians arrived, but its defenses were soon reinforced wherever nature had not already provided strong protection.⁵³ As its excavator Paul Bernard has explained, the city was well-chosen to receive settlers whose task was to seal this frontier, too, against the nomads.⁵⁴

Bernard and Briant agree that the native population as a whole was exploited as an agricultural labor force for the Graeco-Macedonian colonists who were given a *kleros*.⁵⁵ As on the Jaxartes, the king meant to increase his direct control and to have his colonists cut off contact between the Sogdians and the Scythians. Although he did not necessarily enslave all of his non-Greek subjects, their attachment to the *chora* of his new foundations restricted the political autonomy and ancient economy of the area by inhibiting the normal movements of nomads and pastoralists. This again marked a considerable departure from Persian practice in Bactria-Sogdiana. A diverse array of people, from farmers and pastoralists to urban dwellers, had sought refuge in cities or surrounding mountains. Alexander's columns swept through, accepting surrenders or storming hold-outs. The territory was then converted to *chora basitike*, which was parcelled out to the more compliant of the Sogdians.

⁵² The major publications on Ai Khanoum, most by Paul Bernard, are listed in the bibliography and set in context by my historiographical surveys in *AfW* 1984 and 1987 (Part One, note 12). An heroön and Greek inscription reveal that a certain Kineas may have played a chief role in the city's foundation; other proper names from the site include Lysanias, Molossos, and Tribaios. These are characteristic of Macedonia and its environs, while other names are more specifically Greek: Strato, Philiskos, Philoxenos, Theophrastos, Hippias, Hermaios, Cosmas, Callisthenes, Sosiparos, Zeno, Timodemos, Nikeratos, and Isidora. These names, of course, cover a very broad period of occupation and even Kineas may be part of a later re-foundation under Seleucid auspices. Yet, these are at least part of the Graeco-Macedonian population which held sway over the city from the time of Alexander's campaigns.

⁵³ There may have been Achaemenid walls around the site, with additional fortification dated to the period of Alexander's activities: P. Leriche, "Ai Khanoum: un rempart hellénistique en Asie Centrale," *Revue Archéologique* (1974): 252-3. On the nature of the region and its irrigation network, see J.-C. Gardin, "L'Archéologie du paysage Bactrien," *CRAI* (1980), pp. 480-50; cf. P. Bernard, "An Ancient Greek City in Central Asia," *Scientific American* 246 (1982): 148.

⁵⁴ P. Bernard, "Ai Khanoum on the Oxus: A Hellenistic City in Central Asia," *PhA* 53 (1967): 74-75, 89; Bernard, "Ai Khanoum: Ville coloniale grecque," *DA* 5 (1974): 102.

⁵⁵ Based in part upon the existence of grand, segregated, Greek-style houses apparently inhabited by an elitist Graeco-Macedonian colonial society: Bernard, *CRAI* (1971): 400; *CRAI* (1974): 285-6; *DA* 5 (1974): 102, 198-9; *Scientific American* 246 (1982): 154-157. See also Briant, "Colonisation," pp. 77-78, and Bosworth, "Alexander and the Iranians," pp. 10-11.

⁴⁸ Curtius 7.10.15-16, where Alexander is said to have settled Margiana himself. It is possible that the king skirted the Turkestan desert by recrossing the Oxus and advancing past the Andkhot (ancient Ochus?) to the Murghab. If Ptolemy's unit joined Alexander on this march, the circumstances would be right for the famous discovery of oil (note 44). Bosworth, "Missing Year," pp. 24-28 raises serious objections to the possibility of such a march in 328 B.C. It is indeed a difficult task to make sense of the ancient reports, but that the king colonized Margiana seems undeniable.

⁴⁹ Curtius 7.10.16; Pliny *NH* 6.18 (47).

⁵⁰ Arrian 4.16.3.

⁵¹ Curtius 7.11.29.

Enslaved to these, or in larger numbers to the Graeco-Macedonian colonists who constituted the new urban elite of the area, were the Sogdians who had resisted and were captured. Local princes or 'hyparchs', such as Ariamazes, were held liable for all resistance and so were killed. This, in fact, eliminated the ancestral claims of the native aristocracy, stripped away local autonomy, and allowed Alexander to replace a 'feudal' structure based on tribes and tribal chieftains with a stricter system of control: *chora*—cities—satrap—king.

Alexander's inability to complete quickly such a change became painfully obvious. While these new cities were being founded, Sogdian resentment increased and Spitamenes demonstrated the futility of closing the frontier against his allies. A group of dispossessed Sogdian refugees joined with Spitamenes and his Scythian allies for an attack into Bactria proper.⁵⁶ Because no hostilities had yet disturbed this region, a garrison in one of the Bactrian towns was easily caught by surprise and destroyed. Spitamenes dared next to raid Bactra, where a mere eighty mercenary cavalry had been left with the wounded as a garrison. Thus, at about the same moment that Artabazus the satrap had been sent north with Coenus into Scythia to capture Spitamenes, the Sogdian commander was actually carrying away booty from the satrapal capital. The irony may well have been calculated, and certainly it underscores a miscalculation on the part of Alexander.⁵⁷

The king's military honor was rescued in some measure by the timely arrival of Craterus. This resourceful commander was able to overtake the Scythians, and to engage at least part of their force in battle. Craterus won the engagement, though many of the enemy horsemen escaped into the desert.⁵⁸ Bactria itself never stirred into a major rebellion, but Spitamenes had proven his ability to spread the warfare far and wide.

In the meantime, the second phase of the season's fighting came to a close and the divisions of Alexander's army made their way back again to Maracanda. While waiting for Artabazus and Hephaestion to arrive, the king met with embassies from the Scythian tribes which dwelt beyond the Massagetae and Dahae.⁵⁹ These nomads, less likely to be directly menaced by Alexander's policies in Sogdiana, were willing to offer

⁵⁶ Curtius 8.1.3-6; Arrian 4.16.4-4.17.2, cf. Strabo 11.8.8 (513).

⁵⁷ The task of protecting Bactria in Alexander's absence had been left to Polyperchon, Atabaz, Gorgias, and Meleager (above, note 43). These men are not mentioned in the description of Spitamenes' raid, unless Curtius' Artabaz (who was ambushed as he tried to recover plunder) is a mistake for Atabaz. See below, note 118.

⁵⁸ Curtius 8.1.6-7 claims that the Massagetae escaped, but that Craterus' men killed a thousand of the Dahae. Arrian 4.17.1-2 says that a thousand Scythians were forced to fight, of whom 150 were slain.

⁵⁹ Curtius 8.1.7-10; cf. Arrian 4.15.1-6.

peaceful assurances to the king. They may have been urged to press Alexander's case upon the leaders of Spitamenes' Scythian allies, as later events might suggest.

Anticipating winter, Alexander (with the newly-arrived Hephaestion and Artabazus) led his combined forces on a forage operation to Bazaira. Described as virgin forest with abundant wild game, the area yielded a ready supply of food.⁶⁰ The army returned to its base at Maracanda and matters were set in order for the winter months. Hephaestion was sent to arrange supplies for Bactria. The aged satrap Artabazus was retired, and replaced by a Macedonian cavalry officer, Cleitus 'the Black'. But the strains of the season soon led to serious disputes among Alexander's commanders. Cleitus was killed by Alexander in a banquet brawl; Amyntas son of Nicolaus replaced the victim as satrap.⁶¹

Quite unlike the previous year, the king was determined to keep his army in Sogdiana in hopes that Spitamenes and the Scythians might be caught in battle while they were seeking out supplies. Coenus was given overall command of the Maracandan region with his strength augmented by the troops of Meleager and of Amyntas.⁶² Meanwhile, Alexander led his own contingent to Xenippa, a fertile frontier zone between Scythia and Sogdiana where numerous villages could provide the winter provisions that might attract Spitamenes' men. The king's approach alarmed the natives, including a large mass of 'refugees' who were likely to be in service with Spitamenes. Some 2500 of these reportedly fled, and then fell upon Amyntas in a sudden attack. This engagement is probably the same as that described by Arrian (4.17.4-7), where Spitamenes was pressed by Alexander's tactics and so attacked Coenus and his colleagues near the Sogdian frontier. The Scythians and Sogdians were beaten, and most of the former escaped back into the desert. Later Spitamenes suffered the fate of other famous Sogdian leaders whose standing depended upon their latest successes or failures—he, too, was betrayed and ignobly beheaded.⁶³

⁶⁰ Curtius 8.1.10-19. The whole army participated, and then partook of a banquet.

⁶¹ Arrian 4.17.3, 4.8-4.9; Curtius 8.1.20-8.2.12; Plutarch, *Alex.* 50-52.4; Justin 12.6.1-18. The conflicts between Alexander and his commanders are treated below.

⁶² Curtius 4.17.3 gives that and following details, including the fact that Amyntas' forces now included Bactrian and Sogdian troops. The problem of integrating natives into the invading army has been taken up by E. Badian, 'Orientals in Alexander's Army,' *JHS* 85 (1965): 160-161.

⁶³ Arrian 4.17.7 gives the shortened version of the story. Curtius 8.3.1-16 offers a long and sensational account of Spitamenes' betrayal by his wife, and of Diapherms' arrest by the Dahae. These events occurred sometime during the winter of 328/327 B.C. The fabulous tale about Spitamenes' wife resembles the Herodotean account involving Xerxes and Argynta (Part Two, note 123). Alexander allegedly cast Spitamenes' wife from his camp lest she corrupt his mild-mannered men with her savage ways. Apama, the daughter of this delightful Sogdian couple, was apparently not ostracized. She was

Meanwhile, however, Alexander and Coenus reunited and headed for Nautaca. There they spent the winter and early spring clearing away more mountain strongholds of the local nobility. With nomenclature and chronology that are confusing to the modern reader, the ancient sources set forth a series of Graeco-Macedonian assaults against these 'rocks'.⁶⁴ Like Ariamazes earlier, Sogdian 'hyparchs' such as Oxyartes and Sisimithres/Chorienes had collected supplies into fortified places where their families and fellow-tribesmen might escape Alexander's patrols.⁶⁵ Taken together, the sources suggest that the king captured the family of Oxyartes and so won over this Sogdian noble. Oxyartes then assisted Alexander in subsequent negotiations with Sisimithres/Chorienes. After an extensive siege during a prolonged winter (Alexander had miscalculated the seasons in Sogdiana), Sisimithres/Chorienes surrendered. The capitulants, in fact, supplied the king's army on more than one occasion, especially when 'spring' kept turning unexpectedly to winter again. It was while Alexander was being provisioned on a tour of Oxyartes' native region that the king elected to marry the Sogdian's daughter Roxane. As the long winter at last abated, a force under the command of Craterus was sent to deal with two more Sogdians, Catanes and Austanes, still occupying remote districts. Meanwhile, the king left Sogdiana for Bactria. When joined there by Craterus (who killed Catanes in battle and

married to Seleucus at the mass-ceremony arranged by Alexander at Susa (Arrian 7.4.6) in 324 B.C., and became (singularly among the Asian wives of Macedonian generals) an honored queen and progenitor of the Seleucid dynasty. Like Alexander who married the Sogdian Roxane, Seleucus was the only Macedonian king ever to reign over these regions.

⁶⁴ Arrian's 'rock of Chorienes' (4.21.1-10) seems to be the 'rock of Sisimithres' described by Curtius (8.2.19-33), Plutarch (*Alex.* 58), and Strabo (11.11.4). But Strabo's story about Roxane at the 'rock of Sisimithres' fits Arrian's story of the 'rock of Sogdiana', and Arrian's account of the Sogdian rock shares details with Curtius' story of Ariamazes. The tangle is all but overwhelming. The chronology is also a problem, but some of the confusion here may derive from the unexpected length of the Sogdian winter. Thinking the spring had come, Alexander tried to march from winter quarters and was hit by a devastating blizzard: Curtius 8.4.1-20; cf. Plutarch, *Alex.* 58. A deep snow-fall is mentioned by Arrian 4.18.5 for the 'rock of Sogdiana' where Roxane was captured and for the siege of Chorienes soon afterwards (Arrian 4.21.10). In each instance, supplies had to be collected in the emergency, and thus Alexander experienced something like a second winter in the early months of 327 B.C. Note that the 'rock' of Ariamazes had no snow, but rather rising streams from the spring run-off; that operation belongs to the previous year and must not be confused with the 'rock' of Sogdiana. The similarities in operational detail might derive from Alexander's repetition of a plan that worked. There are enough differences to discern two separate incidents at different times of year and with different outcomes.

⁶⁵ Sisimithres ruled a remote valley (perhaps beyond modern Pendzhikent) which was blocked by a narrow defile and guarded by a fortress: Curtius 8.2.20-22. Arrian 4.21.2-5 concentrates on the ravine that protected the fort. The area controlled by Oxyartes was nearby: Curtius 8.4.21.

captured Austanes), and after more trouble with his own officers, Alexander the Great headed back across the Hindu Kush for his much-delayed invasion of India.⁶⁶

It was thus during the winter of 328/327 B.C. that Alexander 'recovered' from the many setbacks of the previous year and a half. What, we may ask, accounts for the apparent change in the king's fortunes? The death of Spitamenes was certainly significant, but not decisive. Conflicts between the Scythians and Alexander continued.⁶⁷ It was rather the king's treatment of the remaining Sogdian chieftains which ameliorated the situation. Whereas Ariamazes and his kinfolk had earlier been executed by Alexander, it is notable that Oxyartes and the others were handled very differently. Even before Spitamenes was dead, Alexander had softened his stand against the rulers of these remaining 'rocks'. It marked the return of the king to an earlier policy, one which actually brought him back into step with Persian practice and so finally broke the relentless cycle of Sogdian resistance.⁶⁸

Rather than punish the native 'hyparchs' who still opposed him, Alexander actually restored them to their ancestral positions. Their fortresses were not plundered by the winter-weary troops of Alexander; their families (including Spitamenes) were not exterminated; their followers were not enslaved; their lands were not parcelled out to other nations who had surrendered long ago. Like the levies of the Persian kings, Alexander naturally siphoned away the soldiers of Bactria-Sogdiana for his own army, and established a future supply (the 'Epigoni') as well. The sons of the nobles, in particular, were kept in Alexander's camps to ensure the good behavior of their pardoned parents, but this was no onerous penalty. Oxyartes delivered all three of his sons to Alexander, though only two were required to serve with the king: one of them, Ianes, became the commander of a special squadron.⁶⁹ More importantly, Oxyartes' daughter was wed to Alexander early in 327 B.C. This was a notable step by the king because, while his father Philip had married many times to help secure the frontiers of Macedonia, this was Alexander's first for an empire considerably enlarged beyond the Balkan world. There can be little doubt that the realities of Sogdian disaffection,

⁶⁶ Arrian 4.18.1-4.22.3; Curtius 8.2.19-8.5.3.

⁶⁷ After the winter finally broke, Alexander raided the Sacae and delivered their cattle to Sisimithres as repayment for provisions offered the king's army on an earlier occasion: Curtius 8.4.20. The fate of Alexander's cities on the Scythian frontier shows continual conflict: they all had to be refounded in the early third century B.C.

⁶⁸ On this important point, see Briant, *L'Asie centrale*, pp. 86-88, and "Colonisation," pp. 73-74.

⁶⁹ Curtius 8.4.22; Arrian 7.6.5, where Ianes' position causes resentment among the Macedonians.

and not romance, were on Alexander's mind as he married into the native nobility; Roxane was as much a bribe as a bride.⁷⁰

By foregoing the effort to exterminate the remaining Sogdian nobles, the king achieved a similar end by coopting them. Local rulers such as Oxyartes and Sisimithres, and their dependencies, were bound to Alexander personally as well as politically. It is possible, too, that their territories might also be transformed into *chora basitike*, especially through their transfers to other appointments, as in the case of Oxyartes who was later made satrap elsewhere (Parapanisadae).⁷¹ In any case, the continued resistance to Alexander had forced the king to temper his interference into the indigenous patterns of Sogdian life. Cities and settlers could be left to finish the job; Alexander was bound for India.

In a sense, this concession to certain Sogdians brings us full circle again to Alexander's position on the eve of the revolt. No opposition had arisen against his claim to the empire, although many were hostile to what they considered to be his excessive and dangerous interference in their local affairs. This resistance does not seem to have lessened in spite of Alexander's brutality, and only a modification of his regional aims along more traditional Persian lines could allow the king the great luxury of leaving for India. This does not mean, however, that matters were finally resolved and the entire population pacified. It means only that Alexander sought an expedient end to his own military involvement in Sogdiana.⁷²

Most scholars disagree.⁷³ The usual view is that the Sogdians and Scythians were thoroughly suppressed and the satrapy of Bactria-Sogdiana left safely in control of the Graeco-Macedonian colonists. It is tempting, of course, to credit Alexander with complete success in the subjugation of the area. The death of Spitamenes, after all, seemed to end the present threat of continued cooperation between Sogdians and Scythians.⁷⁴ The countryside now contained thousands of new military colonists, reinforced by numerous garrisons.⁷⁵ As already noted, Alex-

⁷⁰ See the remarks of Bosworth, "Alexander and the Iranians," pp. 10-11.

⁷¹ Oxyartes was later acquitted of some charge by Alexander and granted this appointment: Curtius 9.8.9-10; Arrian 6.15.3. This suggests a genuine problem still in Sogdiana and solved by a "promotion" and relocation. Sisimithres, too, had been promised a greater 'province' if his loyalty were proven: Curtius 8.2.32. The Sogdian did so (Curtius 8.4.19-20), but his reward is not known to have exceeded the gift of 30,000 cattle rustled from the Scythians.

⁷² Note Oxyartes' argument to Sisimithres: Curtius 8.2.27.

⁷³ For examples, see the following: Hammond, *Alexander*, p. 106; Badian, "The Administration of Empire," *CAH* 12 (1965): 177; Bosworth, "Missing Year," pp. 36-37.

⁷⁴ Curtius 8.3.1-16; Arrian 4.17.4-7; but see note 67 above.

⁷⁵ The cities: Strabo 11.11.1-12. Justin 12.5.13. The garrisons: Curtius 8.1.3, 10.2.8; Arrian 3.29.1, 4.5.2, 4.16.

ander had reached a settlement with the principal 'hyparchs' of Sogdiana and even married a Sogdian noblewoman. In the king's army were to be found Bactrians, Sogdians, and even some Scythian cavalry, with larger numbers of young men being trained for future service.⁷⁶ Finally, the king had replaced the aged Persian Artabazus as his Bactrian satrap; a Macedonian, Amyntas son of Nicolaus, now controlled the satrapy with a force of 3,500 cavalry and 10,000 infantry.⁷⁷

This appearance of conquest by a Macedonian king is, in the *longue durée*, altogether deceptive. First of all, it must be remembered that Alexander did not need to conquer Bactria or Sogdiana in order to establish his authority there as Darius' successor. Bessus was betrayed to Alexander without a fight, and Spitamenes never laid claim to the throne. The rebellion which began at the Jaxartes was a different matter; it was a later reaction to Alexander's wish to seal off the Sogdian frontier. Once hostilities erupted, the king's counter-measures were even more devastating, contributing to further unrest across an ever wider area. The final result was systematic slaughter, followed by the cooption of certain Sogdian nobles, and the momentary exhaustion of everyone else. None of this suggests that the king had improved his position or increased his permanent power on the Sogdian frontier. The ongoing military commitment was staggering, and soon to fail on this troubled frontier. Alexander's only real success lay in the fact that he was able, after two very difficult years, to extricate himself from a problem largely of his own making.

Less as military conqueror than as political chameleon, Alexander learned to survive in Bactria-Sogdiana by blending the outward character of his reign against whatever background surrounded him. In Bactria proper, this was not a great challenge. Also, the king's modified position toward the local leaders in the mountain valleys of central Sogdiana proved a good match for the old patterns of Persian rule. But the king could not—or would not—duplicate precisely the motley political patterns of the Persian hinterland where the Scythians historically played an active role. This meant, of course, that he merely left the problem behind without solving it. His artificial 'march state' still existed, quite precariously, for his Graeco-Macedonians faced a still alien and unreconciled community on the borderlands. In spite of panegyrics past and present,⁷⁸ Alexander did not civilize 'barbarian' Bactria-Sogdiana nor win over its inhabitants to a new way of life. Any permanent transforma-

⁷⁶ Arrian 5.12.2 (Battle of the Hydaspes). On the 'Epigoni': Curtius 8.5.1; Diodorus 17.108.2. See E. Badian, "Orientals in Alexander's Army," *JHS* 85 (1965): 160-161.

⁷⁷ Curtius 8.1.19, 8.2.14; Arrian 4.17.3 and 4.22.

⁷⁸ Diodorus 17.108.2, 17.109.1-2, 17.110.1-2, 17.111.1-2, 17.112.1-2, 17.113.1-2, 17.114.1-2, 17.115.1-2, 17.116.1-2, 17.117.1-2, 17.118.1-2, 17.119.1-2, 17.120.1-2, 17.121.1-2, 17.122.1-2, 17.123.1-2, 17.124.1-2, 17.125.1-2, 17.126.1-2, 17.127.1-2, 17.128.1-2, 17.129.1-2, 17.130.1-2, 17.131.1-2, 17.132.1-2, 17.133.1-2, 17.134.1-2, 17.135.1-2, 17.136.1-2, 17.137.1-2, 17.138.1-2, 17.139.1-2, 17.140.1-2, 17.141.1-2, 17.142.1-2, 17.143.1-2, 17.144.1-2, 17.145.1-2, 17.146.1-2, 17.147.1-2, 17.148.1-2, 17.149.1-2, 17.150.1-2, 17.151.1-2, 17.152.1-2, 17.153.1-2, 17.154.1-2, 17.155.1-2, 17.156.1-2, 17.157.1-2, 17.158.1-2, 17.159.1-2, 17.160.1-2, 17.161.1-2, 17.162.1-2, 17.163.1-2, 17.164.1-2, 17.165.1-2, 17.166.1-2, 17.167.1-2, 17.168.1-2, 17.169.1-2, 17.170.1-2, 17.171.1-2, 17.172.1-2, 17.173.1-2, 17.174.1-2, 17.175.1-2, 17.176.1-2, 17.177.1-2, 17.178.1-2, 17.179.1-2, 17.180.1-2, 17.181.1-2, 17.182.1-2, 17.183.1-2, 17.184.1-2, 17.185.1-2, 17.186.1-2, 17.187.1-2, 17.188.1-2, 17.189.1-2, 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17.937.1-2, 17.938.1-2, 17.939.1-2, 17.940.1-2, 17.941.1-2, 17.942.1-2, 17.943.1-2, 17.944.1-2, 17.945.1-2, 1

tion or 'pacification' of this frontier became the responsibility of those left behind to enforce Alexander's settlement; but, most of these colonists were no more inclined to be the founders of Greek rule in the east than most of the natives were inclined to accept it. To this other side of the conflict we now must turn—the Greek and Macedonian resistance.

Alexander and the Graeco-Macedonian Resistance

The extraordinary career of Alexander the Great began as king of the Macedonians, but ended as master of many times more. During the momentous thirteen years of a reign which carried him from Aegae to India, from monarchy to divinity, from life to legend, Alexander's position and personality changed continuously. This grand transfiguration, so much at issue in modern Alexander studies⁷⁹, had as one of its most important stages the years of struggle in Central Asia.⁸⁰ Thus, by the time he reached Bactria, Alexander found himself trapped between two very jealous traditions. On the one hand, he had become the ruler of a Persian realm that looked upon him as the legitimate successor of the murdered Darius. This role he accepted, indeed could not avoid even when Bessus was securely in chains. His new subjects held him to the historic patterns of Persian rule in Sogdiana, and raised a serious revolt the moment the king introduced a different policy there. It was not an easy thing for Alexander to grow into the role of Great King of Persia. Nor was it easy for Alexander's troops because, on the other hand, he was expected to remain for them a customary Macedonian king. These Macedonians were men of another world, a western one which had invaded the east and now expected to carry its riches home. To share their power—or their king—with the conquered peoples was not considered a just reward for all the hazards of war. Thus, the more Alexander appeased the native inhabitants of Bactria and Sogdiana, the more he alienated the army which had brought him there.

The Graeco-Macedonian resistance which resulted from this dilemma has long been recognized in the famous cases of the Cleitus affair, the *proskynesis* problem, and the Pages' Conspiracy.⁸¹ Yet, though very impor-

⁷⁹ See Part One, "On Alexander", with notes.

⁸⁰ As noted by Robinson, "The Extraordinary Ideas of Alexander the Great," *AHR* 62 (1956/57): 343-344.

⁸¹ There were other occasions before and after the campaigns in Bactria-Sogdiana, including the Philotas Affair and the 'mutinies' in India and at Opis. On the confrontations at Bactra and Maracanda, see A. B. Bosworth, "Alexander," pp. 1-20, together with Hamilton's survey of the *Proskynesis* affair in his *Commentary*, pp. 150-153. A recent article has appeared on the subject of Cleitus' demise: Elizabeth Carney, "The Death of Cleitus," *GRBS* 22 (1981): 149-160. See below, note 118.

tant, these well-known confrontations within the court do not tell the whole story; we must also look to the colony and camp for a clear picture of this turbulent period. It was, after all, the common soldier who became the settler in Bactria-Sogdiana, and it was the colony which remained to determine the future of this frontier and not the king or his court.

We have already examined the immediate reaction of the 'barbarians' to Alexander's policies in Central Asia, now we must see the other side: the reaction of Alexander's army to these same affairs. From the start, Alexander's army showed no enthusiasm whatever for the colonization of Bactria-Sogdiana. In fact, the troops had been reluctant to go there at all, much less stay as settlers.⁸² War weariness would certainly account for some of this sentiment, but perhaps not all. Before reaching Bactria, the troops under Alexander's command could not have thought highly of the place. The fighting men of Bactria, for example, had already established their reputation in the west as a result of the Persian Wars of the fifth century B.C.⁸³ That fame was fully justified when Alexander's army faced the Bactrians and Sogdians at Gaugamela, as indicated earlier. When Bessus later made his way back to Bactria with these forces intact, there was little eagerness to follow these horsemen to what seemed like the edge of the world.

How much the Greeks and Macedonians knew about Bactria-Sogdiana itself is uncertain; the rarity of surviving references in contemporary literature may either reflect the truth or conceal it.⁸⁴ It seems safe to say that the area was generally associated with the ends of the inhabited earth and thus appeared wild and even forbidding.⁸⁵ One is

⁸² At Hecatompylos there occurred a confrontation between Alexander and his weary troops quite similar to the later incident along the Hyphasis in India. In both instances, Alexander met with his commanders before addressing the army with an impassioned speech to continue the march. For Hecatompylos, see Curtius 6.2.15-6.3.18; Diodorus 17.74.3-4; Justin 12.3.2-3; Plutarch, *Alex.* 47. For the Hyphasis evidence, see F. Höl, "The Hyphasis Mutiny: A Source Study," *JAW* 5 (1982): 33-59.

⁸³ Aeschylus, *Persians* ll.306, 318, and 732; Herodotus 7.64, 7.86, 8.113.2. After the Battle of Salamis, the Bactrians were among those first-rate troops selected by Mardonius to stay in Greece where they later fought at Plataea: Herodotus 9.31. Note also Xenophon, *Cyr.* 6.1.45-46.

⁸⁴ For a minimalist assessment of cultural contact between east and west, see the otherwise informative study made by Jean W. Sedlar entitled *India and the Greek World: A Study in the Transmission of Culture* (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield 1980). The opposite extreme is represented by A. K. Narain, *IG*, pp. 1-6, where a few scant references are so magnified that Achaemenid Bactria was heavily populated with Greek settlers.

⁸⁵ It had been Aristotle's opinion that Ocean could be seen from the heights of the Hindu Kush: *Meteorologia* 1.13.15. Turning from east to northeast, the fact that Alexander's city on the Jaxartes was called the "furthestmost" suggests something about that frontier. As for the strange character of this remote region (not unlike that of India after the accounts of Alexander's expeditions were popularized), consider the odd creatures living there: camels which lived a century (Aelian, *Animals* 4.55) and were renowned for

reminded of how poisoned was the Greek perception of the Sogdian and Scythian 'savages' of this remote region, and how geographers often dramatized such distant and desolate places:

...when they come to deal with those parts of the earth which they know nothing about, they crowd them into the margins of their maps with the explanation, 'Beyond this lie sandy, waterless deserts full of wild beasts', or 'trackless swamps', or 'Scythian snows', or 'ice-locked sea'.⁸⁶

There is every reason to believe that Alexander's Greek and Macedonian troops were reluctant to march to Bactria-Sogdiana, and their actual experiences in the area fully justified any uncomfortable premonitions. Even though no military opposition hindered their initial advance, the army soon suffered two great disasters straight from the dismal margins of the geographers' maps. The first took place as the troops crossed the Hindu Kush mountains into Bactria. Afflicted by cold and near-starvation, the men survived only by eating their baggage animals.⁸⁷ Within weeks of this harsh introduction to the weather of Bactria, the army endured its devastating march across the Turkestan desert from Bactra to the Oxus. This time, due to extreme heat and thirst, the army experienced shimmering mirages and finally lost 'more men than in any battle', a circumlocution for heavy casualties indeed.⁸⁸ These disasters were certainly demoralizing and did not endear this hostile environment to men from the Mediterranean.

Similar misfortunes plagued the army on subsequent marches through the area. In the spring of 327 B.C., for example, the troops were hit by a strange storm during a march from Nautaca to Gazaca.⁸⁹ Thunder, lightning, and torrential hail forced the army to break ranks so that each soldier might seek his own refuge; yet, more than two thousand allegedly died of exposure, some frozen solid where they had huddled against trees for shelter.⁹⁰ The long winter spent by Alexander's army in Sogdiana (328/327 B.C.), as described in previous pages, was a difficult one that seemed determined not to end. Not even Macedonian winters were so reluctant to yield their furious grip to spring.

their strength even in Socrates' time (Athenaeus 5.219 A); gold-guarding Gryphons reported by Bactrians (Aelian, *Animals* 4.27) which were another version of the huge gold-mining ants reported by Herodotus, Megasthenes, and others when writing about the east (see Tarn, *GBI*, pp. 105-109).

⁸⁶ Plutarch, *Thersites*, 1.

⁸⁷ Curtius 7.4.22-25; Arrian 3.28.8.

⁸⁸ Curtius 7.5.1-18; cf. 7.4.27-29.

⁸⁹ Curtius 8.4.1-14.

⁹⁰ Such a disaster is not out of the question; snow and blizzards in the Pamirs have been known to wipe out herds of nearly 2,000 animals. André Singer, 'Problems of Pastoralism in the Afghan Pamirs,' *Asian Affairs* 7 (1976): 157 (an interview of the Khan of Kirghiz, Rahman Quol).

It was after one of these climatic disasters (the desert crossing) that a large number of Thessalian mercenaries showed signs of disaffection.⁹¹ The army's desire to quit the area was already strong before there was any fighting at all. Soon after these unhappy men were dismissed, a rather surreal experience shook the remainder of the army as it marched deeper into Sogdiana. As if by another mirage, the weary troops saw a walled camp inhabited by a group of expatriate Greeks. A century-and-a-half earlier, the ancestors of this wayward clan of Branchidae had been in charge of the temple of Didymaeon Apollo near Miletus. After betraying the temple to Xerxes in 479 B.C., they were ordered to settle in the farthest reaches of the Persian Empire. The discovery of their descendants in Central Asia some six generations later was apparently disconcerting for Alexander's troops: by a vote, the Branchidae were massacred and their possessions plundered.⁹²

How many other such Greeks Alexander found living in Bactria-Sogdiana we cannot say with certainty. There are, however, only a few indications that, over the centuries, would amount to a small number of Greeks deported there as punishment (or, in the case of the Branchidae, protection) by Persian kings. Herodotus reports that such an incident occurred in the reign of Darius I.⁹³ Because of a civil disturb the Barceans of Cyrenaica were forced to resettle in Bactria, where the renamed Barca still existed when Herodotus composed his history. On another occasion, the rebellious Ionians were threatened, says Herodotus 6.9.4, that their maidens might be banished to Bactria. Finally, the existence in Bactria of a city named Cariatas might represent a Carian colony.⁹⁴ Though few, and certainly not indicative of massive deportations of Greeks to Central Asia⁹⁵, these reports do reinforce the reputation of Bactria-Sogdiana as a remote and punishing place from the Greek perspective. The reaction of Alexander's men to the two of these settlements still existing in their day is certainly noteworthy: both were razed, with that of the traitorous Branchidae ritually uprooted and erased as completely as Carthage under the plows of Rome.

⁹¹ See Part Two, note 155.

⁹² Curtius 7.5.28-35; Diodorus (narrative lost, but reported in contents for Book 17); Plutarch, *Moralia* 557 B; Ammianus Marcellinus 29.1.31; Strabo 11.11.4 (518).

⁹³ Herodotus 4.159-205; cf. Aeneas Tacticus 37.6-7.

⁹⁴ Strabo 11.11.4; cf. Briant, *L'Afrique centrale*, p. 97. Alexander levelled this town, too.

⁹⁵ Narain, *JG*, pp. 2-6 exaggerates the implications of these reports. Many reviewers of *JG* have noted the flaws in Narain's position: K. J. Ojha, *EAW* 10 (1959): 117-121, esp. 120-121; P. H. L. Eggermont, *BO* 18 (1961): 169-173, esp. 172; W. Samolin, *Gnomon* 32 (1960): 375-377, esp. 376; and F. W. Walbank, *History* 43 (1958): 125-6, esp. 126. See also P. Bernard and O. Guillaume, 'Monnaies inédites de la Bactriane grecque à Ai Khanoum,' *RN* 22 (1980): 12-13, note 7; and Bernard, *Faillies d'Ai Khanoum IV*, pp. 24-26 on the 'Yavanas'.

The case of the Branchidae presents quite an historical problem because many scholars, W. W. Tarn a leader among them, have dismissed the episode altogether.⁹⁶ The effort to exonerate Alexander of all blame led Tarn to argue that Callisthenes invented the tale and that Cleitarchus later embellished it. On the basis of a bronze knucklebone from Susa, a selective reading of Herodotus, and a strong conviction that Alexander was above ordering such a massacre, Tarn concluded that no Branchidae were ever settled in Sogdiana.⁹⁷ None of this evidence is convincing, and it is quite possible that the Branchidae no less than the Bactrians were deported by the Persians to Bactria-Sogdiana.⁹⁸

If the Branchidae were indeed in Sogdiana, there is no reason to doubt that they were slaughtered; nothing known about Alexander's character suggests that the king could not occasionally be cruel. Curtius, too, remarks that Alexander was encouraged to seek vengeance by at least some of the Milesians in his army.⁹⁹ It is interesting that, while the Branchidae were overjoyed to see Alexander and opened their gates to the Greeks, the latter were of a decidedly different opinion about this 'reunion'. The hostility of the Greeks towards these 'descendants of traitors' does not seem impossible or uncharacteristic when one considers who and where they were.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ See Tarn, *Alexander*, vol. 2, Appendix 13 ('The Alleged Massacre of the Branchidae') pp. 272-275. How and Wells, in their *Commentary on Herodotus*, vol. 2, p. 71, also discount the story; cf. T. S. Brown, 'Anisodorus of Cyme and the Branchidae,' *AJP* 99 (1978): 64-78.

⁹⁷ See above, note 96. Tarn maintained that since Miletus and the temple had been destroyed by Darius I and the survivors sent to the Persian Gulf, there were no Branchidae around to be deported later by Xerxes: Herodotus 6.10-20. He adds that the knucklebone, bearing a dedicatory inscription to Apollo, had to be part of the temple treasure taken from Didyma in Darius' reign. Thus the Branchidae went to the Persian Gulf, not Sogdiana. Against Tarn's arguments, one may note that Herodotus (9.99 and 104) mentions that the Milesians betrayed and destroyed a Persian force after the Battle of Mycale in 479 B.C. Who were these Milesians if all had been killed or deported by Darius? Clearly, the site had been repopulated since 494 B.C. The famous temple, too, would have been re-established as it was again by the time of Alexander and Seleucus, see Parke, 'The Temple of Apollo at Didyma: The Building and its Function,' *JHS* 106 (1986): 121-131. Little wonder that its priests would have welcomed to Xerxes. As for the knucklebone, there is simply no way to link it to Apollo at Didyma or the treasures taken by Darius.

⁹⁸ H. W. Parke, 'The Massacre of the Branchidae,' *JHS* 105 (1985): 59-68; Briant, *L'Asie centrale*, p. 97; P. Bernard, *Fouilles d'Al Khanaum IV*, pp. 123-125; Altheim and Stiehl, *Geschichte Mittelasiens*, pp. 158-161.

⁹⁹ Curtius 7.5.30-31.

¹⁰⁰ The Branchidae were neither brethren nor barbarians as a result of their deportation. Curtius 7.5.29 explains that the Branchidae maintained their ancestral customs, but had already degenerated from their native language and had become bilingual. It is noteworthy that a similar period of time elapsed before the Graeco-Bactrians introduced bilingual inscriptions on their coinage during the age of Agathocles/Agathuklayasa (see Part One).

In addition to the unforgiving attitude of the army at a trying moment in its summer march, the hostile position taken by Alexander is worthy of attention. According to Curtius 7.5.30-31, the king was even more anxious than his army to destroy the Branchidae. His motives have been examined recently by H. W. Parke, who finds wide-ranging reasons for the massacre.¹⁰¹ For one, the king could thus reaffirm the Panhellenic nature of his crusade to punish the Persians for Xerxes' crimes against Greece. It was crucial to assure his Graeco-Macedonians, at a time of discontent, that their leader had not lost sight of his traditional role. This gesture was easier to make now that Bessus was being betrayed. On the other hand, Parke also can see in Alexander's actions a calculated display of 'that absolute power over his Asiatic subjects which was inherent in his new assertion of his position as the successor of Darius'.¹⁰² Thus, the incident suggests both that Alexander was accentuating his new position as Persian king and, at the same time, reclaiming his Graeco-Macedonian heritage. Whether the contradictions here are ancient, modern, or both, Parke is at least right to set this massacre 'into the pattern of tragic episodes which ran from the execution of Philotas and the assassination of Parmenion through the murder of Cleitus to the Pages' Conspiracy.¹⁰³

The important thing is that neither side, Greek or Asian, was fully satisfied with Alexander's position. The king soon tipped his hand to the natives at the Jaxartes, and touched off a long and bitter war against his Graeco-Macedonian policy on the frontier. His own efforts to recover the situation by acts of reconciliation to the Persians (*proskynesis*, the introduction of native soldiers into his army, the eventual co-option of the Sogdian nobility, the marriage to Roxane) continued to provoke his countrymen. The outrage felt by these men is easy to understand in the context of the Sogdian campaigns because, once the Sogdian rebellion was stirred at the Jaxartes, the misery of Alexander's men was compounded by man-made as well as natural disaster. The fighting was especially difficult because of withering ambushes and widespread revolts of a type often written upon this landscape. Invading armies might gain control of cities and major roads, but the hills normally belong to the native rebels. Very early in the Sogdian rebellion, more than two thousand men were killed in an ambush set by Spitamenes along the path of the Polyimetus (Zeravshan) River.¹⁰⁴ For a proud

¹⁰¹ See above, note 98.

¹⁰² Parke, 'Branchidae', p. 68.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* Parke adds the important considerations of public opinion back in Asia Minor, where a new Milesian enterprise at the ancient temple would not welcome the return of the 'barbarized' Branchidae.

¹⁰⁴ Arrian 4.5-6; Curtius 7.7.30-39. See below and notes 117-118.

army accustomed to success, this was its first major military defeat in a quarter of a century.¹⁰⁵ The ability of the enemy to attack suddenly and savagely cost Alexander's army unusually high casualties under harrowing circumstances; therefore, it is not difficult to understand the bitterness of these troops whenever Alexander showed signs of Persian royalty.

It was not only while these men were on the march that they were exposed to serious danger. As described earlier, siege operations were especially hazardous, requiring something akin to suicide squads to reduce mountain strongholds into submission.¹⁰⁶ The earlier capture and destruction of seven cities along the Jaxartes caused such hardships for the Graeco-Macedonians that the enemy were systematically brutalized.¹⁰⁷ The Macedonian wounded had been many, including Alexander himself.¹⁰⁸ Those left on garrison duty, too, were subject to the hazards of war. In Sogdiana, an unspecified number of garrisons were seized and the soldiers in them killed.¹⁰⁹ Those occupying Maracanda and Alexandria-Eschate were also attacked during the revolt.¹¹⁰ Nor were the troops left 'safely' behind in Bactria totally unmolested. An unnamed garrison was assaulted by Spitamenes and his Massagetan cavalry in 328 B.C.; the commander was captured and his troops were killed.¹¹¹ Spitamenes next raided the neighborhood of Bactra itself, drawing out the small force guarding the capital city.¹¹² The garrison consisted of only eighty mercenary cavalry, with a small number of sick and wounded; more than seventy-five percent of this force was destroyed. In service of all kinds, whether in Sogdiana or Bactria, Alexander's Graeco-

¹⁰⁵ The army's last major defeat had been Philip's loss to Onomarchus in Thessaly in 354 or 353 B.C. (Diodorus 16.35). For a discussion of the date, consult Thomas Martin, "Diodorus on Philip II and Thessaly in the 350's B.C.," *CPA* 76 (1981): 188-201.

¹⁰⁶ The 'Sogdian Rock': Arrian 4.18.4-4.19.6; the 'Rock of Ariamazes': Curtius 7.11.1-29; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.3.29; the 'Rock of Chorienes': Arrian 4.21.1-9; the 'Rock of Sisimithres': Curtius 8.2.19-33.

¹⁰⁷ Arrian 4.2-4; Curtius 7.6.16-23.

¹⁰⁸ Curtius 7.6.22.

¹⁰⁹ Arrian 4.1.4.

¹¹⁰ Maracanda: Arrian 4.5.2; Curtius 7.6.24 (contrary to Arrian, Curtius claims that the Macedonian garrison was driven out). Alexandria: Curtius 7.7.1. Maracanda, well fortified before Alexander's arrival, was subsequently strengthened by the Graeco-Bactrians with great haste: Galina Chichkina, "Les remparts de Samarcande à l'époque hellénistique," an article forthcoming from the Centre de Recherches Archéologiques du C.N.R.S. (made available to me in advance by its translator, Dr. Paul Bernard). The paper is based upon the latest Soviet excavations.

¹¹¹ Arrian 4.16.5. The garrison may have been Aornus and Archelaus (a companion) the *phrarchi*: Arrian 3.29.1.

¹¹² Arrian 4.16.5-7; cf. Curtius 8.1.3-5, which gives a similar account involving the commander Atinias and three hundred cavalry. All were killed by the Massagetae and dispossessed Bactrians, after which (as in Arrian) Craterus hastened to the scene.

Macedonians paid an enormous price trying to pacify a region most had never wanted to see.

As almost a mirror image of the native resistance to the Graeco-Macedonians and certain of Alexander's policies, there existed this Graeco-Macedonian resistance to the land and peoples of Bactria-Sogdiana and any policy of their king to govern there as a Persian. In the course of a long and bitter war, during which both sides were brutal and brutalized, mutual distrust and dislike reinforced the natural resistance of one group to the other. Had Alexander ever dreamed of fusion and brotherhood, there was never enough good-will where it mattered most: among his many subjects. Once the fighting began, the king's two basic choices were a Graeco-Macedonian conquest or a Persian compromise—the one as unacceptable to the natives as the other to the newcomers.

There is yet another factor in the frustration of Alexander's settlement policy in Bactria-Sogdiana: the hostility it helped to arouse between the Greeks and Macedonians in Alexander's army. In this case, the fact that Alexander commanded a largely non-Macedonian force is fundamentally important for his campaigns in Central Asia, for it was Greek mercenaries who most opposed the king. The growing tension between Macedonians and mercenaries played perhaps a greater role in the eventual ruin of the king's eastern policies than the resistance of the population itself. This statement may seem startling since the mercenaries were *within* Alexander's army has so seldom been stressed. In fact, one menace *within* Alexander's army has argued in his book on mercenaries that "well Macedonia specialist has argued in his book on mercenaries that 'well led by Macedonian officers, [they] seem to have shown that in ordinary circumstances they were just as trustworthy as citizen or national troops, and to have caused no trouble whatever'.¹¹³ This conclusion was reached over a half-century ago, in an age of unbridled enthusiasm for Alexander's leadership and vision. Since that time, judgements have often been less favorable. As an example, Alexander's fear of the mercenaries stationed with the popular Parmenion in Media has not been overlooked when explaining the king's order that this general be assassinated.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, 1935; reprint Chicago: Aris Press, 1975), pp. 15-16. The work, however, is a superb treatment overall, as its 'predecessor' by H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford, 1933; reprint Chicago: Aris Press, 1961). The way in which these treatises reflect an earlier enthusiasm for Alexander's humanitarian motives may be seen in Parke's explanation (p. 195) for the many colonies in Bactria-Sogdiana: "But probably their chief function in [Alexander's] eyes was to introduce a leaven of Hellenism into entirely barbarous regions." For more recent views, see R. D. Milns, "The Army of Alexander the Great," in E. Badian, ed., *Alexandre le Grand: Image et Réalité* (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1975), pp. 87-129, with discussion following.

¹¹⁴ See, for example, N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 182-183.

The Parmenion murder is only a reminder that Greek mercenaries were a growing threat to the stability of Alexander's empire, as is also evident in the later 'Exiles' Decree' and the dangerous extent to which the king's satraps collected mercenary armies during Alexander's long absence in the east.¹¹⁵ And yet, if these mercenaries were not somehow in Macedonian service, they were available for service in the armies of Macedonia's enemies. Darius of Persia had relied upon them heavily, and Agis of Sparta's war in Greece was conducted with large numbers of anti-Macedonian mercenaries.¹¹⁶ Alexander was obliged to absorb many of these mercenaries, in spite of the danger, into his own army. This expedient helped to offset his dwindling supply of Macedonian troops as the campaigns carried further east. But as the ratio of mercenaries to Macedonians steadily rose, they were *not* well-led by Macedonian officers, *not* trusted as highly as Macedonian troops, and certainly *not* above making trouble.

Consider, for example, the situation we left in Sogdiana as the native population rose in revolt. Alexander's first measure against the rebel leader Spitamenes was the dispatch of a mercenary army of over two thousand troops under Macedonian leadership.¹¹⁷ This turned out to be the worst military disaster of Alexander's reign when the Macedonian commanders, and a native interpreter, blundered into a trap. As the commanders apparently quarreled among themselves, the mercenary force was destroyed. The fact that Alexander's Greek mercenaries blamed Macedonian commanders for the debacle is clear in the sources.¹¹⁸ It is also interesting that Alexander avoided the further use of

¹¹⁵ See E. Badian, "Harpalus," *JHS* 81 (1961): 16-43.

¹¹⁶ See the discussions by Parke and Griffith (above, note 113), as well as the following important articles on Agis' war: E. Borza, "Fire from Heaven: Alexander at Persepolis," *CPh* 67 (1972): 233-245; E. Borza, "The End of Agis' Revolt," *CPh* 66 (1971): 230-233; E. Badian, "Agis III," *Hermes* 95 (1967): 170-192; G. Gawthorpe, "The Crowning of Demosthenes," *CQ* 63 (1969): 163-180; R. A. Lock, "The Date of Agis III's War in Greece," *Jahrbuch* 6 (1972): 15-27; A. B. Bosworth, "The Mission of Amphoterus and the Outbreak of Agis' War," *Phoenix* 29 (1975): 27-43; and A. S. Shofman, "The First Stage of the Anti-Macedonian Movement during Alexander's Campaigns in the East," *TDI* 126 (1973): 117-136 (in Russian with English summary).

¹¹⁷ Arrian 4.5.2-4.6.2; Curtius 7.7.30-39. Alexander suppressed the alarming news within his army for as long as he could.

¹¹⁸ In Curtius' account, the Companion Menecleus fights valiantly, but Alexander threatens the survivors (mercenaries) to keep silent about the disaster. In Arrian, the accounts of Aristobolus and Ptolemy differ somewhat, but each blames a failure of communications if not courage among the Companion commanders for the defeat. Many scholars identify the enmity arising from this disaster as the *cause célébre* a year later at Maracanda when Cleitus' death was preceded by a Greek's shaming the Macedonian generals responsible for a recent defeat: Plutarch, *Alexander* 50 with Hamilton's *Commentary*, p. 141. Elizabeth Carney, "The Death of Cleitus," *GRBS* 22 (1981): 149-160 makes some cogent comments in this regard, but I cannot accept her argument that Cleitus (or

detached mercenary forces during the remaining course of his campaigns in Bactria-Sogdiana. Instead, the king chose to divide his Macedonian forces into five units in order to sweep the hostile countryside, no longer using mercenaries for these independent operations but as garrison and settlement forces.

In this context, it is necessary to speculate about the source of these mercenary settlers. After the mercenary disaster in Sogdiana, Alexander received a large number of Greek mercenary reinforcements (no known Macedonians) at Bactra in the winter of 329/328 B.C. Their arrival is reported with substantial agreement by both Arrian (4.7.2) and Curtius (7.10.11-12), although Curtius supplies the greater detail. The total number of troops is given by Curtius as over 20,000, including eight thousand Greek mercenaries sent by Antipater. The mercenaries sent by Antipater, Alexander's general in Macedonia, may have been brought by the very men who had earlier been sent to Antipater with money to hire mercenaries and now returned, to Alexander at Bactra (Arrian 4.7.2; Curtius 7.10.11-12). These 'troop shuttlers' would not have taken Greek mercenaries from Antipater's forces (beyond a smaller force which reached Alexander at Susa) while delivering funds to recruit badly needed soldiers to fight the war against Agis of Sparta. Clearly, Antipater released these 8,000 mercenaries only after the defeat of Agis. Even then, the situation in Greece was unstable and the Macedonians still needed a large number of reliable mercenaries in the Balkans. Who, then, would Antipater send to the king in Central Asia? The most reasonable answer is the mercenary force which had fought for Agis *against* Antipater. Many of these Greeks were avowedly anti-Macedonian, and some had even served earlier with Darius against Alexander (Curtius 4.1.39; Diodorus 17.48.1). These mercenaries, unemployed and unwelcome in Greece, would logically be the men to be sent out to Central Asia. This is

his family) was directly involved in the mercenary disaster. Although it would strengthen my argument about Macedonian/mercenary problems in general, it seems to me that the Polyimetus debacle was *not* the misfortune at issue in the argument at Maracanda. The offending song ridiculed, in late 328 B.C., an event occurring 'just now' (*mangelos*): Plutarch, *Alex.* 50.8. I suggest the answer lies in the embarrassing attack made by Spitamenes against Bactra, the satrapal capital, a matter of some weeks before the murder of Cleitus. Here, too, the Macedonian generals performed badly. In fact, the hero of the day was a Greek *Kitharoides* whose valor Alexander later honored with a statue at Delphi. What better theme for the Greek poets and singers at Maracanda than the remarkable bravery of one of their own? This surely *was* at the expense of Macedonian pride, and ample cause for Cleitus' bitter complaints. Whether Cleitus himself was part of this battle near Bactra we do not know; but, as the Macedonian chosen to stay in Central Asia and succeed Artabazus as satrap at Bactra, Cleitus had reason to be touchy about what had happened.

precisely what did happen in the case of the Thracians who fought with Agis.¹¹⁹

Such may have been the kind of soldiers who arrived in Bactria in 329/328 B.C. and so became Alexander's settlers in Central Asia. Perhaps Alexander was hoping to solve two problems at once: the military occupation of the north-eastern frontier of his empire (against strong native opposition), and the removal from the Mediterranean seaboard of a large (and lately anti-Macedonian) mass of Greek mercenary soldiers.¹²⁰ These Greek mercenaries arrived in Bactria at a time when Greeks and Macedonians were already on edge in Alexander's army, and no doubt were interested in the conflicting reports about the Polyimetus disaster. In light of later events, it seems that some may also have brought with them the seeds of sedition. One may wonder why Greeks would accept an assignment so obviously disliked. But if these were partly the remnants of an anti-Macedonian movement in Greece, they probably were not recruited in the usual way, and had little choice about their assignments.¹²¹ It is little wonder that trouble was in the offing once their *own* opportunity to revolt should arise. Thus, the decision of Alexander to establish military colonies in Bactria and Sogdiana was a provocation to all parties concerned. This helps to explain the explosion of events in Central Asia after Alexander the Great withdrew from this embattled frontier, leaving unreconciled groups of natives, Macedonians, and Greeks behind to finish what he had started.

The Greek frontier imposed upon Central Asia by Alexander the Great was based upon military colonies, most of them in Sogdiana. Their purpose was to control the nomadic Scythians, to insure the king's authority over his native subjects, and perhaps to remove from the

¹¹⁹ Curtius 9.3.21; Diodorus 17.62 (see below, note 139). On the constraints faced by Antipater here and afterward, see W. L. Adams, "Antipater and Cassander: Generalship on Restricted Resources in the Fourth Century," *AncW* 10 (1984): 79-88; and now A. B. Bosworth, "Alexander the Great and the Decline of Macedon," *JHS* 106 (1986): 1-12.

¹²⁰ Above, note 119. Isocrates (*To Philip*, 120) had urged King Philip II to conquer Asia and to found cities there where wandering Greek war-bands (mercenaries) might be permanently and safely settled. Soon after Alexander's death, Antipater and Craterus planned to pack off the troublesome Aetolians to the furthest desert of Asia: Diodorus 18.25.5.

¹²¹ The 1,500 Greek mercenaries from Darius' army who surrendered after Gaugamela give us a clear example. They had to accept whatever assignments and treatment that Alexander ordered: Arrian 3.23.8-9.

¹²² Oxyartes, Alexander's father-in-law, was himself accused of misconduct. Tyrtaspes (Tirioles in Curtius), governor of Parapanisadae, was executed on similar charges and his province given to Oxyartes, after the latter was acquitted: Arrian 6.15.3; Curtius 9.8.9-10. This, as indicated earlier, had the convenient result of removing Oxyartes from Sogdiana without causing him personal insult or injury.

Mediterranean world a dangerous lot of dispossessed mercenaries. None of these goals was ever achieved, although matters would never be quite the same as before the arrival of Alexander and his army. Because most modern historians concentrate upon the itinerant king and his court, very little attention is given to such affairs once Alexander was no longer present. Thus, with a few words about the success of his Bactrian campaigns and the strength of his Sogdian settlement, the focus usually shifts east again in order to follow the king into India. The situation in Bactria-Sogdiana, however, was far from settled and soon became much worse.

Although Alexander moved on, native unrest had not been eliminated. Some areas were still semi-independent, ruled by a native nobility which had not surrendered its ancestral rights and still had reason to resist. As a result, some continued to stir trouble at various points on the frontier.¹²² Those in areas directly occupied by Alexander's troops were either slaves or second-class citizens, ruled in either case by hostile Macedonians and mercenaries. There were also dispossessed but undefeated bands still roving the Sogdian hills or seeking refuge with the Scythians. The latter, too, remained a threat as a result of Alexander's militarized frontier.

The precarious state of Alexander's 'pacification' is made clear by the size of the military force he left to occupy the area: 10,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry.¹²³ That is a force a third the size of the army which Alexander led from Greece into Asia, and more than a fourth of that which won the great battle of Gaugamela.¹²⁴ What is more surprising, the force left in Bactria may have been much larger if the satrap's army of 13,500 did not include Greeks and some disabled Macedonians settled in towns and cities; in fact, by 323 B.C. there were said to be 23,000 unhappy settlers in eastern satrapies.¹²⁵ Thus, with a strong nucleus of settlers in some eight to twelve new cities in Bactria-Sogdiana, plus others in Margiana, Aria, Arachosia, Parapanisadae, and India, the Greek military presence in the region was remarkable.¹²⁶ These numbers help

¹²³ Arrian 4.22. The satrap left in command was Amyntas, in place of the murdered Cleitus: Curtius 8.2.14; Arrian 4.17.3.

¹²⁴ On Alexander's troop-strengths, see E. W. Mursden, *The Campaign of Gaugamela* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1964), pp. 24-39.

¹²⁵ Diodorus 18.7.2; cf. Hammond, *Alexander*, p. 199. At about the same time, Alexander selected an army of 15,000 (not counting colonists and garrisons), to hold *all of Asia*, which shows how considerable was the force of nearly equal strength for Bactria-Sogdiana alone: Curtius 10.2.8.

¹²⁶ Strabo 11.11.4 mentions eight city-foundations in Bactria-Sogdiana. Justin 12.5.13 gives a dozen. Among these were certainly Alexandria-Eschate and Alexandria-Oxiana. All of the new colonies seem to have been in Sogdiana, as Hephæstion's commission would suggest. Garrisons were placed in all areas, including Bactra, Aornus, Drapsaca, and Maracanda. The sizes of garrisons varied greatly (from about a hundred to a thousand, as indicated earlier); the population of cities can only be guessed from a few known

to confirm the serious military situation which still existed after Alexander's departure, and we must recognize in them the predicament of many thousands like Cleitus 'the Black' who unwisely complained:

'You assign me the region of Sogdiana, rebellious and not merely resolute, but actually impossible to subdue. I am thrown to wild beasts.'¹²⁷

The men left in Alexander's colonies and garrisons were many, and they were in no mood to cooperate either with Asians or Macedonians; in fact, the mercenaries were openly mutinous.¹²⁸ The grievances which sparked such a serious reaction have already been discussed at length; therefore, this sequel to Alexander's settlement should not now be so surprising.¹²⁹ Diodorus, in fact, explains the situation quite clearly: many Greek soldiers forced to settle in Bactria-Sogdiana wanted nothing to do with the place or its people, but endured the hardships of life among the barbarians (albeit poorly—'*chalepos*') so long as Alexander was alive. When the king was believed to be dead, these colonists rebelled against their Macedonian commanders on two occasions in order to return home to their Greek way of life.¹³⁰

The first uprising occurred when it was rumored that the king had been killed in India.¹³¹ Apparently some of the Greek mercenaries unwillingly settled in colonies prepared to march for home.¹³² Although

examples. At Alexandria *sub Caucasus* and some surrounding forts, Alexander settled 7,000 natives plus 3,000 camp followers, unfit soldiers, and mercenary volunteers (Diodorus 17.83.2; Curtius 7.3.23; Arrian 3.28.4); more settlers were added later (Arrian 4.22.5). Arrian makes it clear each time that this satrapy had a Persian governor, but that the city and garrisons were under the authority of a Macedonian. It was probably true as well that all cities in Bactria-Sogdiana were governed by Macedonians or Greeks. In Arachosia, the Graeco-Macedonian population (at Khandahar) consisted of 4,000 infantry and 600 cavalry. Curtius 7.3.4. Though commanded by Macedonians and containing a handful of old and unfit Macedonian soldiers, the bulk of the soldier-settlers in the east was surely supplied by Greek mercenaries.

¹²⁷ Curtius 8.1.35. Alexander, of course, murdered Cleitus before the latter could assume his uncherished duties as satrap. Curtius 8.1.19-2.12.

¹²⁸ Justin 12.5.13. There were at least two rebellions: one in 326/5 B.C. when Alexander was thought to have died fighting the Malli in India (Diodorus 17.99.5-6; Curtius 9.7.1-11), and another in 323 B.C. when the king died en route at Babylon (Diodorus 18.7.1-9).

¹²⁹ Important discussions may also be found in P. Bernard, *Familles d'Asie Mineure* IV, pp. 127-128; L. Schoder, *Unteruchungen zur Geschichte Babylonien und der östlichen Satrapen von 323-303 v. Christi* (Diss. Frankfurt, 1981), pp. 27-37; P. Goukowsky, "Un aspect de l'administration d'Alexandre dans les Hautes-Satrapes: la première révolte des colonies grecs de Bactriane en 325," pp. 7-17 in *La géographie administrative et politique d'Alexandre à Mahomet. Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg, 14-16 juin 1979* (Lectien. Brill, 1981); Holm, "Alexander's Settlements in Central Asia," *Ancient Macedonia* 4 (1986): 315-323.

¹³⁰ Diodorus 17.99.5 and 18.7.1; cf. Curtius 9.7.1-3.

¹³¹ Diodorus 17.99.5; Curtius 9.7.1.

¹³² Curtius 9.7.1: "Graeci milites nuper in coloniis a rege deducti circa Bactra" Diodorus 17.99.5: "oi kata ten Baktrianen kai Sogdiane katakisthentes Hellenes".

their number may have included a few disgruntled Macedonians as well, most Macedonians were constrained by loyalty to Alexander and the command of Amyntas to resist those who tried to leave. By the time it was learned that Alexander had survived his injury, matters had gone too far for the rebels: one faction of colonists in Bactria had killed some of their countrymen and so persisted in rebellion not so much against Alexander, but now in fear of punishment.¹³³

The king's recovery seems to have complicated the situation for all concerned in the Bactrian uprising. The emergence of an uncertain number of shifting factions suggests that the rebellion quickly became disunited as rival leaders proposed different courses of action. The most audacious group was led by one Athenodorus, who seized the poorly-guarded citadel of Bactra, urged certain of the natives to join the revolt, and (most alarming of all) took the title of king.¹³⁴ For factions as zealous as this, there was clearly no turning back.

The actions of Athenodorus and his followers are momentous, and yet they are difficult to follow in our sources. Why and how a Greek mercenary would assume royal authority seems impossible to explain. After all, he had followers, but claimed no kingdom.¹³⁵ The many Macedonians from the Hellespont to the Hindu Kush would not likely recognize the claim whether Alexander were alive or dead, nor would Macedonian loyalists allow the 'king' and his 'subjects' safe passage; as such, Athenodorus faced far worse odds than Xenophon and the Ten Thousand. This royal title, presaging the great political turmoils of the Diadochoi, illustrates the importance of these events in the historical evolution of the east. Even if it should mean something closer to 'independent mercenary captain', a title of this kind suggests a desperate and determined gamble to evacuate Bactria-Sogdiana at all costs.

Since the ambition of Athenodorus was not to establish an independent domain in the east itself, but to leave there as soon as possible, the involvement of unspecified 'barbarians' presents a rather negative first case of Graeco-Bactrian cooperation. Fusion, harmony, and brotherhood did not suddenly replace years of mutual animosity; the Greeks with Athenodorus wanted to leave, and the native peoples wanted nothing better. Thus, according to Curtius, Athenodorus incited (*impulsi*) the natives to join the insurrection against the Macedonians.¹³⁶ This was no

¹³³ Curtius 9.7.1-2.

¹³⁴ Curtius 9.7.2-3.

¹³⁵ Curtius 9.7.3 states that Athenodorus assumed the title "non tam imperii cupidine quam in patriam revertendi cum eis qui auctoritatem ipsius sequerantur".

¹³⁶ The meaning of *impello* is important here, and it is unfortunate that some translators have misconstrued the passage. J. L. Rolfe, for example, uses the phrase "they had forced the barbarians" in his Loeb edition of Curtius; John Yardley suggests

doubt an effort to capitalize upon existing unrest by focusing it against those loyal to Alexander's plans for permanent occupation. This does not entail Graeco-Bactrian unity in any positive sense. In fact, Athenodorus was later assassinated by a Bactrian in a plot hatched by a rival Greek mercenary leader. This rival, who clearly had native 'support' of his own, eventually achieved the Greek goal of escape from Bactria.¹³⁷ Thus, the only cooperation between Greeks and 'barbarians' thus far was for the purpose of ridding each group of the other's company.

The seizure of Bactra, the satrapal capital, also shows the bold and irreversible nature of Athenodorus' actions. The capture of the citadel poses an interesting problem. For all the fighting which followed between divided groups of Greek mercenaries, there is no mention in Curtius of the satrap Amyntas or his Macedonian troops. Curiously enough, Amyntas disappears and by 323 B.C. there is another in his place.¹³⁸ It is quite reasonable to assume that Amyntas was killed during the rebellion, probably in the course of Athenodorus' occupation of Bactra.¹³⁹ The situation was thereby made more serious, and the maintenance of order and unity all but impossible. The mercenaries scattered in the colonies of Sogdiana certainly streamed to Bactria both to escape the worst frontier duty and to help determine the issue of the revolt. Alexander's settlement of the region, such as it was, had thus been reduced to chaos within eighteen months of Alexander's departure.

As already indicated, there were many colonists who shared Athenodorus' objective but not his means. Whether because Alexander was reportedly alive or because Athenodorus was too excessive, many rebels wavered between leaders and courses of action. One faction-leader

¹³⁷ "compelled" in the Penguin edition. But the natives did not require much coercion. Closer to the truth is the use of this verb to mean "urge" or "give an extra shove to one already falling".

¹³⁸ Curtius 9.7.4 and 9.7.11.

¹³⁹ Only Justin 13.4 mentions Amyntas as satrap in 323 B.C., but his satrapal list is suspect because it does not generally agree with those in other sources. Diodorus' more reliable list (18.3.3) records the presence of Philip as satrap in 323 B.C.

¹⁴⁰ This would not be the only case in which one of Alexander's satraps was assassinated in the east. While Alexander was in India, his Greek satrap of Assacena (west of the Indus) was killed and the natives openly rebelled. Trysapes and Philip, son of Machatas, were sent to restore order there; Arrian 5.20.6, cf. E. Badian, "Administration of Empire," p. 179. Furthermore, this Trysapes was later executed on charges of misconduct in Parapanisadae (see above, note 122). As for Philip, who later became satrap in India, the mercenaries under his command assassinated him late in 325 B.C.; Arrian 6.27, cf. 6.15. These Thracian rebels (once serving under Agis against the Macedonians, as shown above) were executed by Macedonian troops, but no replacement as satrap had been sent out by the time of Alexander's death in 323 B.C. The situation south of the Hindu Kush was clearly no better than that in Bactria-Sogdiana, and so Amyntas may well have been another victim of rebellious mercenary settlers.

who emerged was Bion, a fellow countryman of Athenodorus.¹⁴⁰ It was this Bion who plotted the assassination of Athenodorus, a deed carried out by a Bactrian named Boxus as the 'king' reclined at a banquet. The removal of Athenodorus was no solution whatever because Bion was unable to unify the resistance movement. The mercenaries were divided on the question of the assassination, and those who disapproved were not easily deterred from murdering Bion in revenge.¹⁴¹

As emotions ran high, the intrigues continued among the rebels. Bion even plotted against those who had saved his life, but he was arrested along with Boxus. The Bactrian was immediately executed, while Bion was sentenced to torture before his execution. In the midst of torture, however, Bion was rescued by one faction of supporters and his oppressors were forced to flee.¹⁴² Bion and his own followers were thus able to evacuate Bactria-Sogdiana and, Curtius 9.7.11 claims, made their way back to Greece. Diodorus, whose account is much less detailed, does report that a band of three thousand marched homeward with great difficulty, but were later massacred by the Macedonians after the death of Alexander.¹⁴³

These events make it certain that Bactria-Sogdiana, indeed much of the east, was in turmoil by the time of Alexander's death. Revolts and assassinations had become the sad sequel of the king's failure to lasting settlement. His efforts to establish control through external organization (in lieu of genuine conquest, or effective compromise) were unsuccessful in the long run because his settlers were no less hostile than his new native subjects to the idea of permanent Greek settlements. The situation was so dangerous, in fact, that Alexander is said to have warned all his satraps in Asia to disband their mercenaries.¹⁴⁴ The satraps Amyntas in Bactria and Philip in India were already victims, however, and it is doubtful whether order was ever restored in these regions. Philip was never replaced in Alexander's lifetime, and Amyntas' successor disappeared in the course of a second Bactrian revolt soon after Alex-

¹⁴⁰ Curtius 9.7.4-11.

¹⁴¹ Curtius 9.7.5-6. Bion claimed that he was detaching himself against a plot set by Athenodorus.

¹⁴² Curtius 9.7.7-10. Curtius could not explain these shifting events: "inertium, ob quam causam".

¹⁴³ Diodorus 17.99.6. The demise of these men after Alexander's death may be directly linked to the massacre of those who revolted later in 323 B.C. (see below, Part Four).

¹⁴⁴ Diodorus 17.106.3. See also Diodorus 18.8.2-7 regarding the famous Exiles Decree. Note the elegant remarks of E. Badian, "Hannibal," *JHS* 81 (1963): 10-43, especially pp. 25-41. He minily draws together all the loose ends of the mercenary problem and ties together the crisis in Greece, the revolts in Asia, and Alexander's measures to meet the emergency.

ander died.¹⁴⁵ As king, Alexander had won the east; as colonizer, it was lost. The child Antipatry had matured.

¹⁴⁵ On Amyntas, see above, note 138. On Philip son of Machatas, see note 139. The Philip who replaced Amyntas was no longer satrap in 320 B.C.: Diodorus 18.39.6; Arrian, *FGH* 156 F9. It is noteworthy, too, that Philip does not figure in the struggles of the Bactrian revolt in 323 B.C., for which see below, Part Four.

PART FOUR

THE AFTERMATH

Interregnum in the East

Alexander's authority in Central Asia was steadily eroded by the very settlements established to maintain it, and an interregnum began in earnest when the great king succumbed at Babylon. The growing independence of the east would stretch down to the time of Seleucus Nicator nearly twenty years afterwards. During this long period, it is clear that Macedonian rule faltered on the eastern frontier. In the sense that Persian rule had relaxed its grip upon Sogdiana and had granted local autonomy to satraps and their subordinates (the 'hyparchs'), it might be said that the *political* past of Bactria-Sogdiana was thus renewed, while the *cultural* patterns of the region were greatly influenced by the new colonial elite. Thus, to the extent that Alexander and his colonists were willing to conform to ancient practice in the east, a Greek *cultural* frontier was slowly formed among the survivors of war and revolution.

It is likely that the Greeks who remained to shape this process were concentrated in the Oxus valley, the most stable and productive zone of occupation. The Sogdian-Scythian frontier was probably drained of Greek settlers, leaving the area much as it had been before Alexander's arrival. This, more than anything else, may have relieved the tensions between the Greeks and 'barbarians'. Meanwhile, the Sogdians still inhabiting places once held by men like Ariamazes, Sisimithres, Oxyartes, Catanes, and Ausanes would certainly be left to their own devices by the Greeks involved in the mercenary revolts. In fact, before the coming of Seleucus to renew Macedonian rule, Central Asia slowly reverted—Greeks and all—to a pre-Alexandrian state.

Meanwhile, however, the death pangs of Alexander's policies echoed through the east. Most of the colonists who remained in Bactria-Sogdiana after the first revolt were still restless about their plight 'in the most distant reaches of the realm', yet they had not left with the others because they feared Alexander's revenge.¹ When the king then expired at Babylon in June of 323 B.C., the eastern colonists seized the moment

¹ Diodorus 18.17.1. On the sources, events, and important individuals of this period, consult Jakob Seibert's bibliographic sequel to his work on Alexander: *Der Zindler der*

to march away from their Macedonian obligations. They collected together a force of more than 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry under the command of Philon of Aeniania.² The size of this army may, of course, seem inflated since Alexander had originally left only 13,500 soldiers under Amyntas' command, and some 3,000 of these had allegedly marched out with Biton. It is possible, however, that the satrap's 13,500 troops were not a total of all Graeco-Macedonians settled in the region. Alexander had founded in Bactria-Sogdiana from eight to twelve cities, suggesting that a total of some 13,000 colonists would indeed be a very low figure. It is possible, too, that mercenaries from surrounding satrapies also joined in the new rebellion.³

The settlers' revolt of 323 B.C. threatened to empty the east (and so flood the west) with thousands of mercenaries. The situation was quite serious for those Macedonian officers in Mesopotamia who had suddenly inherited Alexander's powers—and problems. For the moment, the arguments over the rights of Argead succession were secondary to the question of interim command. Under these circumstances, the Macedonian Perdicas (holding the Persian office of *chiliarch*) assumed power as regent for Alexander's heirs and sent an army under the command of Pithon to deal with the mercenaries.⁴ Pithon was given 3,800 Macedonian soldiers, with an additional 18,000 troops to be supplied along the way by other satraps; the expeditionary force reached Bactria at a full strength of 21,800 (13,000 infantry and 8,800 cavalry).⁵ Perdicas allegedly ordered Pithon to kill 'all' whom he conquered and to distribute the spoils of war among his troops. The reason, explains Diodorus 18.7.4-5, was that Perdicas suspected Pithon would try to win over the rebels and unite them with his own army, thus allowing the latter to establish independent rule over the eastern satrapies.

The problem, of course, is that none of these settlers were inclined to stay in the east, a very serious flaw in Pithon's 'plan'. There is also the question of Perdicas' odd instructions for a wholesale slaughter of all these settlers just to hinder Pithon's supposed ambitions. In any event, could he expect Pithon to annihilate 23,000 rebels with an army somewhat smaller in size? This situation has never been explained in spite of its obvious importance for this and later periods of eastern Hellenistic history.

² Diodorus 18.17.2.

³ See above, Part Three, note 126.

⁴ Diodorus 18.4-8 and 18.7.1-9.

⁵ Diodorus 18.7.3 and 5. The size of this army adds credence to the figures for the rebel forces. Tarn, *GH*, p. 72 for some reason allows Pithon only the 3,800 Macedonians, ignoring the 18,000 auxiliaries which were raised (Diodorus 18.7.5).

Perdicas certainly planned a show of force, but the idea was to keep most of the settlers in the east. Extermination was out of the question. Thus, while a massacre *did* occur, there is no reason to believe that all 23,000 of the rebellious colonists were put to the Macedonian sword.⁶ Diodorus, in fact, describes in fair detail what actually happened next. We are told that Pithon reached Bactria and won the confidence of Letodorus (a commander of 3,000 of the rebellious colonists) through the intervention of a certain Aenianian.⁷ As a result, this Letodorus and his troops withdrew to a hillside and refused to fight when the rebel Philon faced Pithon in battle. The colonists under Philon were thereby thrown into confusion, and the mercenaries finally fled the battlefield.⁸

Having won the battle, Pithon ordered the defeated settlers to disarm and return to their own colonies. After an exchange of pledges, these Greeks were intermingled with the Macedonians just as Pithon had 'planned'; but, his troops recalled Perdicas' orders and so they set upon the Greek prisoners in spite of their pledge. All the mercenaries were killed and their possessions were confiscated as plunder. His alleged ambitions crushed, Pithon and his Macedonians returned west to Perdicas.⁹

⁶ Many scholars do accept a complete slaughter of settlers; some have offered special explanations about it. F. W. Walbank, *The Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 44-5 accepts the massacre of 23,000 settlers, but adds that other settlers did not rebel and so remained as colonists. Tarn, *GH*, p. 72 discounts the figure 23,000 and accepts instead the number 3,000 from Diodorus 17.99.6. 'This is closer to the truth, it seems, although there is no reason to discount Diodorus' total figure of 23,000 rebels. That 3,000 were killed, I accept, and they are identified clearly enough in Diodorus 18.7.6 whether or not in Diodorus 17.99.6 as well. See Bernard, *Fouilles d'At Khanum IV*, pp. 28-30 and 127-128 for further arguments.

⁷ Diodorus 18.7.5. Philon, the leading general of the rebel army, was also from Aeniania (Diodorus 18.7.2). It seems that Pithon was exploiting native Greek loyalties, just as Antiochus the Great tried to do later in Bactria while dealing with the 'rebel' Euthydemus. The Aenianians were one of the twelve tribes in the Delphic Amphictyony and inhabited the Spercheus River Valley in Greece. There is a curious reference in Strabo 11.7.1 (506) to a group of Aenianians who built a walled city near the Caspian Sea where Greek armor, vessels, and tombs could still be seen in Strabo's time. It may well be true that this story is a fabrication arising from the Jason legend (so *RE*, s.v. 'Ainiana'), but there is one possible alternative. The Aenianians were noted mercenaries who served under the Persians and against the Macedonians: Herodotus 7.185.2; Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.2.6; Diodorus 18.11.1 (the Lamian War). Some were certainly settled in Bactria-Sogdiana by Alexander, where two of them were commanders in this second settlers' revolt (and perhaps acting in concert with the Lamian War). Letodorus' men were massacred, but what of Philon? Did some of these men escape as far west as the Caspian, where the city of Aeniana was reportedly founded? Only the spade is likely to clarify the problem.

⁸ Diodorus 18.7.6.

⁹ Diodorus 18.7.7-9.

Surely this massacre of rebels involved only the 3,000 men with Letodorus, not all the others who escaped from the battlefield.¹⁰ Pithon's intention to spare these particular rebels for services rendered may account for the (apocryphal) story of Perdicas' suspicions and pre-emptive orders. Since those orders are problematic in themselves, and since Pithon did plot for eastern hegemony on a later occasion, it is probable that the massacre of Letodorus' men by the Macedonians was rationalized by Diodorus or his source (Hieronymus of Cardia).¹¹ Perdicas had ordered the Macedonians to bring no settlers back, and to pay their way with plunder from those killed. This they did, albeit with questionable zeal and contrary to Pithon's pledges. Our source makes it seem as though the massacre was neither the fault of the Macedonians nor of Perdicas; it was the unbridled ambition of Pithon to establish power in the east which 'accounted' for what happened. The hostility of Hieronymus, the source behind Diodorus' story, helps to explain this point of view.¹²

Whatever were Perdicas' instructions, they were construed by the Macedonian troops in order to gain revenues and revenge. Whether temporary or not, military service in Central Asia seldom brought out the best in these men from the Mediterranean. Many of these same Macedonians, after all, had developed at first-hand only a few years before a great repugnance for these regions (and perhaps for these same mercenaries as well). Having returned west as far as Babylon, and anxious to march on to Macedonia, Pithon's unlucky soldiers (chosen by lot) had suddenly been ordered instead to go back to Bactria to fight again. Letodorus and his like were the reason for this onerous duty, so it is little wonder that events ended so vengefully.¹³

Pithon's expedition did not bring about an annihilation of the remaining Greek colonies or colonists in Bactria-Sogdiana. Though 3,000 were killed, a fairly large number must have remained. For these survivors of

¹⁰ Whether Diodorus 17.99.6 also refers to Letodorus' men is uncertain. The recurrence of the number 3,000 may be a doublet; but, if so, the problem may lie in the first reference (Book 17) rather than the second (Book 18).

¹¹ For Pithon's activities in the east during 317 B.C., see Diodorus 19.14 and discussion below.

¹² Hieronymus' loyalty to Eumenes, an adversary of Pithon, would make it unlikely that Pithon would receive favorable treatment. On Hieronymus, see Jane Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); for Eumenes, see P. Briant, "D'Alexandre le Grand aux Diadoques: Le cas d'Eumène de Kardia," *REA* 74 (1972): 32-73 and *REA* 75 (1973): 43-81.

¹³ This particular point has been made by P. Briant, *REA* 75 (1973): 63, in order to explain Eumenes' struggle against the prevailing wish of Macedonian soldiers to return home. As he notes, the desire of the Greeks to return west was no different during this tumultuous period.

the second revolt, however, the situation could hardly have seemed worse. They were prisoners rather than pioneers, men unhappy to be in the east but unable to fight their way back west. The scars of interethnic warfare had now added to the toll of occupying this area in the first place, and the artificial 'march state' created by Alexander's 'conquest' was made more perishable than ever. Surely the outposts in Sogdiana had been emptied by those Greeks massing to fight the Macedonians, if not years earlier during the first revolt. The chances for order in the satrapy were therefore slim in this distant and disturbed corner of Alexander's ephemeral empire.¹⁴ Four satraps had already been assigned since Alexander's first uneventful march into the region: the 'retired' Artabazus, the murdered Cleitus, and the 'missing' Amyntas and Philip. There were then major revolts setting the natives against the newcomers, and then newcomers twice against themselves.

What followed under Pithon's settlement of affairs remains a mystery, and we must wonder whether any real administrative structure was set in place. Pithon, like many others before and afterward, was probably compelled to withdraw without much gain. No mention of the satrap Philip appears in Diodorus' narrative of the second revolt, even though we do hear of mercenary leaders such as Pithon and Letodorus; we must assume that he, too, was removed. In fact, the next known appointment of a satrap (Sasanor of Soli) occurred several years later in 321/320 B.C. as part of the administrative arrangements made by Antipater at Triparadeisos.¹⁵

This meeting of powerful Macedonian generals at Triparadeisos was made possible by the sudden demise of Perdicas, the man who had dominated affairs since Alexander's death in 323 B.C.¹⁶ Perdicas' bid for power against his peers in Greece and Asia had involved, in part, the manipulation of Alexander's infant son and successor—Alexander IV. This child, of course, was of Sogdian blood since his mother was Rox-

¹⁴ From Ai Khanoum there comes archaeological evidence which suggests fighting in this period between Greco-Macedonians: Paul Leriche, "Ai Khanoum: Un rempart hellénistique en Asie centrale," *Revue Archéologique* (1974): 231-270. Also, Marcanda shows signs of hasty refortification by Greek colonists in the last quarter of the fourth century (above, Part Three, note 110). This may be associated with any one of the crises in the region from the first revolts under Alexander to the later reconquest of Seleucus Nikator.

¹⁵ Diodorus 18.39.6; Arrian *FGH* 156 F9. This Sasanor may be the Siaganor mentioned in Justin 41.4.1, who had reportedly been satrap of Parthia because no Macedonian would accept the position; see Narain, *IG*, p. 7. Even less would a Macedonian want to govern among the mercenary Greek mercenaries of areas further east.

¹⁶ Perdicas was assassinated during an ill-starred invasion of Egypt in 321 B.C., and his adversary Ptolemy then declined to accept Perdicas' old powers. This opened the way for further wars among the contenders for empire. See Diodorus 18.33-37; Justin

ane.¹⁷ But just as the Greeks in Bactria-Sogdiana were forced to conform to native conditions, so too were the Sogdian Roxane and her son compelled in the west to play out the functions of purely Macedonian heirs. Even in the case of Roxane and Alexander IV, it is impossible to speak of a fusion between east and west or the union of Macedonian and Asian kingship in Alexander's son. After the puppeteering of Perdiccas, the strong Macedonian strings upon mother and child were plucked by old Antipater (who died in 319 B.C.) and then in Greece by Antipater's choice as guardian, Polyperchon.¹⁸ It was Polyperchon who then invited the formidable Olympias, mother of Alexander the Great, to take custody of Alexander IV.¹⁹ The boy was to be purely Macedonian regardless of his Asian blood, if only he should survive the maelstrom of Macedonian politics.

The grandson of Oxyartes was thus never allowed to explore his Asian heritage, but neither was Oxyartes inclined (or invited) to become a Macedonian in turn. Roxane saw both worlds, but never did her father or her son. Like others of her age, Roxane's family suffered fission, not fusion. At the time that she and Alexander IV were making their way in Greece, Oxyartes was firmly entrenched as a satrap in Central Asia. In some ways, his life was not much different *politically* than it might have been had Alexander never come. He was a satrap with growing autonomy among other native satraps in the east. In fact, the distribution of satrapies made at Triparadeisos had been forced to recognize officially the increased independence of the eastern empire: Oxyartes remained in Parapamisadae, while Taxiles and Porus were confirmed in power because they could not otherwise be removed.²⁰

¹⁷ Roxane gave birth several months after Alexander's death: Justin 13.2.5; Curtius 10.6.9; cf. Julius Valerius 3.58 and Pz. *Callisthenes* 3.33.11. She had been kept under guard (Appian, *Syria* 52) as the world waited for another Alexander to be born who might share 'power' with Philip Arrhidaios. Alexander the Great's half-brother. Meanwhile, Roxane allegedly murdered (with Perdiccas' aid) her female rivals in a fit of jealousy: Plutarch, *Alex.* 77. This was, we must not forget, an age of war and violence and not of love and romance. She, like the Sogdian daughter of Spitamenes and his 'savage' wife, the Macedonian generals repudiated the marriages arranged for them by Alexander. See above, Part Three, note 63.

¹⁸ Diodorus 18.48.4. As shown above in Part Three, note 43, Polyperchon had served as one of Alexander's commanders in Bactria.

¹⁹ Diodorus 18.49.4; cf. 18.58.4 where Olympias is warned of the dangers to her grandson during these struggles for Macedonian power. See the guarded remarks of Grace Macurdy, 'Roxane and Alexander IV in Epirus,' *JHS* 52 (1932): 256-261.

²⁰ Arrian, *FGH* 156 F9; Diodorus 18.39.6. See above, Part Three, note 139, for earlier disturbances toward India not unlike those in Bactria-Sogdiana. In fact, Porus was later assassinated, apparently by the Macedonians: Diodorus 19.14.8. So much for any attempts at brotherhood beyond the Hindu Kush; see Martin J. Price, 'The 'Porus' Coinage of Alexander the Great: A Symbol of Concord and Community,' pp. 75-85 in

Only one Macedonian, in fact, seems to have shown any real interest in the east between the demise of Alexander and the rise of the Seleucids. Yet, even this individual, the familiar Pithon, sought only to exploit the growing independence of the eastern satrapies with an eye toward the struggles in the west. After his mission against the rebels in Bactria, Pithon had been a prominent leader in the conspiracy that eliminated Perdiccas.²¹ It was the betrayal of Perdiccas and the conference at Triparadeisos which made Pithon satrap of Media.²²

After the death of Antipater in 319 B.C., the satraps of Asia stirred revolutions to enhance their individual powers, the formidable Antigonos in particular. Appointed *strategos autokrator* of Asia by Antipater, Antigonos planned to appoint his own candidates as satraps and gain control of the eastern treasures.²³ Antigonos' ambitions were seriously challenged by Eumenes of Cardia, a non-Macedonian who gained considerable power and retired east to the 'upper satrapies'.²⁴ Eumenes invited Pithon and Seleucus, the satraps of Media and Babylonia, to join him against Antigonos, but these two Macedonians refused.²⁵ What developed was a keen competition between Eumenes and Pithon for control of the 'upper satrapies'. It turned out, however, that events finally played into the hands of neither Pithon, Eumenes, nor Antigonos—but rather of Seleucus.²⁶

Pithon was able to reach no further east than Parthia, where he executed the satrap Philotas and replaced him with his own brother Eudamios.²⁷ At this, all the other eastern satraps joined forces against Pithon and defeated him in battle; Pithon retreated to Media and later joined with Seleucus. This left much of the east already disposed and mobilized to assist Eumenes in his further struggle against Antigonos and

Simone Schecters, ed. *Studia Paulo Nestor Obelia I. Numismatica Antiqua* (Leuven: Peeters, 1982).

²¹ Diodorus 18.36.5.

²² Pithon resigned his regency, allowing Antipater to gain power: see Diodorus 18.36.6-7 and 18.39.2-3. For Pithon's appointment to Media, see Diodorus 18.39.6 and 19.12.2; Arrian *FGH* 156 F 9.

²³ Diodorus 18.5.1-5. Antigonos' main interests were confined to western Asia, but the east was obviously useful as a recruiting ground and revenue source for mercenaries.

²⁴ Diodorus 18.53, 18.58-63, 18.73; Plutarch, *Eumenes*; cf. above, note 12.

²⁵ Diodorus 19.12.

²⁶ For what follows, see Diodorus 19.13.7-19.14. That Pithon was acting alone, as Diodorus suggests, seems unlikely. His actions carry out the designs earlier attributed to Antigonos (above, note 23). Again, the hostility of Diodorus' source (Hicronymus) would account for insinuations of sedition and personal ambition.

²⁷ At Triparadeisos, Antigonos had appointed Philip as satrap of Parthia: Diodorus 18.39.6; Arrian *FGH* 156 F9. Philotas, whose appointment is otherwise unrecorded, may have been supported by Eumenes. This is all the more likely since all the other eastern satraps supported Eumenes: Diodorus 19.14.2.

his allies. That Eumenes was not himself a Macedonian may account in part for this orientation, but also important was the abiding dislike of many Greek mercenaries in the east for Piton personally.

A survey of those who fought at the Battle of Paracetaene (316 B.C.) between Eumenes and Antigonus shows, however, that the east was still very much divided into hostile camps. Those who defeated Piton and joined Eumenes included: Sibyrtius, satrap of Arachosia, with 1,000 infantry and 610 cavalry commanded by Cephalon; Androbazus, sent by Oxyartes from Parapamisadae with 1,200 infantry and 400 cavalry; Stasander, satrap of Aria and Drangiana, with 1,500 infantry and 1,000 cavalry including troops from Bactria; and, Eudamus (not Piton's brother of the same name) from India, where Porus had been assassinated, with 300 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 120 elephants.²⁸

This represents a very strong bloc of eastern support. The most notable absentee in this roll-call of eastern satraps is Stasanos, the Greek satrap of Bactria-Sogdiana. It is possible that his name dropped out of Diodorus' text because of his like-named neighbor Stasander, but this is not the best explanation. Oxyartes also did not participate in person, but sent a contingent under Androbazus instead. Stasanos, too, may have been unable or unwilling to leave his satrapy. Given the disturbances which had devastated the area before Stasanos's arrival, Bactria-Sogdiana could not long endure another lapse of leadership. Also interesting is the fact that not many troops were apparently spared from Bactria, since Stasander's forces (augmented by Bactrian settlers) were not so much greater than those from Arachosia or Parapamisadae. There was at the battle, stationed next to the Parapamisadae, a unit of 500 cavalry made up of Thracian colonists from the 'upper country'.²⁹ These are the only troops we may reasonably link to the Bactrian delegation, although others may have been brigaded with Stasander. With the partial

²⁸ Diodorus 19.14.6-8, where Eumenes' reinforcements number 18,700 infantry and 4,600 cavalry. This may be compared with the 35,000 infantry, 6,100 cavalry and 114 elephants deployed by Eumenes before the actual battle in autumn, 316. Diodorus 19.27.1-28.4. By the time of the battle, Sibyrtius had fled back to Arachosia because of a quarrel with Eumenes, but the Arachosian contingent remained with Eumenes under the command of Cephalon; Diodorus 19.23.4 and 19.27.4. There were no other changes among Eumenes' generals. On the battle as a whole, see A. M. Devine, "Diodorus' Account of the Battle of Paracetaene," *AntCl* 12 (1985): 75-86, as well as the sequel "Diodorus' Account of the Battle of Gabiene," *AntCl* 12 (1985): 87-96.

²⁹ Diodorus 19.27.5. The term 'upper country', which occurs again (see below, note 31), may be constructed to mean territories from Iran eastward to India; however, the use of the term in these passages seems quite specific and set apart from the satrapies already listed (Arachosia, Aria, Drangiana, Parthia, and India). Diodorus 18.7.1, as we have seen, uses this term to designate Bactria-Sogdiana in particular, and so it seems to be here. Although a number of Thracians had been settled in India by Alexander, they had

exception of Bactria-Sogdiana, Eumenes enjoyed the full military support of the satrapies east of Parthia.

The troops from Parthia, a thousand strong, participated on the side of Antigonus under command of Piton.³⁰ The only other eastern support for Antigonus, elephants excepted, came from 800 cavalry composed of colonists from the 'upper country'.³¹ This important fact reveals that Bactria-Sogdiana was indeed very much divided by feuds and factionalism, and that Alexander's old settlers fought on both sides of the Battle of Paracetaene. It also would explain the reluctance of Stasanos to leave his satrapy, and his inability to send a full contingent to Eumenes. No doubt, some seven years after their last revolt, many Greek settlers in Bactria-Sogdiana still sought a means of escaping their colonies. The struggles of western dynasts now offered to some that opportunity, although it was apparently no easy task to choose sides. It would seem that about equal numbers of mercenaries from Bactria-Sogdiana were arrayed on each side. This may account for the contemporary reference in Menander's *Samia* (v.799-801) which identifies Bactra (and, to the west, Caria) as a great center for hiring mercenaries. The ongoing mercenary crisis in Central Asia provides, in any case, ample reason for such a reference in an Athenian production of the period.³² By risking the hazards of service on one side or the other, the least happy and most troublesome of Alexander's remaining settlers were allowed to leave the Sogdian frontier at last.

The momentous struggle between Eumenes and Antigonus ended dismally. Like Perdicas earlier, Eumenes was betrayed. His plan to retreat to Bactria (a well-worn eastern practice) failed to stop Antigonus.³³ Antigonus' good fortune now made it possible for him to appoint his own eastern satraps, as he had earlier planned. Eumenes was executed, along with Eudamus (not Piton's brother, but the commander from India), and others who had opposed Antigonus.³⁴ Before appointing their successors, however, Antigonus also executed Piton on charges of sedition.³⁵ So ended the stormy career of this great opportunist of the east. Then, hailed as though "Lord of Asia", Antigonus

³⁰ Diodorus 19.29.2-3.

³¹ Diodorus 19.29.2.

³² P. Bernard, *Fouilles d'Al Khanaum IV*, pp. 129-130 with references. The Carians were well-known mercenaries in eastern service: Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, 1935, reprint ed., Chicago: Aris, 1975), p. 236. See below, note 41.

³³ Diodorus 19.43.6. The betrayal: Diodorus 19.43.7-9.

³⁴ Diodorus 19.44.1-2.

³⁵ To lure Piton, Antigonus offered him command of the 'upper satrapies'; Diodorus 19.46.

redistributed the eastern satrapies.³⁶ Eritus and then Evagoras replaced Stasander in Aria-Drangiana, while Eumenes' enemy Silytrius regained Arachosia from Cephalaon.³⁷ The Punjab of India was apparently ignored even though Eudamus and Porus were dead. More importantly, Stasenor and Oxyartes were allowed to remain as satraps in Bactria-Sogdiana and Parapamisadae respectively, although not because these had supported Antigonus. As Diodorus 19.48.1-2 plainly states, Stasenor and Oxyartes could not easily be removed because they had very successfully cultivated the support of those in their satrapies.³⁸ This fiery frontier had turned into a smelting pot, separating out the mercenaries by motive and mettle, and leaving behind a solid core committed to stay in the east.

During the earliest struggles of Alexander's successors, the far eastern satrapies had thus achieved a semi-independent political and military status of the type evident there from time to time during the Achaemenid era. Stasenor held firm control of Bactria, Oxyartes controlled Parapamisadae, and India soon passed into the hands of another (and greater) native ruler, Chandragupta Maurya.³⁹ Additional proof of the growing independence of this broad eastern region is provided by numismatic evidence. Several local issues of gold, silver, and bronze were struck in the names of independent satraps, including Sophytes and Vakhshavar, between 315 and 305 B.C.⁴⁰ It is impossible on the basis

³⁶ Diodorus 19.48.1-5; Plutarch, *Eumenes* 19.2. As pointed out by N. G. L. Hammond, "Alexander's Veterans After his Death," *GRBS* 25 (1984): 61, Antigonus sent the elite Silver Shields to another eastern Siberia—Arachosia under Silytrius—where they were to be kept out of trouble until gradually killed off. Note that this was the easternmost satrapy safely in Antigonus' power, and thus almost as good a place for eliminating troublemakers as Bactria and India had been for Alexander.

³⁷ See above, note 28.

³⁸ This certainly means the Greeks, and not the native Bactrians and Sogdians themselves. A hint of the conflicts still dividing these groups may be found in Porphyry, *De abstinentia* 4.21 where the Greek aversion to the 'devourer dogs' of Bactria stirred trouble for Stasenor. See also Strabo 11.11.3, (from Onesicritus). There is now archaeological evidence to prove that neither Alexander nor Stasenor was able to alter this native custom: P. Bernard, "Campagnes de fouilles 1976-1977 à Ai Khanoum (Afghanistan)," *CRAI* (1978): 440-441.

³⁹ Diodorus 19.48, Justin 15.4.12-14. The latter describes Chandragupta (Sandrocottus) as "Auctor libertatis" after the deaths of Porus and Eudamus. Chandragupta's ascendancy falls in this period between 316 B.C. and the arrival of Seleucus no later than 303 B.C.: Strabo 15.2.9; Appian, *Syr.* 55. For the disputed date of Seleucus' confrontation with Chandragupta, see Jakob Schibert, *Historische Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen in hellenistischer Zeit*, Historia Einzelschriften 10, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1967), p. 46 note 2, and H. Hauben, "A Royal Toast in 302 B.C.," *Ancient Society* 5 (1974): 109-111.

⁴⁰ M. Mitchiner, *Indo-Greek and Indo-Scythian Coinage*, vol. 1 (London: Hawkins Publications, 1975), pp. 23-24 (henceforth "Mitchiner I-G-I-S"); also, Bernard, *Fouilles d'Ai Khanoum IV*, pp. 27-28 with discussion of the historical problem and past scholarship.

of present evidence to determine whether this Sophytes somehow replaced Stasenor as satrap of Bactria-Sogdiana, or whether he ruled some neighboring region as an independent contemporary of Stasenor. His coinage, however, is generally attributed to a Bactrian mint on the basis of its distribution and its clear evolution from earlier, anonymous issues of Athena types with owl and eagle reverses.⁴¹ This entire series of bronze and silver issues shows a specifically regional development which was independent of the general trend in the west to imitate the coin-types of Alexander.⁴² These coins are a clear indication that satraps in or around Bactria were creating a local coinage for local needs, and the addition of Sophytes' name suggests increasing autonomy within an Achaemenid (rather than Greek) tradition.⁴³

The case of Vakhshavar is also significant, and would be more so if he were actually the satrap Oxyartes as boldly suggested by some numismatists.⁴⁴ The gold staters issued by him are rare, but they bear two very interesting types: a bust of the satrap in Persian dress with four-horse chariot reverse, and another having an Athena-type obverse with

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, and P. Bernard and O. Guillaume, "Monnaies inédites de la Bactriane grecque à Ai Khanoum (Afghanistan)," *RN* 22 (1980): 12-17, cf. F. Holt, "The Euthydemid Coinage of Bactria: Further Hoard Evidence from Ai Khanoum," *RN* 23 (1981): 13. The coins of Sophytes are quite striking pieces, showing not only the Greek language on them, but also the skills of Greek die-cutters. The reverse type has a strutting cock, and pictures Sophytes in ornate helmet, garlanded, with a high crest and wings sweeping down the cheek pieces. It is interesting in light of these features that Carian mercenaries were called "cocks" by the Persians because of their helmets: Plutarch, *Alexander*, 13. Sophytes could possibly have been a Carian mercenary captain who, like Athenodorus and others, became his own master as Macedonian power declined. It is less likely that he would be associated with a possible settlement of Carians at Cariaea, a town destroyed by Alexander as noted above in Part Three, note 94.

⁴² The striking of imitation Athenian 'owls' in Bactria during the earliest years of the Hellenistic period is not simply a result of Greek colonization in the area. It suggests, instead, a conscious attempt on the part of satraps such as Stasenor (and later Sophytes?) to provide a currency already familiar and acceptable to natives as well as newcomers. Pre-Alexandrian hoard evidence shows that Athenian 'owls' had become a mainstay of the Bactrian economy in the Achaemenid era: D. Schlumberger, "L'argent grec dans l'empire Achéménide," pp. 1-64 in R. Curjel and D. Schlumberger, *Trésors Monétaires d'Afghanistan*, MDAFA 14 (Paris: Klincksieck, 1953), to which add further evidence from H. Throell and W. Spengler, "A Hoard of Early Greek Coins from Afghanistan," *ANSMN* 15 (1969): 1-19.

⁴³ Persian satraps occasionally placed their own names on satrapal issues, and this practice did not end with Alexander's *anabasis*: A. R. Bellinger, *Essays on the Coinage of Alexander the Great*, Numismatic Studies 11 (New York: ANS, 1963), p. 60. See also Mitchiner, *I-G-I-S*, pp. 13 and 15 for some examples (Mazaeus, Sabakes, Mazabazus). Such coins were circulated in Bactria; issues of Menon, Phrodratus, Tiribazus, Pharnabazus, Datames, and Mazaeus were found in the Oxus hoard (1877): see A. R. Bellinger, "The Coins from the Treasury of the Oxus," *ANSMN* 10 (1962): 51-67. Also represented were the coins (and a signet ring) of the satrap Vakhshavar, who is discussed below.

⁴⁴ See Allotte de la Fuye, "Monnaies incertaines de la Sogdiane et des contrées voisines," *RN* 14 (1910): 281-333; and Mitchiner, *I-G-I-S*, pp. 9 and 24.

winged Nike on the reverse.⁴⁵ These coins show, therefore, a mixture of Achaemenid characteristics along with those Greek types already familiar in this region. Furthermore, the issue in Vakhshavar's own name suggests a growing political as well as economic independence. This conclusion is reinforced by the persistence of a local coinage, especially the traditional punch-marked silver, in India and perhaps Arachosia as well.⁴⁶ Altogether, the numismatic evidence clearly supports the literary sources regarding the growing independence of eastern rulers, Greek and native, within their own provinces.⁴⁷

The split between east and west was therefore widening. As Oxyartes and the others gained their liberty from Macedonian rule during the all-consuming battles for power in the west, Roxane and Alexander IV lost theirs to the very same process. Olympias had groomed the boy for Macedonian kingship, and she even assassinated her grandson's rival, Philip III Arrhidaios, in 317 B.C. during a bloody purge.⁴⁸ Then she, too, was captured and condemned for her crimes by the ambitious general Cassander, who promptly locked up Roxane and Alexander IV and stripped the boy of his royal titles.⁴⁹ Guarded in the citadel at Amphipolis in northern Greece, Oxyartes' daughter waited out with her son the last agonies of Alexander's legacy. The royal dynasty of Macedonia had been winnowed to one, Alexander IV, but that was one too many for many of the generals. In 311/310 B.C., Cassander ordered the assassination of Roxane and Alexander IV; their bodies were hidden away.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Mitchiner, *IG I-S*, p. 24 (attributed to a mint at Kapisia); see Bernard, *Fouilles d'Al Khanoum IV*, pp. 32-35.

⁴⁶ For examples and discussion, see Mitchiner, *IG I-S*, pp. 10 and 25-27.

⁴⁷ It should be noted that the gold and silver coinages minted in Parthia and bearing the name of Andragoras may also fall in this period. There is much debate, however, on this issue; Andragoras may be the Seleucid satrap defeated by Arsaces in the mid-third century B.C. (Justin 41.4). For a summary of various (inconclusive) numismatic arguments, see Mitchiner, *IG I-S*, p. 8, where these coins are dated from 315 to 312 B.C.; but J. Wolski, "Le problème d'Andragoras," *Éphémérides Institut Archéologique Bulgarie* 16 (1950): 111-114 considers the tradition of this early Andragoras to be a Parthian invention to connect their power to Alexander's age. Wolski's argument is not convincing, and the matter must be considered unresolved in spite of ongoing debate; cf. L. Robert, "Une inscription hellénistique d'Iran," *Hellenica* 11/12 (1960): 85-91 (mentioning an Andragoras) and J. Wolski, "Andragoras, étaire-Il iranien ou grec?" *Studia Iranica* 4 (1975): 159-169.

⁴⁸ Diodorus 19.11.1-9.

⁴⁹ Diodorus 19.35.1-19.36.6; 19.49.1-19.52.6. See W. Heckel, "IG II² 561 and the Status of Alexander IV," *ZPE* 40 (1980): 249-250 for evidence of these honors.

⁵⁰ Diodorus 19.105.1-4. In a rather dramatic development, one of these bodies may now have been found. At Vergina (ancient Aegae), archaeologist Manolis Andronikos has unearthed several royal Macedonian tombs. One unlabeled grave is that of either Philip II or Philip III; the other belonged to a teen-aged youth. Even Andronikos has cautiously acknowledged that the evidence points to a single conclusion—these are the

The murder of Alexander IV and Roxane demonstrates how thoroughly the ambitions of Alexander's generals overshadowed their commitment to the great king's plans and progeny. If Alexander did dream of mixing east and west into one world government, it is certainly beyond question that his generals—and most others of his generation—did not.⁵¹ Except in isolated cases of expedience or exploitation, there was never a union of Central Asia and Macedonia even in the marriage of Alexander to Roxane. The Greeks left in the east made their way as best they could according to local conditions, just as the Sogdian Roxane and her son did for a much shorter time in the west.

The Lengthening Trail

The way was cleared by these cataclysms for new conquests and new kings. Cassander, Ptolemy, Antigonos and others were free to claim royalty and to "control thereafter the lands under their power like kingdoms conquered in a war".⁵² In the east, the new Alexander was Seleucus Nicator, a Macedonian whose dynasty leads us to the next step (and so next study) along the trail left by Agathocles. For now, it may be said that Seleucus would twice follow in the footsteps of Alexander, and perpetuate some of the same political and military patterns set forth here. Between 308 and 305 B.C., he took power in Bactria in a fairly unobtrusive way; later, after 293 B.C., he embarked upon a second (and more unsettling) phase of royal control through extensive Greek colonization.⁵³ Seleucus' own *imperium Macedonicum* in Asia⁵⁴ was not simply inherited by blood from Alexander; it was claimed and won just as Alex-

cremated remains of Alexander IV; see now Andronikos' 'interim' report, *Vergina. The Royal Tombs and the Ancient City* (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon, 1984). The tomb, of course, is thoroughly Macedonian.

⁵¹ The point is driven home by R. M. Errington, "Alexander in the Hellenistic World," pp. 136-179 in E. Badian, ed. *Alexandrie le Grand*.

⁵² Diodorus 19.105.4.

⁵³ On these and subsequent events in Seleucid history, consult the following works: Édouard Will, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique (323-30 av. J.-C.)*, 2 vols. (Nancy, 1966 and 1967; 2nd ed. 1979-81); É. Will, C. Mossé, and P. Goukowsky, *Le Monde grec et l'orient*, Vol. II: *Le IV^e siècle et l'époque hellénistique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1975); and C. Préaux, *Le Monde hellénistique: La Grèce et l'orient de la mort d'Alexandre à la conquête romaine de la Grèce*, 2 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978). Will's *Histoire politique* has been updated in his contribution ("Livres III: Le Monde Hellenistique," in Will, Mossé, and Goukowsky *Le Monde grec et l'orient*, vol. II (cited above), and this will be cited hereafter as Will, *Le Monde Grec*., which includes references to the earlier work. For major works in English, see Part One, note 23; Will's contribution to the new *CAH* volume is partly a translation of sections in his *Histoire politique*.

⁵⁴ See Charles Edson, "Imperium Macedonicum: The Seleucid Empire and the Literary Evidence," *CPh* 53 (1958): 153-170.

ander's had been from Darius. Thus, by arms and *emulatio*, Seleucus fit the mold to which his king and commander had once conformed and so followed—at least in part—the ancient patterns of the past.⁵⁵ Seleucus, for example, marched out of Mesopotamia to suppress the 'rebellious' satraps of the east.⁵⁶ He was inaugurating a new era for himself and for his family; but, the *anabasis* itself was merely old business in the long history of Bactria-Sogdiana.

The details of Seleucus' wars in the east are sadly lost, like so much else of significance in Hellenistic history. It is clear that Seleucus was basically successful in Bactria, though he did have to fight his foes, whether *Sisianor*, Sophytes, or others, are not named.⁵⁷ His success is not easily explained since his own army was small, but it was probably achieved as much by diplomacy and propaganda as by arms.⁵⁸ Now an enemy of Antigonos, Seleucus was mustering eastern support in the same way as Eumenes a few years earlier, and with similar success. Seleucus, too, did not have the same political handicaps as Pithon, and actually enjoyed at least one unique advantage over all others (except Alexander) who had previously sought favor in Bactria-Sogdiana. Seleucus was the only Macedonian not to repudiate the Oriental marriage arranged for him by Alexander.⁵⁹ Furthermore, his wife Apama was the daughter of the great Sogdian rebel Spitamenes, and she certainly served for Seleucus the same political function in the east as Alexander's Sogdian wife Roxane. For such reasons as these, it was possible for Seleucus to challenge successfully the satrap of Bactria, whose military resources were certainly limited after the years of unrest in this satrapy.

⁵⁵ For a convincing discussion of Seleucus' conscious imitation of Alexander in the east, see P. Goukowsky, *Mythe d'Alexandre*, vol. I, pp. 125-131.

⁵⁶ See H. Seyrig, "Seleucus I et la fondation de la monarchie syrienne," *Syria* 47 (1970): 290; J. Wolski, "L'effondrement de la domination des Séleucides en Iran au III^e siècle av. J.C.," *Bulletin Internationale de l'Académie Polonaise des Sciences et Lettres* 5 (1947): 13-69; R. A. Hadley, "Royal Propaganda of Seleucus I and Lysimachus," *JHS* 94 (1974): 50-65. Appian, *Syr.* 54-55 suggests that Seleucus marched east in response to a 'revolt'.

⁵⁷ Some claim that the Bactrians "cheerfully submitted" to Seleucus, but this is an out-dated notion, at least as old as the pioneer studies of the nineteenth century: A. Cunningham, *Coins of Alexander's Successors in the East* (London, 1884; reprint ed., Chicago: Argonaut, 1969), pp. 7-8. The sources are clear: Diod. 19.92; Justin 15.4.11 ("Bactrianos expugnavit"); Appian, *Syr.* 54-55.

⁵⁸ Appian, *Syr.* 55, comments upon Seleucus' skillful use of persuasion as well as force. Goukowsky, *Mythe d'Alexandre*, pp. 125-131 has emphasized the effectiveness of Seleucus' propaganda (again, patterned after Alexander's). See also R. Hadley, "Hieronymus of Cardia and Early Seleucid Mythology," *Hesperia* 18 (1969): 142-152; and Hadley, "Seleucus, Dionysus, or Alexander?" *NC* (1974): 9-13.

⁵⁹ Apama, daughter of Spitamenes himself; Appian 7.4.6. The marriage had been arranged by Alexander at Susa, and Seleucus made the most of it; in fact, several cities

Alexander had learned at great cost that success in Bactria did not necessarily bring success in Sogdiana. This proved to be the case for Seleucus as well, and it seems so for similar reasons. It has been shown that Alexander's conquest of Sogdiana was never really completed, so that local concessions (and a Sogdian bride) were used to extricate Alexander for campaigns elsewhere. The king marched on, but the fighting continued until the first of the settlers' revolts. Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that Alexander's artificial 'march state' survived on the Sogdian frontier, and the effort to reimpose it was probably beyond the abilities (if not the interests) of subsequent satraps in Bactria.

During his early *anabasis*, Seleucus also had to extricate himself from his eastern campaigns in order to hurry west for the great showdown with Antigonos at Ipsus in 301 B.C.⁶⁰ He did not have the necessary time and resources to subdue either Sogdians or Scythians, and so probably reached some diplomatic agreement with the Sogdian nobility just as he did with the Mauryan ruler in India. This latter diplomatic exchange between Seleucus and Chandragupta Maurya reveals precisely the general policy pursued by Seleucus in the east. With economy of military commitment and a growing concern for matters elsewhere, Seleucus accepted a token submission from Chandragupta: the Macedonian received five hundred war elephants and recognized Chandragupta's control of the easternmost satrapies, those south of the Hindu Kush. A marriage alliance completed the compromise.⁶¹ This settlement is considered by some scholars to reflect the earlier agreement between Alexander and Porus.⁶² The similarities are striking, and the renewal of this treaty by Antiochus the Great a century later shows that it was a permanent as well as practical solution.⁶³

⁶⁰ Justin 15.4; Appian, *Syr.* 54-55; Strabo 15.2.9; Diod. 19.92 and 20.12. For Ipsus, consult B. Bar-Kochva, *The Seleucid Army* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 105-110.

⁶¹ Appian, *Syr.* 55; Strabo 15.2.9 (724); Justin 15.4.21. For discussion, see the following: F. Schwarz, "Die Griechen und die Maurya-Dynastie," in F. Altheim and R. Stiehl, *Griechische Mitteilungen in Asien* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970), pp. 267-316; H. Scharf, "The Maurya Dynasty and the Seleucids," *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung* 85 (1971): 211-225; J. Seibert, *Historische Beiträge*, pp. 46-48; Bernard, *Fondation de l'Khanum IV*, pp. 85-95; and Allan Dahlquist, *Mitteilungen und Indian Religion. A Study in Motives and Types* (Uppsala, 1962; reprint ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977).

⁶² See H. Scharf, "The Maurya Dynasty," pp. 217-218.

⁶³ Will, *Le Monde grec*, pp. 376-381. The treaty concluded between Seleucus and Chandragupta included a guarantee of consubstantial rights. This agreement seems to protect the rights of children produced (past or future) by mixed marriages of Greeks and natives. This no doubt reflects the union of Greeks and natives during the decades following Alexander's invasion; see Diodorus 19.32.3-19.34.6 for a clear example involving polygamy and *suttee*.

The areas which came under Mauryan control (India, Parapanisadae, and Arachosia) were recognized *de facto* and *de jure* as semi-independent by all Seleucid kings from Seleucus I to Antiochus III. This political condition was no more than the natural culmination of a process well underway in Alexander's lifetime. This evolution took place, moreover, with the active participation of a substantial number of Greek colonists alongside the native population. In other words, the growth of Mauryan power did not require the explosion or extermination of all Greek settlers. Those unable or unwilling to adapt to local conditions and native rule were purged in the violent years of the early Hellenistic period; those who remained became as much a part of the area's growing independence from Macedonian rule as Chandragupta himself.

This political and cultural development was quite pronounced in Arachosia, especially in the vicinity of Khandahar. Recent archaeological and epigraphic discoveries have revealed a surprisingly strong Greek presence there under Mauryan rule. The evidence includes the Greek votive inscription of the son of a certain Arisonax, dated to the early third century B.C.⁶⁴ The existence of bilingual inscriptions (including combinations of Greek, Aramaic, and Prakrit) erected nearby by the Mauryan king Asoka (ca. 268-234 B.C.) are especially important because they confirm the presence there of educated Greeks willing to cooperate with Asoka's move to control the area and to promote Buddhism throughout his empire.⁶⁵

Eastern independence, therefore, did not entail the exclusion of Greeks from the cultural and political development of these areas under native rule. Those settlers south of the Hindu Kush once unwilling to rule the natives were now displaced by those willing to be ruled by them. Although that transformation had been a traumatic one for the east, events unfolded in direct response to Alexander's policies. Many of these areas had not been subdued by the Macedonian king, but left under local control. Seleucus followed the lead of Alexander here, except for col-

⁶⁴ P. M. Fraser, "The Son of Arisonax at Khandahar," *Afghan Studies* 2 (1979): 9-21. Fraser's interpretation of the text is problematic, and he takes this inscription to mean that the area was still under direct Seleucid control. This argument is unconvincing in light of Asoka's bilingual inscriptions set up there soon thereafter. See also A. N. Oikonomides, "The Territories of Alexander the Great at Alexandria in Arachosia," *ZPE* 56 (1984): 143-147.

⁶⁵ See the excellent analysis of the relevant inscriptions and other evidence, plus a persuasive rebuttal to the theories of Schoder and others, by P. Bernard, *Fonilles d'Afghanistan I*, pp. 85-95. On continued diplomatic contact between the Mauryan and Seleucid empires, see Ashmuneis 14 652-653 and the careers of ambassadors Daimachos and Megasthenes in E. Oikonomides, *Prosopographie der hellenistischen Königsdynastien*, vol. 1 (Leuven: Studia Hellenistica, 1973), 171-172.

onization, and so the former enjoyed a measure of success more useful than his elephants: there were no Indian wars.

It should not be surprising, therefore, that a similar situation should develop in neighboring satrapies under similar historical circumstances. Thus, in Bactria-Sogdiana, where local independence evolved less quickly and under Greek rather than native leadership, the results were still much the same by the end of the fourth century B.C. Intern marriage must have become commonplace and, as already noted, a local economy had been fostered by regional coinages. Much of this Seleucus had to leave as he found it, though he did not *cede* this satrapy. He asked for nominal rule, and apparently won it almost as easily as Alexander against his rival Bessus. For the moment, the process had come full circle because Seleucus had neither the time nor the troops to re-colonize the Sogdian frontier. A decade later, however, he did so, using his son as 'viceroys' in the east with several fine generals and scores of fresh soldier-settlers.⁶⁶

This 'reconquest' and re-colonization of Sogdiana would in time produce the same problems for Seleucus and his successors as the artificial 'march state' had for Alexander and his satraps. Alexander's frontier cities, resettled by Seleucus after 293 B.C., would again stir up Sogdians and Scythians and eventually lead once more to weakened Macedonian control. Meanwhile, between these wars of colonization, between the reigns of conquering Macedonians, the Greeks and 'barbarians' learned that they could live together—if not as equals, at least not as adversaries. The result would be an autonomous Graeco-Bactrian kingdom ruled by men like Agathocles/Agathuklayasa. But all of that is another story stretching well beyond the turbulent age of Alexander, beyond the fiery formation of a Greek frontier among the natives of Central Asia, and beyond the first step of that tantalizing trail marked out for us by a few coins from Afghanistan.

⁶⁶ On Seleucid colonization in general, see G. Cohen, *The Seleucid Colonies: Studies in Foundation, Administration and Organization*, Historia Einzelschriften 30 (Wiesbaden: Franz Schöner Verlag, 1978). The whole subject of Seleucid rule in Central Asia will be considered in a future study. There the Greek cultural legacy in the east will be explored at length in light of the fuller archaeological evidence for the third century B.C.

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